

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URBAN HERITAGE AND THE POLITICS OF THE PRESENT

Perspectives from the Middle East

Edited by Mona Fawaz

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Introduction
City Debates 2005: Urban Heritage and the Politics of the Present: Perspectives from the Middle East

Mona Fawaz

As I write this introductory note for the second proceedings of City Debates, Israeli bombs pour down on Lebanon's heritage sites. In fact, entire neighborhoods have been obliterated in Tyre and Baalbeck, two cities discussed in the City Debates 2005 panels. From this vantage point, heritage preservation seems to be a luxury, as life itself becomes threatened. Yet, our insistence to remember the value of heritage and the built environment has impelled us to continue working on the publication of the series, knowing this latest Israeli assault will eventually end and that Lebanon's postwar reconstruction planning agenda will again resume its vital work for the next coming years. It is thus our hope that the critical investigations offered by City Debates 2005 in the local and regional practices of urban heritage preservation and their significance to the fields of urban planning and design at large will be of much value in guiding the country through Lebanon's renewed phase of reconstruction.

The critical evaluation of the fifteen years of postwar reconstruction after the end of the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990) was among the most widely discussed issues in the Department of Architecture and Design in 2005. That year, the City Debates Series sought to investigate urban heritage preservation, knowing that local authorities as well as international organizations and donors had prioritized this item on the reconstruction's agenda. In that vein, City Debates 2005 first sought to document projects that had been initiated under the broad concept of *urban heritage* (e.g., preservation, conservation, adaptive reuse, and revitalization). The 2005 series attempted to examine the practice and context of those projects, investigating how issues of heritage ownership are dealt with by addressing questions such as; Who is heritage for? To whom is it significant? How are decisions taken to preserve a building or an urban quarter? What are the implications of such decisions for local and national economies?

The second goal of City Debates 2005 was to problematize the framework under which the urban heritage projects have been conceived. Panelists addressed the cultural and political dimensions of urban heritage projects in relation to history and its active interpretations, probing questions about how romanticized versions of history are created, whether through the "museumification" of urban monuments or urban quarters or the circulation of particular images of tradition (and hence the re-invention of tradition).

Finally, panelists investigated the impact of the economic/tourist dimension of urban heritage projects in relation to the "commodification" of urban quarters.

City Debates 2005 ran over the course of four weeks, during the month of April 2005. It included four panels and brought together twelve speakers and four other discussants who launched active debates. Each of the panels was designed to raise a particular aspect of urban heritage preservation. They are described below.

Global Forces, Local Claims

Wednesday, April 6. The panel investigated the tension between the global historic preservation agenda, often fostered by international donors and the embeddedness of monuments in local historical and social contexts. The debate was inaugurated by Oliver Kögler, who drew an overarching framework for the heritage debate, describing four general values generally ascribed to heritage (artistic, socio-political, economic, and academic) and evaluating the heritage preservation efforts in Beirut against those values (the two reviewed projects were the reconstruction of the Beirut Central District and the work of APSAD in preserving the Pericentral Districts in Beirut). Kögler argued that the economic value of heritage has been systematically prioritized in Lebanon's preservation strategies, often at the expense of others.

It was next the turn of the department's chair, Howayda Al-Harithy, to argue for the need to depart from heritage preservation as promoted by international donors and to develop new approaches that look at "urban fabric" rather than individual buildings and respect the local claims made on such fabrics. Al-Harithy's argument was partially built on a critical investigation of the World Bank's rehabilitation of the city of Tripoli (Lebanon), triggering Omar Razzaz, the country manager of the World Bank Lebanon Office and the final speaker on this panel, to abandon his prepared paper and propose instead a counter-argument to Al-Harithy, showing the necessity to balance local and expert visions of heritage and to account for the devastating forces of the market when heritage is only left to local communities.

Emerging State Initiatives

Tuesday, April 12, 6:30 pm. This panel sought to document and investigate public initiatives in urban heritage preservation. The panel began with Rami Daher's investigation of public practices in heritage preservation in Jordan. Daher argued that Jordan is adopting a new and direct role in subsidizing what he called large-scale real estate investments for business elite and multinational corporations. His discussion judiciously followed on the previous week's discussion, criticizing what he called "preservation recipes" adopted by international donors who are insensitive to local differences and showing the linkages between such practices and public policies. He illustrated his claims with examples of secondary cities in Jordan (e.g., Salt) and Lebanon (e.g., Saida and Tripoli), as well as the Abdali downtown development project in Jordan and the Solidere project in Lebanon. The second paper brought an insider's view on public practices in urban heritage projects, since the speaker, Nabil Itani, has been directly involved with the joint World Bank/Council for Development and Reconstruction Cultural Heritage and Urban Development Project (CHUD) for several years. By describing locally adequate and applicable building regulations for the old

cities included in the CHUD projects, Itani brought to life the difficulties and intricacies involved in these endeavors. Sylvia Shorto wrapped up the panel with an art historian's eloquent call for the importance of heritage preservation as an ongoing part of discourse formation, since buildings, she argued, are part of the material culture that assumes an important role in any present interpretation of the past. Using the late nineteenth-century summer settlement of Ain Sofar in Mount Lebanon as a case study, her paper explored ways that preservation might occur, showing that aside from preservation by legislation and by voluntary action, one should acknowledge that preservation often happens by default. Her comments thus raised important questions to policymakers interested in preservation and what the role of the State should be in such conditions.

The Politics of the Present

Wednesday, April 20. This panel sought to investigate the importance of preservation and its intertwining in the politics of the present. A recurrent theme among all three panelists was the notion of "recreating the past," which they all agreed to be a project of the present rather than a "resurrection" of the past. Both Ayfer Bartu Candan and Simone Ricca looked at how the past becomes a contested entity that is negotiated and even recreated within the politics of the present. Taking the example of Istanbul Bartu Candan examined the case of the preservation and revitalization of the first "Europeanized" neighborhood of the city, Pera/Beyoğlu, showing how different readings of the past informed and shaped the present debates over cultural heritage, eventually transforming this heritage into a site of struggle between local and global claims. Adding to this debate, Ricca argued that in the case of Israel, heritage is a political product of the present rather than a legacy of the past. Building on a case study of the Jewish Quarter reconstruction in Jerusalem, Ricca described how a large-scale heritage planning project was designed to 'create' a mythic, ancient/modern Jewish Jerusalem which is otherwise inexistent. The revival of the past into mythical futures was also the subject of Walid Sadek's inquiries. In his paper, Sadek sought to highlight the place of the present in this endeavor. Building on a parallel between the Bible's account of the resurrection of Lazarus and a billboard displayed in Beirut downtown during the first years of its reconstruction and depicting an imagined Beirut of the future, Sadek argued that heritage preservation is often used as a way to halt necessary negotiations of what the present is and what the future can be by claiming the resurrection of a pre-existing "past" which is brought back as is. To avoid this, he added, we need to acknowledge that the resurrection of the past is impossible and it is better to integrate heritage preservation in negotiations of the present and the future.

Heritage in Practice

Tuesday, April 26. The final session was engaged directly with the practice of heritage preservation. Two practicing architects, George Arbid and Omar Abdulaziz Hallaj, brought their experiences to the debates. Arbid argued for the need to learn from recent architectural production, notably modern architecture that has been widely neglected in preservation efforts. He took the audience on a photographic journey of modern architecture, including disfigured and demolished buildings, hoping

to convince listeners of the necessity to protect this heritage. Hallaj's presentation provided a reflective statement on the effect of preservation strategies adopted by international organizations. Taking the example of Aleppo (Syria) and Shibam (Yemen), which were both designated as World Heritage sites in the 1980s, Hallaj showed how such classifications intervened in the economic cycles, as well as the way the two sites are used and valued by their users and stakeholders. Finally, Stephan Weber, whose paper unfortunately is not included, dwelled on the concept of authenticity in private rehabilitation projects, looking at the restoration of old houses in Damascus.

For the purpose of this publication, we asked the speakers to submit the papers they presented and left it to them to choose the format they wished to adopt. In some cases, papers were already published in other venues; we thus opted to print a revised version of the transcription and to refer readers to the main paper. Others chose to develop and update their papers in an academic format. Only one speaker declined to present his paper. We also requested discussants, whenever possible, to provide us with their main comments on the sessions. These are printed below.

In concluding, I would like to extend my gratitude to all those who helped in the making of City Debates 2005. The publication is indeed a collaborative effort involving faculty and students in the Department of Architecture and Design, notably its graduate Urban Planning and Urban Design programs, as well as the scholars who participated in the debate series. I thank them all for the interest, time, and energy they contributed in the debates series, particularly those who agreed to travel to Beirut for the occasion. Huge thanks should be extended to Sirine Salam and especially to Rania Ghosn, who took charge of the debate series throughout the month of April 2005, when I was unable to attend to my responsibilities. In addition, the graduate students of the MUPP/MUD program rose to the occasion, appropriating the organization of the event and making it very much their own. Particularly, Nadine Khayat, Rana Andraos, and Fadi Shayya actively took part in the institutional organization of the series, as well as did Youssef Azzam, Hanadi Samhane, Nancy Hilal, Amr Saeddedine, Doris Summer, and Karim Eid-Sabbagh. Colleagues in the Department of Architecture and Design who were key to the making of City Debates 2005, Mona Harb and Howayda Al-Harithy, provided valuable advice. Steve Campbell facilitated the initial discussions surrounding the choice of topics, and several agreed to present papers in the series. Finally, Nadine Kobayter and Lara Captan designed the beautiful poster for the series.

The publication could not have been possible without the helpful advice of Professor Leila Musfy, and I thank her warmly for sharing her professional experience. For work on the publication, I thank Rima Abou Chakra, and Mary Choueiter for taking charge of the graphic design and Nancy Hilal for patiently transcribing the recording of the debates. I also want to acknowledge the promptness and efficiency of Sally Kaya in the American University of Beirut's Publications Office. Finally, I would like to thank the Office of the Dean of Engineering and Architecture for the financial support that made this publication possible.

1 Global Forces, Local Claims

Postwar Heritage Projects in Beirut: Perspectives from Human Geography

Oliver Kögler

Oliver Kögler completed his PhD in Geography at the University of Heidelberg in 2005. In his thesis, titled "Urban Cultural Heritage Preservation in Postwar Lebanon," Kögler focuses on the renovation of historic buildings in the Beirut Central District, the failed attempts by governmental institutions to protect historic buildings in the Pericentral districts of Beirut, and the rehabilitation of the historic city centers in Baalbeck, Tripoli, Byblos, Sidon, and Tyre. The interpretation of the case studies investigates three levels of urban cultural heritage preservation and interprets the interplay of the public, private, and civic protagonists.

Between 2001 and 2004, Kögler participated in the Zokak el-Blat Research Project of the German Orient Institute. Earlier research experiences include a diploma thesis in geography (2001), examining stakeholders and conflicts related to the preservation of the historic city of Sana'a, Yemen.

In this paper, I want to examine two major postwar heritage projects in Beirut; one in the Beirut Central District, the other in the directly adjacent quarters, the so-called Pericentral Districts. The paper will be structured into three parts. First, I will describe the theoretical framework of my analysis, which is based on recent approaches used in cultural and political geography. I will do this by identifying four general values of urban cultural heritage. In part two, I will describe the efforts made to protect historic buildings in Beirut and their results, one in the Beirut Central District and the other in the directly adjacent quarters. Part three then summarizes the extent to which the four described values are visible in the urban landscape.

Four General Values of Urban Cultural Heritage

The first value of urban cultural heritage is a very general and more or less artistic one. Often, the unique and admirable architectural styles of historic buildings are simply seen as a universal heritage, an outstanding example of the cultural production of humankind that must be preserved as such. Along this line of thought, the UNESCO describes the common qualities of the very different forms of world heritage as

"These cultural and natural sites constitute [...] a common heritage, to be treasured as unique testimonies to an enduring past. Their disappearance would be an irreparable loss for each and every one of us".[1] This is, of course, a more or less naive idea, but it is often used to justify the various attempts to preserve built heritage, and its importance should not be underestimated.

The second value is a socio-political one. Here, urban cultural heritage is used to preserve or reinvent a certain identity. These identities can take many forms and range from ethnic, post-colonial, or class to other specific local identities that often exist in resistance to other more dominant identities, such as colonial, globalized, or commercialized identities.

In this regard, often academics, possibly active in conservation practice themselves, have a very clear idea that urban cultural heritage protection should not be used as a tourist attraction and a commodification, but as a tool to resist the homogenizing forces of consumerism and globalization. The Jordanian architect Rami Daher gives a clear example when he writes:

> "The cultural heritage of a particular region should be seen as a source of inspiration for future generations and as a means for resisting globalization and commodification of the built and social environments. Proper heritage conservation has been seen by many sociologists, anthropologists, and geographers as a counterforce to cycles of capital accumulation expressed in many new developments."[2]

But there is not only the idea of maintaining one singular identity. There is also that dealing with all the issues would generate a profound discussion about the identities to be preserved and give all the different identities the right to be expressed in the landscape, thus helping society grapple with a difficult history. "The memory of stones", to use Jad Tabet's phrase,[3] therefore, would not only be used to support certain identities, but also to build stable societies.

The third value of urban cultural heritage is clearly economic; especially in postmodern societies, when "difference" has become an important economic asset. In urbanism, this has found its most obvious expression in postmodern architecture aimed at producing unique buildings. But it is also expressed in the use of existing local architecture and traditions, which can provide a "distinction" and can help to promote and sell a city. Therefore, urban cultural heritage preservation is also seen as an important contribution to the economic development of a city, a region, or a country. The former leader of the World Bank, John Wolfensohn, refers to this trend by saying:

> "For too long the range of values provided by culture attributes and artefacts has not been recognized – their role in job creation, social cohesion, tourism, and so on. Cultural preservation and renewal is not a luxury good, something to be done later. It is a productive sector."[4]

The fourth value is an academic one. Here, urban cultural heritage is predominantly used by architects, historians, and art historians as a rare testimony of a specific society

and culture in the past. But historic buildings can also be used to analyse present societies. There are indeed a number of very different functions and related identities that can be communicated by urban cultural heritage preservation. And, of course, there is never only one single identity at work, but many different identities that struggle for expression in the urban landscape. As we human geographers learned from Doreen Massey, "places do not have single, unique 'identities'; they are full of internal conflict: a conflict over what its past has been, conflict over its present development, conflict over what could be its future".[5] As a result, different political, economic, and cultural needs determine how cultural heritage, its definition, and preservation are handled.

From an academic viewpoint, that means that we can also establish an understanding of these undermining needs and of the power-relations between them by analysing how urban cultural heritage is in fact is handled. Based on this line of thought, I will now examine two greatly differing attempts to preserve the built heritage of Beirut.

Postwar Heritage Projects in Beirut

Beirut Central District

Our first case study is the reconstruction of the Beirut Central District, under the control of the private company Solidere. Before even Solidere came into existence, the private consulting agency, Dar al Handasah, prepared a study on the reconstruction of the Beirut Central District. This 1991 study saw the demolition of most of the buildings extant to this period. Only a few buildings located almost exclusively in the Place L'Étoile and Foch-Allenby area were meant to be preserved, forming a so-called "historic city core." This step was justified by the poor condition of the buildings and the general need for modern reconstruction after the civil war.[6]

Along with many other aspects of the founding of Solidere and the expropriation of all private holdings and the eviction of all inhabitants, the massive demolition of the existing built structures provoked immense criticism from the public and the media. The sociologist Nabil Beyhoum described the ensuing discussion as "the first public debate since the beginning of the war and the first on urban matters in Lebanon's history"[7]. Academics and heritage groups, in particular, strongly opposed the plans to erase the majority of the built structures, fearing an architectural amnesia. And the planners picked up this critique. Later, Gavin and Maluf wrote:

> "To most people, the early plans seemed grandiose and unfamiliar. The plan projected a vision of a new city, a grand and somewhat foreign vision. [...] to many, these visual images had little to do with the traditional urban fabric of Beirut."[8]

So, in the final masterplan that was approved by the Lebanese government in 1992, the number of retained buildings increased from around 190 to slightly over 300 buildings. The additional buildings were mainly concentrated in the areas of Saifi and Wadi Abu Jamil, which were meant to become additional residential areas within a historic setting. It has to be said, though, that still only a minority of the existing buildings from 1991 were foreseen for preservation, while the majority was demolished in the following years until 1998.[9]

Fig 1 Renovation works in the Beirut Central District

Fig 2 Historic buildings reduced to their street-front facade

Fig 3 Rebuilding heritage homes in the Beirut Central District

Fig 4 Neo-traditional buildings in Saifi Village

Fig 5 Historic buildings in the Pericentral Districts waiting for demolition

In order to preserve the "historic character" in the retained neighborhoods, a detailed masterplan from 1994 designated so-called "special policy areas", whereby construction would be regulated by very specific provisions. The designation of "special policy areas" to preserve the historic character of an area was not conceived only within the framework of Solidere, but was already foreseen in the renewed urban planning laws of 1983.

These provisions led to a very special kind of restoration of historic buildings. While the facades were restored in detail, the interiors of the buildings were dramatically transformed to meet the needs of the future inhabitants and the high norms of Solidere. As a result, the renovations ranged from extensive restoration of the given structures, to the complete demolition of building interiors, while keeping the facades intact, to the reduction of the "historic" building to its street front façade. There were also a couple of buildings that were totally destroyed, but rebuilt in the original style.[10] As a result, it became increasingly difficult to distinguish between a historic building and a new one, especially given the additional number of buildings built in the neo-traditional style, as are especially found in Saifi Village. (Figure 1-4)

We can see that the handling of urban cultural heritage within the Beirut Central District did not clearly focus on preserving the given structures as a witness of the unique production of humankind, or as a tool for dealing with a difficult history. Instead, the planners of Solidere almost exclusively focused on the economic function of urban cultural heritage, in which the unique and beautiful facades were used to promote the city. This focus on economic value was also expressed by the use of the buildings as a setting for a vibrant dining and clubbing area and for high-end retail, office, and residential buildings. And the planners of Solidere also clearly expressed what they expected from preserving the urban cultural heritage within its boundaries: "The preservation of Beirut's unique cultural and historic identity will reflect favourably upon the city's status as it competes against others in the Middle East and the eastern Mediterranean for an international role and prominence."[11] The important factor was to attract international tourists, money, and companies. Consequently, considerable effort was made to preserve the old houses and promote the unique and traditional character of the new-old city center on the local, as well as on the global scale.

For example, a print advertisement that was widely distributed in 2002 described Saifi Village as a "unique residential quarter, designed in traditional Lebanese style". Honestly enough, the commercial doesn't show any historic or traditional building, but rather its postmodern, neo-traditional imitators. Still, the commercial somehow gives the impression that Saifi Village will be a historic residential quarter, although only a minority of its buildings today in fact have been built before 1945. References to history and tradition can also be found extensively on the company's webpages or in its quarterly and annual reports. Additionally, Solidere publishes extremely well-designed, eye-catching coffee-table books that describe how well the built heritage is being preserved during the reconstruction process.[12]

Also, in academic conferences, such as the City Debates in 2002, Solidere's representatives claim that the Beirut Central District will soon be the only area left in Beirut where a considerable number of historic buildings remain, making Solidere

the caretaker of the capital's urban cultural heritage.[13] Such a delicate statement is demonstrated by the fact that Solidere obviously avoids giving any precise numbers of the historic buildings actually being preserved within its boundaries. In general, Solidere only speaks about the initial 300 retained buildings, but they provide no details as to how many of them were in fact "historic", how many were preserved for other reasons, and how many of those buildings were then demolished anyway.

My own investigations, based on a visual assessment of buildings and a GIS-supported interpretation of various maps and aerial photographs, will probably not give exact numbers but might suggest an appropriate scale. These investigations indicate that out of the approximately 300 buildings foreseen for preservation by the 1994 masterplan, a little less than 50 buildings were already demolished by 2004. Only ten of them were later rebuilt in their original style. Of the remaining buildings, roughly 150 buildings were built during the French Mandate and earlier, and around 30 belonged to public or religious institutions *(Waqf)*. This would reduce the 300 buildings foreseen for preservation in the detailed 1994 masterplan to approximately 120 to 130 historic buildings preserved by Solidere in the year 2004.[14] (Maps A and B)

Pericentral Districts When Solidere destroyed most of the buildings in the Beirut Central District in the mid-1990s, the focus of the heritage activists switched to the directly adjacent quarters, where they expected to find quite a number of historic buildings that needed to be saved as well. The heritage association APSAD (Association pour la Protection des Sites et Anciennes Demeures) conducted an inventory of all historic buildings in this area on the demand of the Ministry of Culture in 1995. In 1996, they presented an inventory of around 1,000 buildings to the Minister of Culture, who decided to freeze all action on all of these buildings regardless of their condition or their architectural value. This "freezing" resembles the "placing under study," as foreseen in the urban planning law of 1983, as an element of a detailed masterplan that would then permanently protect the historic buildings by designating "special policy areas" similar to the ones in the Solidere area. This freezing, however, lacked the necessary legal texts required to secure the approval of several institutions, including the Higher Council for Urban Planning and the Minister of Public Works and Transportation. Instead, the Minister of Culture merely sent a letter to the Governor of Beirut, in which he asked him not to hand out any building or demolition permits until further studies on the buildings were conducted. And the Governor complied.

Of course, many of the property owners were completely upset by the step, as they saw their property value diminish dramatically (mainly determined by the right to build a certain number of floors) without any explanation on behalf of the governmental institutions.

In 1997, a more detailed study was prepared to identify the buildings worth preserving in the long-term. This time, the study was conducted by the concerned governmental authority, the Directorate General for Urbanism (DGU), although the head of the DGU commissioned almost the same architects who had undertaken the first survey. These architects, who volunteered their services, identified certain clusters of heritage buildings that were supposed to uphold the specific local identity of Old Beirut, as only these clusters would provide an "authentic" urban experience.

Fig 6 Historic buildings in the Pericentral Districts waiting for demolition

Fig 7 Recently renovated historic buildings in the Pericentral Districts

Fig 8 Recently renovated historic buildings in the Pericentral Districts

The final suggestion was to preserve four different clusters with approximately 530 buildings. To work out a comprehensive preservation strategy, the architects suggested placing these buildings "under study," which would mean that no demolition permits could be granted for another two years. In addition, to develop detailed masterplans for the concerned areas, they also suggested preparing comprehensive architectural, economic, legal, and urban studies that could lead to a general reform of the laws for protecting urban cultural heritage, as they saw the existing laws as totally inefficient and outdated. They especially saw the need for some sort of compensation or support for the building owners, who were supposed to maintain their historic buildings. The study was approved by the Higher Council for Urban Planning, and the 530 buildings were "placed under study", this time by an official ministerial degree. The remainder of the initial 1,000 buildings were then unfrozen, which meant that the owners were free to demolish them whenever they pleased.

But none of the comprehensive studies nor any of the legal reforms were ever conducted. Instead, the government decided to do another study in 1998, which many observers recognized as a clear attempt to simply bring down even further the number of historic buildings intended for preservation. This new study was then conducted directly by the Council of Ministers, who gave the job to the private consulting company, Khatib & Alami. The new study totally denied the idea of a cluster approach and simply classified the historic buildings' architectural or "heritage value" by looking at the single buildings. At the end, only around 200 buildings were considered worth preserving, with the remaining buildings being unfrozen as well.

And even for these 200 remaining buildings, the governmental institutions did not come up with any sort of long-term protection scheme. Instead, these buildings simply remain frozen to this day under a ministerial decree that contradicts the existing urban planning laws, as the time frame of two years is already extensively overstretched and there is yet no effort to prepare a detailed masterplan for the area. Moreover, there is no compensation for the concerned owners, nor is there any kind of reliable information about the whole process.

So, we can clearly say there is no legally sound protection for historic houses in the Pericentral Districts. This has been made worse by the fact that many additional houses have been unfrozen by the informal lobbying of the concerned authorities. This situation has left the homeowners who are without patronage or informal access to relevant information in a state of agony, as they neither can afford to renovate the buildings nor are they allowed to demolish them.

This is part of a larger picture involving many other factors that greatly determine the situation of the historic buildings in Beirut outside the Beirut Central District. The problem of old rent contracts, the paralysing property rights, or the difficulties to obtain a building permit often prevent the property owners from any kind of building activity requiring significant levels of investment. The only way to economically benefit from their property is to sell out to some wealthy real estate investor with good ties to those in power, who will then be able to overcome the various difficulties.[15]

This situation is reflected by the high number of historic buildings where obviously no development is taking place at all. My own survey shows that out of the approximately 1,100 buildings that were indicated as being historic on the maps of one of the three

studies, around 200 buildings or 17 percent were demolished by 2005, while around 900 buildings are still remaining. (Map C) But more than half of those remaining buildings are in a medium or bad condition, where obviously only recently minor investments in their renovation took place. (Map D) So, in most of these cases, one can expect their demolition in the near future, or at least as soon as the real estate market picks up again.

This is what makes Mona Hallak, a well know heritage activist, say:

> "If we do not protect them, there will come a time, in which funnily enough, only Solidere will have heritage buildings, which for us was the massacre of heritage buildings in Beirut. If we do nothing, one day will come and you will thank Solidere for keeping at least 280 buildings in Beirut."[16]

I need to raise two objections: first, there are to my knowledge, far fewer than 280 heritage buildings being preserved in the Beirut Central District (Maps A and B); second, there are also over 300 buildings, which are around one third of the 918 remaining buildings in the Pericentral Districts that will not face demolition in the near future, as they are still in a good condition or were recently extensively restored. And these buildings also still form certain clusters, at least for the moment (Map D).

Additionally, there are an unknown number of historic buildings in Beirut that were never identified. The study conducted by APSAD in 1996 only covered a small area of municipal Beirut, where most but by far not always were historic buildings. Already, a short visit to some of these areas (for example, to Ras en Nabah, Mouseitbeh, or the western part of Bliss Street) reveals that there is still a considerable number of historic buildings waiting to be discovered, and to be protected, of course!

Conclusion

As we have seen, only a minority of the buildings extant in 1990 in the Beirut Central District were foreseen for preservation in the detailed masterplan of 1994. A considerable number were later demolished, with only a minority of them rebuilt until 2004. Also, the built structures of the remaining buildings were often dramatically transformed. These new-old buildings and their neo-traditional counterparts were nonetheless used to promote a "unique cultural and historic identity" of the city, in order to attract international tourists, money, and companies.

In the Pericentral Districts, heritage activists tried to preserve the "authentic character" of "Old Beirut" by defining certain areas with a high number of heritage buildings. Although their proposals had some partial success, the governmental institutions did not come up with any long-term protection scheme, but only kept a small minority of the identified historic buildings under protection by questionable legal means. But because of the low demand on the real estate market and the numerous factors preventing the owners from any kind of building activity, many of the historic buildings in the Pericentral Districts have survived until today, slowly dilapidated , but still in their original built structures. Together with the "undiscovered" historic buildings in the remaining area of municipal Beirut, they still pose a high potential for the promotion of the city, as well as for dealing with its difficult history.

Until today, the two examples cited clearly show that it was predominantly

the economic value of urban cultural heritage that was validated during the reconstruction process in Beirut. Mainly in the Beirut Central District, but also in the Pericentral Districts, the new-old historic buildings exemplify the strong standing of commercialization and consumerism in Lebanese society. The socio-political value, by contrast, has not been that successful. There clearly have been some attempts to preserve a certain local identity that could resist this commercialized and globalized identity. But those attempts have not managed to achieve any visible result in the urban landscape.

It has to be said, though, that all these different values cannot be separated clearly. For example, it cannot be denied that there is still a socio-political function at work in Solidere, but it is clearly subordinated to the economic one. On the other hand, many heritage activists also tried to find new commercial uses for the old buildings outside the Beirut Central District as well, although their original intention was clearly not to spur economic development.

To sum up, I want to exemplify the "academic value" of the present handling of urban cultural heritage. First, our example shows the predominance of economic values at the expense of the cultural needs of an academic middle class. Second, it shows that the historic buildings were not used to create any kind of discourse about the country's difficult history, reflecting the general national amnesia concerning that matter. Third, the blockade of the historic building development outside and the expropriation of the buildings inside the Beirut Central District also reveals a massive economic marginalization of the middle class to the benefit of a political and economic elite. And fourth, the many uncertainties concerning the number of historic buildings being preserved in the Beirut Central District and the confusing course of events in the Pericentral Districts demonstrate that urban planning in Lebanon still lacks transparency, inclusiveness, and accountability. Historic buildings in Beirut, therefore, not only tell us a lot about the history of the place, but also about current problems in Lebanese urban planning, and reflect differing cultural orientations and power relations in contemporary Lebanese society.



Map A **Beirut Central District**

Buildings foreseen for preservation in the detailed masterplan 1994, and their demolition until 2004

Source: Detailed masterplan 1994, GIS-supported interpretation of various maps and aerial photographs, Survey Kögler 2004 Cartography and GIS: Kögler 2005

Still extant
Demolished
Demolished and reconstructed to the original style



Map B **Beirut Central District**
Age of buildings
Source: GIS-supported interpretation of various maps and aerial photographs, Survey Kögler 2004
Cartography and GIS: Kögler 2005

Map C **Pericentral Districts**

Demolition of buildings identified as "historic" in one of three official surveys 1996-1998. **Source:** APSAD-Study 1996, DGU-Study 1997, Khatib & Alami-Study 1998, Survey Kögler 2005 Cartography and GIS: Kögler 2005

☐ Demolished
• Still extant

Map D **Pericentral Districts**

Comdition of buildings identified as "historic" in one of three official surveys 1996-1998. **Source:** APSAD-Study 1996, DGU-Study 1997, Khatib & Alami-Study 1998, Survey Kögler 2005 Cartography and GIS: Kögler 2005

■ Good Condition
■ Medium Condition
☐ Bad Condition

Notes

[1] UNESCO, Webpage 2006, Defining Our Heritage. Date of visit: 2006-04-10, http://whc.unesco.org/intro-en.htm

[2] Daher 2006, Heritage Conservation in Jordan: The Myth of Equitable and Sustainable Development. In Dagher, R. and Maffi, I. (2000) Patrimony and Heritage Conservation in Jordan. Beirut (Document du CERMOC, 10), p.29.

[3] Tabet J. 2001. Beirut: The Memory of Stones. In: AUTODAFE N°2, 2001

[4] See World Bank 1999, Sustainable Tourism and Cultural Heritage. A Review of Development Assistance and Its Potential to Promote Sustainability. p.40.

[5] Massey D. 1994, *Space, Place, and Gender.* Cambridge. p.155.

[6] Schmid 2002, *Der Wiederaufbau des Beiruter Stadtzentrums. Ein Beitrag zur handlungsorientierten politisch-geographischen Konfliktforschung.* Heidelberg. p.94.

[7] Beyhum 1992, The Crisis of Urban Culture: The Three Reconstruction Plans for Beirut. In *The Beirut Review,* 2 (4), p.50.

[8] Gavin and Maluf 1996, *Beirut Reborn. The Restoration and Development of the Central District.* London. p.54.

[9] Schmid 2002, *Der Wiederaufbau des Beiruter Stadtzentrums. Ein Beitrag zur handlungsorientierten politisch-geographischen Konfliktforschung.* Heidelberg. p.183.

[10] Saliba 2004, *Der Wiederaufbau des Beiruter Stadtzentrums. Ein Beitrag zur handlungsorientierten politisch-geographischen Konfliktforschung.* Heidelberg. *Der Wiederaufbau des Beiruter Stadtzentrums. Ein Beitrag zur handlungsorientierten politisch-geographischen Konfliktforschung.* Heidelberg. p.161ff.

[11] Gavin and Maluf 1996, *Beirut Reborn. The Restoration and Development of the Central District.* London. p.28.

[12] Gavin and Maluf 1996, *Beirut Reborn. The Restoration and Development of the Central District.* London. And Saliba 2004.*Der Wiederaufbau des Beiruter Stadtzentrums. Ein Beitrag zur handlungsorientierten politisch-geographischen Konfliktforschung.* Heidelberg. *Der Wiederaufbau des Beiruter Stadtzentrums. Ein Beitrag zur handlungsorientierten politisch-geographischen Konfliktforschung.* Heidelberg

[13] Lecture, Gavin 2002. Lecture at the City Debates 2002 "Beirut: Renovation or Evisceration?", American University Beirut, 17-04-2002, (author's notes).

[14] Kögler, O 2006. Der Umgang mit dem urbanen Kulturerbe im Nachkriegslibanon. Heidelberg. p.67ff.

[15] Kögler 2005, Prospects for Preservation of Historic Buildings. In Gebhardt, H., Sack, D., Bodenstein, R., Fritz, A., Hanssen, J., Hillenkamp, B., Kögler, O., Mollenhauer, A., Stolleis, F. (2005). History, Space and Social Conflict in Beirut. The Quarter of Zokak el-Blat. (Beiruter Texte und Studien 97). p. 271ff.

[16] Interview, Hallak, May 2002

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Cultural Heritage: Between Universal Concepts and Local Identities (*)

Howayda Al-Harithy

(*) A revised version of this essay titled "[Reframing] World Heritage" is published in the journal *Traditional Dwellings and Settlement Review*, Vol XVII, Number 1.

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My paper is entitled "Cultural Heritage between Universal Concepts and Local Identities." Having been engaged in urban conservation projects of historic medieval cities in the Arab world, my research developed into a critical inquiry of the concept of world heritage, as conceived by the international treaty called the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage adopted by the UNESCO in 1972. I will discuss the universal tools and implementation strategies imposed by international funding agencies in such projects. The paper will reference the medieval cities of Cairo and Tripoli as case studies, and the questions and issues posed will hold wider implications.

The position and argument I attempt to put forth today is the following: cultural heritage has suffered at the hands of both national and global constructs and actors who claim to defend and preserve it. Restoration or conservation efforts should neither be about the internationalization of heritage, which often results in packaged frozen icons to be consumed by the world public through the tourist industry, or what Hewison termed the "heritage industry", "a phenomenon that has been rendered emblematic of cultural decline." To quote Hewison, "Hypnotized by images of the past, we risk losing all capacity for creative change." Nor should it be about the nationalization of heritage, which results in the contemporary political construct that is national identity. Here, I am operating within Anderson's definition of nations as imagined communities, as a concept of heritage that is a manufactured one.

Heritage should remain linked to the cultural context to which it belongs; it should be defined as that which is beyond the physical and visible and it should be recognized as an open process of production and transformation sustained by its rooted links to the community and its local identity.

I will try to construct and elaborate the argument of a critique of the concept of World Heritage and its tools and implementation strategies. By referencing Cairo and Tripoli, the paper aims to demonstrate the inapplicability of the concept and its universal tools to a densely populated historic urban center with culture-specific political and social dynamics and with region-specific forces of modern development and postwar reconstruction. I will also attempt to propose an alternative approach to urban conservation projects within living historic cities.

The historic core of Tripoli is one of the five historic cities that received World Bank funding towards rehabilitation in 2003. Tripoli was not originally among the cities listed by UNESCO in 1984 as World Heritage sites in Lebanon. Baalbeck, Byblos, and Tyre were listed because of the recognition their ancient monuments received under the international classification criteria of "Outstanding Universal Value." The old city of Cairo was listed as a World Heritage site in 1979.

Before I turn to Cairo or Tripoli, let me address this notion of universality imbedded in the concept of World Heritage as conceived by the convention and its inherent contradictions as applied in projects throughout the world.

"What is it that constitutes the 'outstanding universal value' of a cultural or natural treasure?" is a question posed and answered by the World Heritage Committee. According to the convention, a property must satisfy the selection criteria adopted by the World Heritage, and I quote, "A cultural monument could be a masterpiece of creative genius; have exerted great architectural influence; be associated with ideas or beliefs of universal significance; or may be an outstanding example of a traditional way of life that represents a certain culture."

The concept of World Heritage as defined by the convention, its terminology, and its selection criteria reveals a contradiction between what is designated by the convention as a cultural monument and its universalization, a process which is doomed to divorce heritage from its cultural context and bound to result in a loss of regional/local identity. The applications, so far, reveal a practice that freezes monuments into an iconic existence and locks their interpretation into a singular reference to a particular historic era that is then packaged and marketed to the whole world audience through the tourist industry. It is a process that bases itself on disciplinary memory (and here I am referring to historical disciplinary memory, using Anderson's definition of it) that concerns itself with typology, style, and building technique and utilizes an archaeological method of restoring that layer which is authentic, pure, and unique. This problematic universality neutralizes the plurality of meaning in any cultural product and denies the dynamic process of cultural regeneration of the built heritage, especially as it cuts social and economic links between the local communities and inhabitants of such sites.

Today, Cairo and Tripoli present a totally different challenge to the international practice and criteria. The historic core of Tripoli has 195 monuments dating from the Mamluk and the Ottoman periods. Cairo's historic core has several hundred monuments from the Fatimid, Ayyubid, Mamluk, and Ottoman periods. These buildings in their

Fig 1 Residential fabric in the old city

Fig 2 View of the minaret of al-Burtasi Mosque



Fig 3 The muqarnas portal of the Attar Mosque

Fig 4 Inscriptions on the facade of the Madrasa a-Saqraqiyya

network constitute a medieval urban fabric. They range from religious, to civic, and to secular buildings that include mosques, madrasas, khans, and hammams — buildings that have been in use or reused, neglected, appropriated, added onto, and so on as the urban dynamic has dictated over the years and centuries.

Dealing with a living city with urban artifacts of this nature makes the challenge therefore twofold. One lies in the fact that the numerous historical buildings and their surroundings form an historic urban fabric; the built heritage in this case is far removed from the condition of a single monument or an archaeological ruin. The second lies in the fact that the city is an evolving dynamic entity, fully inhabited and densely populated. Its functioning monuments are evolving social spaces, whose rehabilitation would mean the rehabilitation of a whole city across multiple layers: economic, social, and political, as well as physical.

Cases like Cairo and Tripoli no doubt present a serious conceptual challenge to the internationalist view that cultural heritage should be "preserved as part of the world heritage of mankind as a whole," revealing the elitist, Eurocentric, and discriminating application of the so-called criteria of "outstanding universal value," which remains the case despite the 1994 reform and adoption of what came to be called the Global Strategy for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention.

During the first twenty years of the convention, the concept of cultural heritage evolved from a nearly single focus on monumental architecture (particularly European and Christian "elitist" buildings) to a recognition of cultural groupings that were complex and multidimensional, which demonstrated in spatial terms the social structures, ways of life, beliefs, systems of knowledge, and representations of different past and present cultures. But the implementation strategies and tools remained restricted. And although the importance of an understanding of the multiple relationships had with its physical and non-physical environment complemented this change of focus, living cultures figured very little on the list. An over-simplified division between cultural and natural properties took no account of the fact that in most human societies the landscape, which was created or inhabited by human beings, was representative and an expression of the lives of the people who lived in it.

The operational guidelines of the World Heritage Convention still specify four visible measures of the test of "authenticity": design, material, workmanship, or setting, plus the "distinctive character and components" in the case of a cultural landscape.

Despite many critical junctions in the meetings of the World Heritage Committee, such as the recommendations of the Amsterdam meeting and the adoption of the Nara Document, the World Heritage Committee has been slow to make formal changes to the operational guidelines to reflect the recommendations of those meetings. The practice remains however within the older conceptual frame of the convention. The restoration policies and efforts still focus on monuments, and still find in tourism the force of economic development.

A good example is found in Cairo. Despite the UNESCO listing, the implementation methods remained focused around monuments and their restoration into icons of the time to which they were born. Historical buildings that are part of the everyday life of community members around it become artifacts that are turned into museums of sorts, guarded and made inaccessible by the threshold of a ticket booth. Very few projects



Fig 5 General view of the density of housing

Fig 6 The main spine of the old souq

go beyond mere technical restoration to address the question of the social and environmental context, adoptive reuse, institutional sustainability, and training.

Cairo reveals an equally critical dimension of the UNESCO modeled process and its politics, which lies in the sources and agenda for funding. A serious example is found in the restoration of the Fatimid monuments in Cairo by the Bohras, a Pakistani religious group branching from the Ismaili sect claiming descent from the Fatimids. Funding of the restoration of the Fatimids monuments can be seen as a claim of that historical layer of the city and its artistic production. The restoration work of two fine monuments, such as al-Azhar built by al-Mu'iz in 971 and al-Hakim built by al-Hakim between 990 and 1003, replaced all the fine stucco and brick work by white imported Italian marble that emphasizes the notions of light and reflection, notions that are central to the doctrine of the Ismailis and represent the guiding light of the Imam. This is clearly an act of claiming Fatimid heritage.

The restoration work is not only technically problematic, but raises serious issues that revolve around the question of whose heritage? Particularly critical in this process is that it divorces the built heritage from its cultural context and local social practices. It raises issues of claim and reclaim, authentic and reconstructed historical narratives that merely justify a group's role definition or political agenda.

This is neither a case on nationalization nor a case of internationalization of cultural heritage, but reveals the vulnerability not only of the conceptual frame but also of the implementation strategies on the ground. This example also raises issues relating to the layering of a city's history and built environment. Which layer is worthy of recovery, restoration, and celebration and by whom? This is a negotiation of heritage that takes place and cannot but be a discriminating one, even when it comes to individual monuments. Al-Azhar, for example, is a monument built at the hands of the Fatimids but since then evolved as a building with Mamluk and Ottoman layers, and equally evolved in function from a Shi'i symbol of enlightenment to a Sunni educational landmark.

Therefore, any conceptual frame or implementation strategy for urban conservation such as the proposed project for the old city of Tripoli has to accept the dynamics of cities and their monuments as open text, in the Derridan sense of the word, subject to reading, interpretation, and regeneration by their users. And by users here I mean the local community and city dwellers, in order for the process to be sustainable and to remain open-ended. Otherwise, it falls into the trap of the hijacking of history or that of freezing monuments and urban settings into iconic static museum pieces packaged for the tourist industry and experienced in a prescribed fashion, thus limiting interpretation and blocking regeneration.

This was made obvious as I followed the process of negotiating Tripoli's built heritage and its representation through the urban conservation project funded by the World Bank and proposed by Debs-Tabet Consultants. The heavily politicized process involves international and local key players, agencies, and experts, but despite the wishes of the consultants hardly involves the principal stakeholders, the population that inhabits and regenerates the city every day.

The administrative set up for the project (called the Cultural Heritage and Urban Development project or CHUD) states among its objectives: "This project treats Lebanon's cultural assets as economic assets and integrates them into the life of the community

Fig 7 Mixed use buildings within the souq area



Fig 8 Courtyard of Khan El-Askar

Fig 9 General view of the old houses

to achieve local growth." The objectives first compromised as the designated task for the consultants were articulated by the Council for Development and Reconstruction as the following: "Urban rehabilitation and/or construction of (a) facades in the old souq of the historic city; (b) public spaces rehabilitation in the old town; (c) historic monuments (Khan Al-Askar, Khan, Hammam); (d) Abou Ali River public spaces and around the Citadel; (e) on-street parking and meters in the old town; (f) Lot 131 rehabilitation; and (g) selected houses."

Recognizing the limitations imposed by the funding that prioritized public space, facades, and infrastructure, the Debs-Tabet team opted to invest in social surveys, to build an understanding of the social profiles and economic dynamics of the city's inhabitants in order to incorporate the findings into the proposed urban conservation project. But once more, funding conditions were challenged since funding is only invested in publicly-owned property, thus keeping the privately-owned khans, shops, and residences that make up the connecting tissue of the old city outside the equation. The funding stressed that the design intervention be limited to the infrastructure and open public spaces, pushing in the direction of monument façade restoration and public space design, giving priority to the segment of the city that is the souk spine as the main public artery and an important launching point for the interventions to come. The consultants, who believed in a more integrated approach that acknowledges the human/social layer of the city, managed to negotiate a proposal for the restoration of an urban residential block as a possible model for future financial packages. Again, the issue of private ownership had to be overcome. The negotiated result was that the funded project would offer upgrading of the infrastructure, with the work undertaken by residents for hire and pay them as long as they agreed to spend 30 percent of their pay on restoring and upgrading the old houses in which they lived.

This very act of selection, of what to restore and how, is an act of historical editing and not an innocent or objective act. It remains, in this case, an exercise of disciplinary memory that designates monuments based on age and outstanding physical properties, intertwined by a funding process that operates within the realm of public ownership and an economic development agenda that targets the tourist industry. Thus, a process emerged whose very structure has alienated the local community, and if not corrected, will likely to disconnect the restored sections of the city from the daily lives of its inhabitants.

To better answer these challenges, one must first adopt a broader definition of heritage, a broad concept including values, attitudes, customs, historical memory, language, literature, art, architecture, and so on. A very important and visible part of heritage consists of the built environment as the context of urban living.

Many countries have pursued conservation policies that conserve the past in offering a source for cultural identity and a basis of reference for the future. Recent attitudes towards conservation are concerned with protecting more and more aspects of heritage. Selection and assessment therefore become priority concerns, and such changes call for a reorientation of conservation policy. New analytical tools and concepts are thus required to enrich and expand the conventional methods utilized and ensure sustainability of cultural heritage in an urban setting.

By arguing against the frame of internationalization and globalization and by arguing for this broad definition of heritage, an alternative approach to conservation can be proposed, one that does not base itself on recognition of unique and outstanding monuments, archaeological methods of conservation, and disciplinary memory, but rather on the recognition of cities as dynamic entities whose living built heritage is produced everyday by diverse spatial practices and sustained by social memory. Social memory is based on events and associations with the place and interacting with it on a daily basis rather than on its physical properties alone.

This calls for a premise that recognizes cities as the trustees of cultural heritage, and most importantly it recognizes that sustainable city life is the carrier of socio-cultural heritage. This is then a call to reorient the conservation enterprise toward local or regional identity as an alternative to the more ambiguous term cultural identity or the even more problematic national identity. Local identity is that which lies in the rooted practices, social, economic, and political lives of the local inhabitants. It is an identity that emanates from living with the historic monuments and dwelling in them on a daily basis by the community members who pass by them, meet in them, pray in them, and so on. It is a place that is an extension of their daily existence.

When using the term local identity, I am referencing the modem urban and regional planning field, which considers local identity conservation as its main goal, and in doing so, directs an effective means of sustainable city and territory development. Highlighting the importance of protecting and valorizing the identity of places and communities obliges decision makers — limited by the perennial problem of financial resources and the complexity of certain decisions — to establish priorities and methods for cultural goods recovery within the context of global actions for territory development and human evolution, thus proposing implementation methods and design strategies that are multidisciplinary and socio-economically sustainable. It embodies the effort to move from conservation policies focused only on the unique and outstanding using archaeological conventional methods. Developing sustainable urban cultural heritage will mean recognizing the layering of a city and its open process of production. And it will require integrated multidisciplinary methods of conservation, development, and management.

Any economic development plan integral to urban conservation or rehabilitation has to invest in the people, to support them to stay in the old city, and continue to produce its heritage. If tourism is to be introduced, it needs to be an invitation to a full experience and interaction with the place and its people, with the social practices of today, not to gaze upon the masterpieces of yesteryears.

Fig 11 Khan al-Masriyyine



Fig 10 Detail of historic houses in the old city



Fig 12 Soap Factory

A Development Perspective on Cultural Heritage

Omar Razzaz

Omar Razzaz is the manager of the World Bank's Lebanon Country Office. He joined the bank in 1993, and in 2000 he became the bank's Lead Urban Specialist in the Finance, Private Sector, and Infrastructure Department, where he led the preparation of the Yemen Port Cities Development Program; the Iran Low Income Housing Program; and the Jordan Municipal Finance Study. His country experience includes Russia, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Iran, Lebanon, and Jordan, among others. Prior to joining the World Bank, Razzaz was an assistant professor at MIT in the International Development Program and Regional Planning Program at the Department of Urban Studies and Planning. He holds a PhD from Harvard University in Urban Studies, and a post-doctorate from the Harvard Law School. He has a number of publications in refereed journals.

As I was listening to Howayda Al-Harithy's presentation, I deliberated whether to present the paper I had prepared or put it aside and juxtapose instead a series of comments that partly relate to the paper but also emanate from the interesting thoughts that Howayda had presented. For the interest of debate, I think perhaps it would be much more useful to reflect from that presentation, especially since it was about a World Bank-funded project in Tripoli.

Let me start by saying that I really agree with the bulk of what Al-Harithy presented; I couldn't agree more with the whole issue of approaching urban fabric rather than approaching monuments. Indeed, in World Bank experience and from lessons learned, we have shied away from projects that deal with the preservation of monuments. In fact, when we do get involved in that, we tend to do it in partnership with UNESCO or other agencies that specialize in monument preservation, since in the World Bank we don't have the comparative advantage or expertise in historical preservation. Interestingly enough, if you look at the World Bank projects, including the one in Tripoli, you will find that the bulk of investment is in the urban fabric itself, in the streets and markets, and not so much in the monuments.

I also very much agree with the criticism of the concept of authenticity and the world heritage criteria. Think of the multicultural, multireligious, multiethnic groups around the world — in nations and in cities and even in neighborhoods — and how we

just juxtapose the two terms, cultural and heritage, and assume therefore that they attain a universal objective meaning that everybody can agree upon. This is ridiculous. In fact, as you pointed out and as we have seen all around us, what is revered by one group is very often seen as *kitch* and meaningless by another. And there have been so many attempts to transfer cultural icons that are revered by one group to another group. The worst we could do would be to paper over this and pretend that we all agree on what the culturally significant assets are. I suggest, instead, that the debate about cultural heritage could be one way to create a dialogue about identity itself and what shared identity is. Whether it is a neighborhood, a city, or a nation (as in the case of Lebanon today), it is ultimately critical to discuss the issue of what it is that is shared. There is a uniqueness to each neighborhood, there is a uniqueness to each city, but what is it that a nation shares?

This leads me now to areas in the presentation that I found problematic from an implementation point of view. Let me start with the idea of cities or the locality as the trustees of cultural heritage, as opposed to the national or international. First, let me say that in every project we have in Lebanon, the locality takes a leading role, as with the municipality of Tripoli and the other municipalities as well. But to assume that simply putting it on the level of locality addresses the issue of cultural identity does not in my view solve the problem, because if anything, the locality is likely to be more biased in its view, since the locality might very well represent one dominant vision of the community — thus eliminating a part of history, a part of culture, or a part of identity that is significant to subordinate groups in the locality, to the nation as a whole, or to the global community. Could you imagine if such decisions were the prerogative only of local officials in multiethnic/religious cities dominated by one group? So, I very much understand the tension of setting a sort of global or universal value on what cultural heritage is and I understand the tension on the national level as well. But just putting it in the local context in my view does not necessarily solve the problem; it might actually exacerbate it.

Another issue I am struggling with is the notion of the contrast between freezing these assets, freezing the cultural heritage, versus leaving it alone or letting a dynamic process of cultural regeneration take place. Here, I will rely a little on the paper I had prepared and want to say that, fortunately, a paradigm shift occurred at the World Bank during the 1990s. The 1980s at the bank were the years of the Washington consensus, a view which basically said that if we take care of fiscal policy, fiscal reform, privatization, and trade liberalization, if we undertake macroeconomic reforms, everything else will take care of itself, the markets will take care of everything else. That was the paradigm of the 1980s. This view was clearly devoid of any institutional understanding, any understanding of issues of distribution, especially when it came to the poor, who are affected by those policies. There was a vagueness about the role of the state in development, and there was no notion that markets could fail. That was why cultural heritage came under consideration at the bank in the 1990s and not in the 1980s, along with other topics, because of the recognition that markets by themselves don't always work.

Cultural heritage is, in many ways, a public good. Once you preserve cultural heritage, everybody gets to benefit from it; it is not like an apple or a computer that is privately owned. So, there is an aspect about cultural heritage that makes it a public

good, which got emphasized; but there is also an aspect about cultural heritage in which markets fail.

There are two reasons why markets in cultural heritage fail; one is called the "missing markets." If we agree that the urban fabric of today is not only owned by today's generation but also by future generations, then clearly those future generations are not here now to put a value on that heritage. So, basically what the market does is that it undervalues. Let's say, if you have a historic house, the market will undervalue it, because you don't have future generations saying "Excuse me, I want this preserved and not turned into a shopping mall." So you don't have enough bidders in the market, because future generations are not around to bid. The other reason is that the benefits from having these cultural assets are widely dispersed, but the cost of preserving them is concentrated. So basically, if we have a private owner or a municipality or an agency that owns these assets, they have to preserve them and bear the cost of preserving them; but the benefit of having them preserved is spread in the neighborhood, in the city, in the country, and universally, if people around the world feel that having those assets is of some value. Let's say, somebody has a historic house and is offered a deal by somebody who wants to tear it down and build a hotel because it is in the central business district. That market transaction makes complete sense for those two people, the buyer and the seller; but it is not a good transaction, because it does not reflect the social value, which would impute the contingent valuation to all those who would be willing to pay to keep the status quo. So, in such cases, markets don't always work.

My fear is that, left to the dynamic process of cultural regeneration, the cultural heritage is put at risk of loss, because the dynamic process, whether we like it or not, is a process of the market. You might think it ironic that the World Bank is now saying: don't simply leave it to the market. In the case of cultural heritage, the "dynamic regeneration" process described by Howayda risks a process of the gradual loss of cultural heritage.

So, the question we have to address is: how do you stop the loss of cultural heritage? Obviously, you can't freeze space and turn it into a museum. The question then becomes who decides on what to do or not to do, by what process, and how do you get funding to do it? And I see absolutely no a priori reason why we should say that national or international institutions have no role or no say in cultural heritage. A crude or easy example would be the Buddhist temples in Afghanistan. Something like that is of international value, and there are people outside the country who revere those symbols; so why is it not viable for the world community to have a say over those types of assets, when at some point a local community decides "Well, we don't need these anymore and we don't like them; they don't represent the values that we stand for." One last thing on the economic side of it: the strings that come with the funding, in my view, are nonetheless sometimes a necessary evil, because getting public resources to upgrade and preserve heritage is not easy — such resources are not readily available. Every government in the world has to think about the trade-off between putting public funds in health or education or environment or the military or whatever use versus cultural heritage; and there is always this constraint of whether you put funds in cultural heritage or elsewhere and how you sustain the investment that is made. If it doesn't increase the tax base of the country, then where are these funds going to come from, if there is no

booth charging some fee at the entrance? The fee does not necessarily have to be prohibitive. In fact, what I would recommend is a close to zero fee for nationals and a spiked-up fee for tourists. If you don't have a source of revenue for the up-keep of those sites, then how can you guarantee funds to keep those assets preserved for future generations?

Whether Tripoli is a success or whether it could have been done better is an open and valid question. But let me say that these are, indeed, very risky projects. Perhaps cultural heritage projects are among the riskiest that the World Bank has undertaken, because they are not "green fields," and we are not simply putting in infrastructure networks in a featureless environment. There is the issue of cultural conflict: what layer do you dig down to? There is the issue of the quality of conservation: how do you agree on the standards within a team of archaeologists, architects, planners, economists, and finance people? You don't want to gold-plate a site, because you could wipe out all your funds. You also don't want to do harm to the site or do considerable damage to its authenticity. There are no easy solutions here.

There are also tenure problems that often come up in these cases. Once you identify a site for preservation and the ownership of the property is vague, it becomes a problem. The biggest problems that I see in these types of works are issues of equity and gentrification. The biggest risk we face in cultural heritage projects is how do you make sure that the intended beneficiaries are those who will ultimately, actually benefit? The incentive to sell out and move is tremendous. And that, I think, calls for exactly the types of measures that you were talking about: having a comprehensive approach that involves civic groups, communities, livelihoods, sources of income, and so on, and not just focusing on stone and monuments. Even with these types of risks, which are significant, we have to ask what the alternative is. Does that mean not to undertake these kinds of projects? My fear is the alternative — the slow, gradual, and painful vicious circle in which these types of neighborhoods, because they are dilapidated, continue to attract the poorest of the poor communities who can not afford to maintain them, which brings those neighborhoods further down. Anybody who makes it in these communities, in fact, immediately moves out, because the living standards continue to deteriorate. The fear is of a vicious circle that will continue to take those neighborhoods completely down; and the challenge is for everybody to think of a different kind of circle — a virtuous circle, in which you make an investment through a monopoly voice of the community or the city to regenerate these places and make them lively places that work for everybody.

It is a challenge. I cannot pretend that all World Bank projects have tackled that challenge successfully. But the alternative of doing nothing will be devastating for the heritage. The challenge of going forward is how local, national, and international institutions can complement each other to share a heritage that has meaning, even if different meaning, for all.

Comments on Session I

Diane Riskedahl

The 2005 City Debates concentrated on the tension of global forces and local claims embedded in the concept of 'urban heritage.' This session specifically honed in on this issue through the interrogation of the universality of the concept of 'world heritage' as defined by the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage. This attention to the evolution of core concepts recognizes how discursive activities are materially integral to social practices such as urban conservation. Through the discussion of the case studies of Tripoli and the Beirut Central District and surrounding areas, the debate concentrated on the central issues of identity, ownership, and authenticity.

The issue of identity is vividly highlighted through the competing claims of ownership over cultural heritage at the local, regional, state, and international levels. Howayda Al-Harithy's challenge is to the international level and the claims by organizations such as the World Bank to invest in these sites for the sake of 'public good.' She argues that the overlay of outside interests on to local contexts smothers the concerns and livelihood of the individuals directly impacted by such projects. Al-Harithy argues instead for an organic participatory approach, which allows for local input in defining the scope of heritage projects. She contends that this is the means for creating a sustainable community that should be at the core of the notion of cultural heritage.

Omar Razzaz agrees that the threat of projects to monumentalize world heritage sites, regardless of current local inhabitants, should be problematized. At the same time, he argues that without some basic standards, the market would dominate in each project in such a way that the values and ideals of future generations would not be taken into account. By suggesting that local inhabitants are temporary and individualistic in their agendas, Razzaz challenges the idea that local claims are all that separate from global forces. He asserts that both local and global levels need checks and balances in order for heritage projects to succeed.

Al-Harithy's argument calls for solutions to be derived on a flexible case-by-case basis. There is no standard pattern for these projects, because each must take into account the variations in socio-economic and political histories and identities involved. These variations create distinct constellations of claims over ownership and authenticity by constituencies from the local to the international levels. Key to this perspective is the understanding that embedded in any claim regarding cultural heritage is the relationship of power that one must work on to denaturalize and make explicit in analysis.

II Emerging State Initiatives

Swift Urban Heritage Donor Recipes and Neoliberal Urban Restructuring: Jordan and Lebanon as Case Studies

Rami Farouk Daher

Rami Farouk Daher is an associate professor of architecture at Jordan University of Science and Technology (since 1996), and a conservation architect interested in research related to politics and dynamics of place and heritage conservation, especially the conservation of the architectural heritage of recent periods (Ottoman ***Bilad al Sham****). He holds a PhD. in architecture (1995) from Texas A&M University, a master's of architecture (1991) from the University of Minnesota, and a bachelor of architecture (1988) from the University of Jordan. Daher was awarded several research grants from places like the Social Science Research Council and Fulbright. Daher is the recipient of several international certificates and fellowships in the field of urban heritage and has organized several local and international conferences on heritage conservation, urban regeneration, and heritage tourism. Daher also has many publications on this subject. Next to his research and teaching, Daher has worked as a consultant for several heritage conservation and environmental management projects. He is a cofounder and a principal of* ***TURATH: Heritage Conservation & Management and Environmental Design Consultants*** *(1999-present).*

In the first part of my presentation, I address Amman's heritage as a marginalized reality and as a heritage within the context of different discursive practices (e.g., nationalism, orientalism/academia, modernity). In the second half, I address current transformations in terms of urban regeneration (e.g., the projects of urban regeneration in smaller Jordanian and Lebanese towns funded by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the World Bank) and also in terms of neoliberal urban restructuring and the circulation of surplus global capital (as in the case of the Abdali mega-urban project, which is represented as the new downtown for Amman and is modeled on Beirut's Solidere project.

The strength of the presentation will be in the drawing of similarities within the region in terms of urban transformations and heritage projects. In the case of urban regeneration/tourism and "swift urban heritage donor recipes," the similarities between Amman, Salt, and Kerak in Jordan, on one hand, and Tripoli, Saida, and other places in Lebanon, on the other hand, are astonishing. Similarities and differences are also

analyzed in the case of Beirut's Solidere and Amman's Abdali project. Although these two projects are very similar, they are very different in many ways, especially in the dynamics of the investments, and most interestingly, in the level and nature of the contestation within the public sphere. Nevertheless, both examples exemplify that, contrary to the formal rhetoric that promotes the idea of an "absent" state in the "private" investment of mega-projects, the bottom line is that the "state" is subsidizing large-scale real estate investments for the business elite and multinational corporations of the region. This subsidy takes on different manifestations: in Amman's Abdali, it is mainly land acquisition, but also includes taxes, infrastructure, and elimination of all barriers.

By showing these two examples (and the involvement of donor agencies in urban regeneration), one can form a better understanding of current transformations in the production, manufacturing, and consumption of heritage and of urban space, as well as in the circulation of different forms of urban and heritage projects within the region. These transformations are leading to a very generic reality of both urban space and of heritage. Not only are we witnessing the disintegration of local differences; we are also witnessing a new system of visioning and acting on the city, in which the issues of accountability, transparency, democracy, inclusion/exclusion, and private/pubic become highly contested in the midst of the continuously shifting formal (the state and other) discursive practices and in the emergence of new actors.

Amman: The Heritage within the Context of Discursive Practices

Granting Voice and Qualifying Amman's Disguised and Subjugated Urban and Social Heritage.

Amman, for some people, is no more than a new city that offers a comfortable way of life. But for many, Amman tends to represent a rich reservoir of personal and collective memories, where the social memory of place, represented in its streets, alleys, steps, and courtyards, is more than a topic of discussion at gatherings and becomes, instead, a "lived" experience of heritage. This section of my presentation will attempt to voice and qualify various examples of this heritage only within the time frame of Amman's recent past. The aim is to reveal the latent nature of domination and also to show the extent to which power mechanisms are present in the city's institutions, regulations, and discursive practices. Qualifying the heritage sites would enable the formation of a discourse counter to the standard dominant and prevailing discourses, which confined and excluded this heritage in the first place.

Official Narrative Discourse

In general throughout the Arab world, rejections of and disassociations from the recent past have roots in the pre- and post-mandate and colonial periods, when modernity was introduced as ever-changing and progressive, as contrasted with tradition, which was presented as static, non-changing, anti-progressive, non-scientific, and non-individualistic. Separation between the recent past and the present led eventually to a dilution of people's awareness and knowledge of the past, its various moments of transformation and change, and the role it played in their everyday life. Out of this separation, the past and heritage became molded into constructed and esoteric periods of "then" and "now." (Daher 2002)

The official rhetoric of the post-mandate nation states, in their desperate search for foundation, legitimacy, and origins, attempted consciously to create links with the distant, antiquarian past. Several newly established national and foreign archaeological institutions facilitated the search for those ancient origins. Archaeological museums flourished in the Levant, and official discourse highlighted the interconnections with the points of ancient origin that were conceived to have operated within an approximate territorial boundary similar to that of the contemporary nation state. Maffi (2000) highlights one example, which explicates the Hashemite Jordanian fascination with the ancient Nabataean civilization that once existed in today's southern Jordan.

The cultural heritage that is located outside and beyond the boundaries of the nation state, which denies the existence of supra-national identities/realities that question its legitimacy, has been qualified as the "other." The other, here, could be the heritage that exists beyond the nation state's territorial boundaries or also beyond its ideological and genealogical discourses. The stereotypical image of "what Jordan is" becomes a discursive practice and works to define heritage in a way that disguises Amman's urban and social heritage. Kept outside the official national definition of heritage, Amman is grounded in a disassociation from the recent past and bears the strong influence of foreign archaeological research (Daher 2000), in which heritage is confined to the classical (e.g., mainly Greco-Roman and early Islamic).

Amman's multi-ethnic and heterogeneous beginnings in the middle of the nineteenth century were very inclusive;[1] in addition to the existing tribes that resided in Amman, the city's population was composed of Circassian, Damascene, Lebanese, Iraqis, and Palestinian migrants. The fact that Amman felt it had to conform to an ancient origin that was homogenous in its ethnic composition created a crises of identify that many residents of the city still subscribe to. The author believes that this crisis of identity is constructed, and that the distinctiveness of Amman and its urban cultural heritage need to be revealed and reactivated.

Orientalist/Academic Discourses

The urban heritage of Amman dating to the first half of the twentieth century was discredited by several discursive practices, which disqualified that heritage and rendered it as insignificant and marginal. First of all, Amman — as a city, in general, and in its urban heritage, in particular — had to conform to the stereotypical model of what an "Islamic" or "Arab" city should look like. The Orientalist discourse constructed models and typologies of Islamic or Arab cities, which were adopted by academia in the first half of the twentieth century (and, in certain cases, still hold today). Such images worked to discredit heritage that did not fit the Orientalist criteria and models. Consequently, the application of those models on a controversial city like Amman, a city of more recent origin grounded in multi-racial points of origin, becomes very problematic, especially when this city is compared with others like Damascus, Cairo, or Jerusalem, which more or less fit the constructed models.

Amman does not have to conform to a unitary discourse that constantly attempts to compare it to cities that fit the traditional Islamic historical model — cities that possess a distant past, a perceived homogeneous beginning, and a specific point of origin. By emphasizing homogeneity, such discourses eliminate local differences,

and in the process, the distinctive heritage of Amman is disguised and forced into a state of regression. This includes insistence on enforcing a unified, stereotypical style of architecture for Amman, borrowed from other traditional urban realities. Such discourses are discrediting the multiplicity and distinctiveness of urban experiences in Amman, such as the *Hawooz* in the residential hills, the urban experience of Faisal Street, the central three-bay hallway of an Ammani residential house,[2] or the pedestrian steps that connect the downtown area to the surrounding hills.

Swift Urban Heritage Donor Recipes:

Urban Cosmetics Regeneration

Jordan, Lebanon, and other countries in the region have received international funding from the World Bank and JICA to boost their national tourism strategies and to assist in the development of urban regeneration in secondary cities and smaller towns. Such international aid provided support for several tourism and urban regeneration projects in different cities, among them Tripoli, Tyre, Baalbeck, Sidon, and Byblos in Lebanon, and Kerak, Salt, Jerash, Amman, and Madaba in Jordan.

The projects in Jordan were seen by critical observers as being within the frame of a "wider plan aimed at developing international tourism in Jordan" (Maffi, 2002), and the historic urban heritage of several Jordanian cities became the focus of their tourism development activities. Gray (2002) believes that "the main link between the economic liberalization programme and tourism in Jordan is that tourism has been used to cushion some of the financial hardships caused by liberalization." It is significant to note how much certain governments in the region are attracted to the labor-intensive nature of tourism and to the hard currency that foreign tourists provide for the economy. Furthermore, tourism is not a complex sector to develop and does not usually rely on large injections of capital or expertise.

In the case of Jordan, for example, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1999 approved credits totaling $220 million in support of the nation's "economic adjustment" and "structural reform programme" for the period 1991-2001. Of the total $220 million, about $174 million was made available under a three-year Extended Fund Facility (IMF External Relations Department 2001). A major portion of that amount was allocated to tourism through several World Bank-funded projects. The amount allocated to tourism was in the range of $40 million, but this amount continued to increase. The program started with the First and Second Tourism Priority Projects, which addressed urban development and tourism in the cities of Kerak, Jerash, and Salt; and now the Third Tourism Priority Project is under way, targeting the same cities but also including Ajloun and Madaba as well. A recent (October 2005) meeting with members of the Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities provided information about a new World Bank project, in which urban tourism is the focus: the Cultural Heritage, Tourism, and Urban Development Project (CHTUD), funded by a Japanese grant through the World Bank. The CHTUD project addresses urban architecture and tourism in selected areas within the historic cores of Kerak, Salt, and Madaba.[3]

The situation in Lebanon is a little different, but it still shares a lot of similarities with Jordan. In Lebanon, the World Bank provided funding in the amount of $31 million

for the Cultural Heritage and Urban Development Project (CHUD). Other international donors were Agence Francais de Dèveloppement, the French Government, and the Italian Government. The objective was to protect, rehabilitate, and revitalize the historical and cultural heritage resources of five selected peripheral cities: Baalbeck, Tripoli, Tyre, Byblos, and Sidon. It is interesting to note that the original name of the CHUD Project, given it when it was first initiated as a partnership between the World Bank and the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR), was Cultural Heritage and Tourism Development, but the name was then shifted to CHUD, to include urban development, as some of the local consultants felt that the project needed to concentrate more on the problems of the urban historic cores rather than simply address tourism (World Bank and CDR 2002). It is still too early to judge whether the scope of the program has shifted as indicated by the name, since the projects are still being implemented.

Shock Treatment and Urban Cosmetics: "Too much money, too little time, and modest outcomes"

I present now some comparisons of the scope, objectives, and details of the donor agency projects of urban regeneration and tourism development in Jordan and Lebanon. The terms of reference applying to those projects reveal how similar they are in scope, components, rhetoric, tendering procedures, and even place details. In almost all the projects, the terms cover issues of physical and functional accessibility to the site (e.g., tourist trails, public spaces), improvement of infrastructure and quality of services, rehabilitation of the urban environment, community participation, and institutional capacity-building at the level of municipalities. Many of these components have not been implemented, particularly those related to the rehabilitation and conservation of the built environment, community participation, and capacity-building.

One of these projects, an outcome of the JICA study, is the Urban Heritage/ Tourism Development Project in the city of Salt. There, the work centers on the following components: the historic house museum of Abu Jaber, tourist trails and steps, open plazas, panoramic lookouts, and training for tourist services. The projects in the other Jordanian towns have a similar focus. It would be interesting to find out if such projects emerged out of a conscious motivation and "practice" of governmental institutionalized urban conservation/regeneration policies or if they simply emerged as "shock treatments" with negligible outcomes and low levels of sustainability (Daher 2005).

Once one attempts to understand the various components and the nature of the end products of the projects in Salt and in other places in Jordan and Lebanon, it is obvious that they mainly concentrate on the physical aspects of urban regeneration. The intervention on the public urban space centers on stone pavements for plazas, streets, or steps, outdoor furniture and lighting, and signage. Eventually, this is a one-time limited intervention in the form of architectural cosmetics on the historic urban tissue of the city, without any serious attempt to address the establishment of heritage tools, systems, or practices that insure the continuity of urban regeneration and community involvement on the long run. Issues such as capacity-building, building communities, helping communities to invest in tourism, or other non-physical interventions are not likely to be addressed.

Inam (2002) has elaborated how in several urban regeneration projects and heritage conservation endeavors, the practice is manipulated by architects, engineers, and urban planners more than by any other experts (such as urban sociologists and anthropologists). Therefore, the approach is "obsessed with impressions and aesthetics of physical form; and it is practiced as an extension of architecture, which often implies an exaggerated emphasis on the end product." Urban regeneration is as much about community building as it is about physical place enhancement, which these projects are not succeeding in achieving.

In February 2002, an open workshop was held in Tripoli to discuss the urban regeneration/tourism development projects in Lebanon, and in Tripoli specifically. The meeting was attended by representatives of NGOs, anthropologists, academicians, and specialists and experts who worked with the World Bank consultants on the Bank's funded projects. One particular expert from Tripoli who works with the consultants indicated that the World Bank CHUD Project is very comprehensive, as presented in reports, Power Point presentations, and different project documents; but, in reality, when it came to implementation, the project ended up being very modest, as several initial components got deleted, such as restoration of houses, addressing heritage tools within the historic cores, capacity-building, and economic incentives for the local community. In the end, the project concentrated on urban beautification of the public space, in the form of tiling of tourist trails and plazas, awnings and canopies, signage, and the like. He added that a lot of money was spent during a very short period, but that the outcome did not match the initial aspirations of the project. During the same meeting, a local anthropologist commented that "the same way we are sold a fast food meal, we are sold the World Bank project."

Such projects in Jordan and Lebanon started with comprehensive planning on the scale of the whole historic city core; in fact, they were seen by local politicians as the optimum solution to the various problems of historic city cores. Gradually, they were reduced to very modest outcomes (action projects) centering on open space beautification and architectural "cosmetics." Even such action projects and cosmetic attempts were very limited and did not target private properties. In addition, these projects led to the circulation of different forms of urban and heritage projects and of a prototypical tourist experience within the region. Gradually, not only are the local differences between the different cities disintegrating, but the tourist experience is also reduced to consuming the same manufactured concept of heritage and to gazing at the same urban furniture detail, lamp fixture, or floor pattern.

Neoliberal Urban Restructuring:

Fragmented City/Fragmented Governance

Neoliberalism at Work: Formal Semiotic Discursive Shifts The Socioeconomic Transformation Program

Cities across the Middle East are currently competing with one another in order to attract international business investments and tourism development; they are obliged to create the right milieu, a competitive business climate, and first-class tourism facilities to serve that purpose. Developments in Dubai and the current urban reconstruction of downtown Beirut (the Solidere project) are prime examples of such efforts.

This section focuses on formal discursive shifts in the creation of public urban space/tourism investments orchestrated by partnerships between multinational corporations and the state through the establishment of newly regulating bodies (such as Solidere[4] in Beirut and Mawared[5] in Amman) within the last ten years. Several of these neoliberal corporate visions, blessed by the state's public discursive shift that concentrates on economic prosperity and encourages international investment in the country, are leading to urban geographies of inequality and exclusion, of the spatial and social displacement of citizens, functions, histories, and itineraries in favor of tourism developments and real estate ventures. In an attempt to compare and contrast each of these two cases, in order to understand the nature of urban transformations in the different contexts of Beirut and Amman, the author will oscillate between the two rather than present each separately, so that the similarities and differences between them will be more readily reflected.

The Solidere project in Beirut, presented to the public as Lebanon's main postwar reconstruction effort, has been critiqued as simply being a real estate development project in which history and heritage are simply themes incorporated through "disneyfied" pastiche representations. (Khalaf 1997, Summer 2005). This reconstruction is creating a collaged urban morphology that is designed for consumption by tourists and the Lebanese people alike. The Solidere model for neoliberal urban restructuring was copied in Amman in the Abdali project, and there are plans to adopt it in other places within the region as well. This neoliberalization in the creation of public urban space, which circulates urban images, spectacles, and models, is gradually creating generic realities out of cities, leading to the dilution of local differences and the circulation of corporate urban realities and images.

In Jordan, formal governmental discursive shifts are gradually moving away from regional politics (e.g., emphasis on Arab nationalism and unity) and elaborate social agendas (e.g., agriculture, health care, education) to the adoption of neoliberal agendas of privatization, in which the country's most vital assets and sectors are being "rented out" by the state or sold to outside interests (e.g., water, telecommunications, power). The Abdali project, representing a clear realization of such neoliberal urban restructuring efforts, is facilitated by the state's socioeconomic transformation program. Blessed by the state's public discursive shift that concentrates on economic prosperity and encourages international investment, the Abdali project — by turning its back to Amman's original downtown, which is only about 1.5 km. away — is anticipated to lead to urban geographies of inequality and exclusion and spatial and social displacement, as explained above.



Fig 1 Gold Market in historic Tripoli in Lebanon. This old *souk* represents one example of several efforts for urban regeneration in the city's international donors like the World Bank. Most of such efforts center on provision of pavement, light posts, and canopies; which the author of this chapter had termed "urban cosmetics". Similar projects are taking place in other Lebanese and Jordanian towns, with circulating images and "heritage" details. (Photograph taken by Rami Daher, 2002)

Fig 2 The old core of the historic city of Salt, Jordan. This city is in the process of undergoing schemes for urban regeneration and tourism development funded by donor agencies (JICA and the World Bank). Similar design guidelines and project objectives (that center primarily on urban cosmetics) are shared by several other Jordanian and Lebanese towns, of which Salt is but one, leading to the disintegration of local differences within the region. (Photograph taken by Rami Daher, 2000)



Fig 3 The Saifi Village is part of the reconstruction efforts in downtown Beirut after the civil war, known as the Solidere Project. The Saifi Village is an upscale adaptation of existing historic fabric into chic and expensive apartments that are becoming very popular among tourists from Saudi Arabia and from rich Arab Gulf States. The police in the picture are not City police, but rather security guards to provide a certain feeling of exclusiveness for this "gated community" in the center of the city.(Photograph taken by Rami Daher, 2005)

Socioeconomic and Spatial Polarization: Quartering Urban Space

This neoliberal urban restructuring phenomenon is not new to the world. Swyngedouw et al (2002), from a study incorporating 13 recent large-scale urban development projects in Europe, elaborated how most of these projects "accentuate socioeconomic polarization through the working of real estate markets (price rates and displacement of social or low-income housing), changes in the priorities of the public budget that are increasingly redirected from social objectives to investments in the built environment, and the restructuring of the labor market."

Amman's Abdali , modeled after Solidere (and, in fact, enjoying some of the same investors), is promoted by Mawared's brochures, web site, short video, and other promotional materials as the "New Downtown for Amman." New functions introduced include the American University of Amman, an IT Park, medical tourism, and different high-end commercial activities, in addition to a newly created civic "secular" plaza bounded by the State Mosque, the Parliament, and the law courts. This represents a symbolic replacement of the existing historic downtown and the current civic/urban symbols (e.g., the historic Husseini Mosque and the specialty Ammani markets). This will intensify the city's socioeconomic and spatial polarization, not only between east and west Amman, but also between this new elitist urban island and the rest of the city.

It is very important to understand local/global relationships vis-à-vis the latent processes of urban inclusion/exclusion and the power mechanisms embedded in such urban restructuring projects and corporate visions in Middle Eastern cities. It is interesting to attempt to understand also the effects of such socioeconomic transformation on the creation of new public urban space in cities like Amman and Beirut, which produce "a privatized public space" based on a highly selective definition of the public (Crawford 1995), thus triggering a new critical investigation of the meaning of public/private and inclusion/exclusion (Anderson, 1995). The Solidere project is producing "gated communities" that are isolated from the rest of the city and that are facilitated by this privatization of planning.

In Beirut, Solidere worked to annex different parts of the downtown area to the Central District and demarcated that district from its periphery (Saliba 1997-b). This notion of "island planning," wherein certain urban development projects turn their backs to adjoining areas, has become a contested reality that deserves further contemplation. For example, the issue of reconnecting Beirut's Central District to its periphery is now a preoccupation of planners and urban designers (Saliba 1997-a). The same problem is expected to appear in Abdali and is referred to by Sassen (cited in El-Sheshtawy 2004) as the "quartering of urban space." The result will be a fragmented city, a patchwork of discrete spaces, with increasingly sharp boundaries (gated business centers, leisure, or community spaces). This is reinforced through a combination of physical, social, and cultural boundary formation processes.

Conspicuous and Unaccountable State Subsidies

In Beirut, the Solidere project eradicated the whole concept of property rights, divorcing the city of its social memory, in which it was no longer a "downtown" where the city's businesses take place and people of different social backgrounds go shopping. The compensation and consolation for the ex-owners of land and property took the form

of "shares" in the newly-erected multinational corporation, Solidere. In the case of Amman, the Abdali project will culminate in the displacement of the nearby existing Abdali transportation terminal, together with its drivers, informal vendors, and occupants, to the outskirts of Amman and away from the city center. The project will also definitely present fierce competition to the existing downtown, which is gradually disintegrating and is already suffering from a lack of economic vitality. Hall (1996, 152) elaborated how such projects of neoliberal urban restructuring create a "bourgeois playground" in the name of economic progress and induce considerable tension in the urban policy-making environment.

After clear observation and critical analysis of the details of the investments in Beirut and Amman, one realizes the bottom line: that the state is subsidizing large-scale investment for the business elite of the region to create flagship or mega-projects of urban restructuring. Contrary to formal state discourse, which advocates an absent state in such neoliberal privatization efforts, it is very clear that in these urban restructuring projects, the "state" is not absent, but is heavily involved and there to stay. Yet, regardless of the similarities in these two huge urban projects, the forms of their subsidies differ, according to the context of each.

In Beirut, for example, the financial contribution of the state is considerable. On the one hand, it cannot cash any possible tax revenues from the development for the first ten years. On the other hand, and most importantly, it had to compensate the private developer for the infrastructure works by allocating it 600,000 m^2 of land reclaimed from the sea that can be developed at very high densities (Summer 2005). In Amman, prime urban land made available for investment forms a greater part of the subsidy, but other forms of subsidy also include tax exemptions, infrastructure provisions, and elimination of all barriers and red tape, in addition to providing special building regulations to cover this particular development.

It is also important to compare the two cases in terms of the nature and details of the shareholding setup. In Beirut, Solidere's capital, initially valued at $1.82 billion when first issued, consisted of two different types of shares: Type A shares issued to holders of expropriated property in downtown, relative to the value of the expropriated property; and Type B shares (with an initial stock offer of $100 per share) issued to external investors.

Solidere's own rhetoric sugarcoats the Type A shares and rationalizes their facilitation by stating that "most lots in the Beirut Central District are owned by tens, hundreds, and in some instances (the *souk* areas) thousands of people." Therefore, the Type A shares were presented as the only "just" solution for such a dilemma. Furthermore, it was stated that "through this approach, the property rightholders would relinquish their rights in exchange for shares in the company, while investors would provide the required capital in exchange for shares in order to finance the project" (Kabbani 1997). Maha Yahya (2005) elaborated on the process of "emptying" the center" of Beirut and how the 4,000 previous residents never came back. This emptying of the center is already exerting negative consequences, not only on the ownership patterns and on the city's social memory, but also on the overall urban experience for users and tourists alike.

Fig 4 Billboard at Abdali, Amman's major neoliberal urban restructuring site. These images represent an Oriental vision of the Occident and are the only interface and source of information about the project between the multi-national realestate companies financing such urban restructuring endeavors and the public at large. The project promises a "new downtown for Amman," and a high-class built environment for distinguished tourism, shopping, working, living, and entertainment geared towards upper class Ammanis. (Photograph taken by Rami Daher, 2004)

In Amman, the Abdali Investment Company that was created is composed of only two main investors, Mawared and Saudi Oger. As a private real estate developer, the company is in charge of the management and the masterplanning of the project and is responsible for its implementation (similar to Solidere in Beirut). But the shareholder setup in Abdali is very different. The two main stakeholders in the company are Mawared and Saudi Oger, and no other company or individual is allowed to buy shares (Summer 2005).

Personal Activism Aspirations

It is interesting to note that regardless of the similarities between the Beirut and Amman projects, each of the projects has taken shape within a completely different local context and is consequently reshaped by it. El-Sheshtawy (2004) confirms that while certain processes in globalization may seem to come from outside (e.g., multinational corporations and the setting up of regional headquarters), those processes are activated from the inside by local actors. Furthermore, Swyngedouw et al (2002) elaborated on how such neoliberal urban restructuring projects are incorporated in localized settings, hence the term "glocalization."

The purpose of my presentation has not been simply to critique, but rather to contribute to understanding this new phenomenon of "neoliberal urban restructuring." My aim was to elevate the level and essence of the discourse and public debates about key crucial transformations in my city, Amman, while also keeping in mind a regional comparative framework; hence the comparison with Beirut and with Lebanon. I realize that this neoliberal mega-urban phenomenon is very difficult to challenge. I simply want to push and lobby for a public request on behalf of the city to the business elite who are making best use of this opportunity to at least pump a small fraction of profit and royalties into "my real downtown" Amman. Such a contribution could be considered as overdue taxes or charity, or even as a reversal subsidy.

Notes

[1] Public lecture by Seteney Shami, entitled: "Amman Is Not a City," presented at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at the University of California, Berkeley. The lecture, part of the center's Spring Lecture Series, was held in March 2001.

[2] This Ammani house was modeled on the Beiruti three-arched house and came to Amman with migrants from Syria and Lebanon. It was transformed and molded in Amman to suit the city's terrain and needs, which resulted in a distinctive hybrid type that was adapted for commercial and office buildings as well.

[3] *Al-Rai'* newspaper, October 5, 2005, Amman, Jordan

[4] Solidere: Lebanese Company for the Development and Reconstruction of Beirut Central District.

[5] Mawared: National Resources Investment and Development Corporation.

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Field Work

Diwan al Mimar Session with Rami Daher and Doris Summer (March 7, 2005), Darat al Funun, Amman.
Diwan al Mimar Session with Akram Abu Hamdan. (November 25, 2002), Darat al Funun, Amman.
Interviews with different Mawared personnel.
Interview with Millennium personnel.
Interviews with local communities in the Abdali area.

The Legal Framework as Preservation Strategy: A Comparative Look at the CHUD Approach in Lebanon

Nabil Sami Itani

Nabil Sami Itani is an architect restorer, currently in charge of the urban components in the Project Management Unit (PMU) for the Cultural Heritage and Urban Development project (CHUD).[1] *CHUD is a major World Bank initiative project that it is implemented by the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) across five main cities. Itani completed his studies in architecture at the Lebanese University (1986), received a master's degree (1992) and a PhD (2001) in Conservation of Historic Towns and Buildings from the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. During his journey in Belgium, he worked in the academic and architectural field. Soon after his return to Lebanon (2001), he taught theory and history of conservation in the postgraduate program at the Lebanese University. From 2001 to 2003, he joined the Minister of Culture's office and, next to his expertise in conservation, he was assigned the responsibility of setting up the official sites (airport, conference rooms, press-centre...) for the Arabic and Francophone summits held in Beirut. He led a number of consultancy studies, most recently the preliminary study for the rehabilitation of Hasbaya Citadel, assessment study for the Post Hall building of AUB, restoration of Khan al-Khayyateen, rehabilitation of the Lebanese National Library, and restoration of Rachayya Citadel.*

In my presentation, I wish to talk about the legal framework and the strategy adopted by the different projects known as the Cultural Heritage and Urban Development (CHUD) in the five historical cities of Baalbeck, Byblos, Saida, Tripoli, and Tyre. The framework, however, deals with only four of the cities, as Saida was covered earlier by a governmental entity in 1995. I will start with an introduction of the CHUD project and then I will talk about the actual situation of the legal framework governing the preservation of the cultural heritage in Lebanon and the conservation process of those historical cities. I will explain how this process has been adopted up until now, what is currently happening, and what we should expect in the next steps.

The CHUD project's objectives include the conservation and management of the Cultural Heritage in Baalbeck, Byblos, Saida, Tripoli, and Tyre. The project can be divided in a managerial way consisting of three different integrated components. The first is the urban component, which is the preservation of the historic city centers. The second

component is the archaeological, which deals with the archaeological sites in Tyre and Baalbeck. The third component is the requisite that ensures the sustainability of the project's objectives. This involves the strengthening of the governmental institutions in charge of the Cultural Heritage sector; specifically, the General Directorate ofAntiquities (GDA), the General Directorate of Urbanism (GDU), the respective municipalities, and other concerned partners. As for the institutional strengthening, this concerns the issue of Special Building Regulations (SBR).

The overall strategy of the project was to touch on the majority of historical and cultural layers, so as to utilize the different urban, social, economic, and other levels, and give new meanings and functions of heritage urban fabric while getting the community directly involved. As I highlighted, the project adopted an integrated planning approach, which included urban rehabilitation, archaeological preservation, socio-economic redevelopment, institutional strengthening, environmental upgrading, and coastal zones protection.

After this brief introduction, I will proceed with the actual situation of the legal framework. So, what is the actual situation? Let's talk about the governmental authorities; we know that several entities are involved in the project, specifically the DGA, the governmental entity directly in charge of the Cultural Heritage, and the DGU, which works in tandem with the DGA, since we are dealing in this project with the urban historical cities. As for the available tools, there are decrees, building laws, guidelines, policy incentives, and so on. We do not exaggerate when we characterize the current situation of the governmental authorities in relation to the Cultural Heritage as immobilized. We have authorities with a minimal budget, understaffed, an aging and old-fashioned workforce, and strong constraints on the recruiting of new and needed staff. If we look closely at the DGA, there is only one architect restorer to follow the restoration activities (public and private) for all for the Lebanese territories. Another characteristic of the authorities is that they are severely under-equipped. So, these limitations are all common to the authorities: the DGA, the DGU, and the municipalities.

Regarding the policy tools, most architects know very well that the legal framework governing the Cultural Heritage is outdated, where the urban and built heritage is only looked at and approached as archaeology. To exemplify, the national laws consider cultural monuments as only structures that were built before 1700, which means that Beit Eddine is not considered a national heritage! Furthermore, the current laws allow the classification of individual architectural elements, such as doors or window, as heritage apart from the structure where it exists, which means the laws allow us to dismantle the house as long as we can maintain our classified individual classified element. Another overt instance of our outdated law regarding the cultural heritage, after all the inflation that hit our national currency, the financial penalties remain as they were in the middle of the twentieth century.

At the same time, the DGA has no published guidelines that can be implemented to steer the owners in the way of interventions and in the maintenance or upgrading of their properties. At the time, restoration specialists were rare and their role or contribution was not specified per se. In Lebanon, integrating the role of various specialists within the conservation process — such as economists, social historians, etc. is relatively new. Thus, a multidisciplinary team of specialists will have to contribute jointly to the conser-

vation practice of our urban cultural heritage.

Another important issue is the centralization of the restoration permit process. If somebody in Akkar or Baabda wishes to restore his classified property, the permit must get the approval of the DGA and the DGU in Beirut. This process is tedious and lengthy and can take up to one year; at the end, by the time the permit is secured, the house will have collapsed!

At the outset of the CHUD project, issuing new Special Buildings Regulations (SBR) for the four cities Baalbeck, Byblos, Tripoli, and Tyre was a prerequisite for World Bank approval of the project's loan. The purpose was to ensure that adequate laws would safeguard the objectives of the project. During the processing of the SBR, many difficulties had to be overcome, such as getting the consensus of the multiple local and governmental authorities (DGU, DGA, municipalities, Higher Council of Planning, and others), conflicting effective laws, masterplans under preparation, and maintaining the specificities of each city. One SBR cannot and must not be applied across four cities. We have to deal with each city as an entity, looking at its urban tissue with its instruments and dynamics, at its built heritage with its methods and material of construction, the era of erection, and the prevailing socio-economic characteristics.

Coordination of the SBR with the existing and the masterplans under preparation was another critical task; it was an overlapping exercise to make sure that harmony was ensured.

Regarding some specificities of each city:

Baalbeck is an inland city, rich in archaeology and built heritage. The urban fabric is characterized by the presence of traditional individual houses and many mud introverted house clusters.

Byblos is a walled coastal city. It is rich in archaeology, built heritage, and individual pitched roof limestone houses with gardens.

Tripoli is an inland walled city. Its urban fabric is a complex composition of specialized narrow souks, residential areas, and historical monuments dating back to the Mamluk, Ottoman, and Mandate periods. The built heritage is introverted.

Tyre is a coastal city. It is rich in archaeology, built heritage, and introverted and individual garden houses.

How did we proceed to prepare these Special Building Regulations? I will cite an example. In Byblos, for instance, in the preliminary study we did a complete survey of the Old City. We looked at each house by house – the location, the quarter, the parcel. The survey also included the status of each house: its structure, architecture and used material, its owners, occupants, uses, and so on. This approach was implemented in all the cities, following a complete survey that went from the macro to the micro level.

What did we achieve by developing these new Special Building Regulations? Among are the following points of importance:

- *Free the city from the "freeze" of the construction and rehabilitation works.* In Tyre and Baalbeck, there are a lot of lands expropriated or blocked by the DGA for projected excavation purposes. These lands were never excavated, and furthermore in some cases, the DGA does not have the financial means to compensate the owners or to implement the needed works. Consequently, the old urban tissue of these cities is suffering from the presence of blocked empty

lands interrupting its natural development. Meanwhile, the new SBR allow the DGA to expropriate lands, providing they have enough financial resources to execute the excavations within a defined time frame.

- *Find appropriate solutions to lingering failures.* The new SBR will propose adequate solutions to problems which can't be regulated or integrated within the heritage urban tissue as well as illegitimate additions and habits.
- *Establish a new simpler and decentralized process.* The SBR should put into service a decentralized process and encourage the development of guiding tools (guidelines, checklists). Thus, some of the work can be approved locally; the concerned citizen can go to the municipality and get all the information needed to submit his permit request: documentation, plans, and so forth.
- *Involve multidisciplinary specialists in the implementation of the SBR: restorers, economists, social scientists, and others.* Since we are dealing with a highly complex urban tissue, the new SBR call for the creation of local committees in each city composed of multidisciplinary specialists; such committees will be able to look at the various aspects and come up with recommendations that answer the future needs of development.
- *Organize functions and activities within the Old City.* No more highly polluting industries or activities (such as gas stations, car repair shops, and warehouses) can exist in such a valuable historical urban fabric. Furthermore, the character of the specialized souks will be encouraged, as in the original traditional medina.
- *Respect the specificities and the diversities of the urban tissue.* The new SBR will capitalize on the values of all historical layers, and thus retain its unique architectural diversity. The early twentieth-century architectural typology can coexist with the Mamluk and Ottoman architecture, while maintaining the integrity of each era.

Notes

1 The Cultural Heritage and Urban Development (CHUD) Project is an initiative undertaken by the Lebanese government, with the support of the International Financiers (World Bank, AFD, FG, IG) in order to protect, rehabilitate, and revitalize the historical and cultural heritage resources of five selected peripheral cities: Baalbeck, Byblos, Saida, Tripoli, Tyr. The project has two key development objectives: (a) to create the conditions for increased local economic development and enhanced quality of life in the historic centers of five main secondary cities; and (b) to improve the conservation and management of Lebanon's built cultural heritage. Therefore CHUD presents for the first time a new governmental strategic approach to protect, preserve, enhance, and better present the country cultural heritage, both as a focus of national identity and pride, and as a unique magnet for the cultural tourism industry. One of the key successes, among others, for the sustainability of the CHUD objectives was the preparation of Special Building Regulations for each city. This presentation will try to highlight them in a comparative approach locally and regionally: a) the existing laws, b) the involved entities, c) the preparation process, d) and difficulties and next steps.

So Far, So Good: Ain Sofar as Textual Evidence

Sylvia Shorto

Sylvia Shorto has a PhD in the History of Art and Archaeology from the Institute of Fine Arts, New York University. Her doctoral dissertation, ***Public Lives, Private Places: British Houses in India, 1803-1853,*** *supervised by Jean-Louis Cohen, reflects her commitment to architectural conservation. Her current research is on hybrid domestic space in Lebanon. Shorto has been teaching at AUB in the Department of Architecture and Design since 2002.*

"There may be circumstances where no action is required to achieve conservation."
Burra Charter (1999), Article 14

This paper addresses the importance of the role of heritage preservation as an ongoing part of discourse formation. Using the late nineteenth-century summer settlement of Ain Sofar in Mount Lebanon as a case study, it explores ways that preservation might occur in specific conditions in contemporary Lebanon.[1]

Within carefully defined methodological frameworks, historic buildings either singly or in groups can be used as primary texts for interpreting the past. Towns and villages, ensembles of buildings, are complex primary texts. The information they yield can be used in combination with information from other sources — including oral accounts, official and unofficial documents and private papers in archives, and visual materials such as photographs — both to retrieve and recreate a memory of a place and to write its histories. If the written record is no longer extant, if it is inaccessible, or if it was never there to begin with, buildings as material culture will assume an increasingly important role in any present interpretation of the past.

Because every generation necessarily constructs its own historical perspectives, a central premise of this paper is that the protection of historic sites as texts is a responsibility to be taken very seriously. But how do we make informed decisions about which aspects of built heritage we should try to save as textual evidence? To what degree is the present generation responsible for enabling future historical interpretations? It is not self-evident that we would necessarily choose to pass along material things which were once valued from one generation to the next. It is very clear, nonetheless, that material culture can transmit information about immaterial values.

There are two principal ways to achieve preservation: through legislation or by voluntary action. We might think of them as "stick or carrot" methods. The first implies enforcement and control, the other seems spontaneous; although both can be shown on closer examination to be ideological constructs that are culturally specific. The two positions are, therefore, interconnected. Both can be equally effective in context. Legislation in Great Britain, for example, was first implemented using the stick and the element of surprise. In 1932, people were informed overnight that their properties had been graded and listed. Such an approach works only if two factors are in place: an authoritarian government and a population that is sympathetically inclined towards a particular reading of its own past. In the case of Britain, there was already a strongly nationalistic invented tradition that had begun in the mid-nineteenth century with the efforts of Ruskin and Morris.[2] Another more recent example occurred in 2002 in Bermuda, one of the most politically conservative places on earth, and a place that actively chooses to remain a colony of Britain. There, the Minister of Planning shattered a long-standing attempt to put an act through parliament to protect the built environment when he found that several of his family properties were on the list.[3] The public was so annoyed by his actions that they spontaneously reverted to the carrot method, and more than 70 percent of the owners concerned volunteered to have their properties listed — frozen in time — without any financial remuneration.

One reason for success in the examples cited above is that the people in both places had a common understanding of exactly which culture was being represented. Lebanon has no such unified self-perception; neither does it have any effective preservation laws. It has no popular public support for historic preservation, and no effective state control through legislation — despite a heritage history that might have encouraged awareness.

Preservation legislation was first locally introduced during the late Ottoman period, evolving from mentalities that also informed the traditions of Ottoman collecting. But in that tradition, the concept of patrimony was associated more with *athaar* (vestiges, ruins) than with *tourath* (heritage); the cognitive value was of a dead patrimony revealed through monumental buildings.[4] Today, Lebanon's official understanding of cultural heritage rests on the similarly constructed concept of antiquity that derives from the French Mandate period and is informed by the rational classicism that was the very ground of French culture. Written into the original Mandate document of 1919, it formed the basis for the subsequent law of 1933, a law that at the time of writing had not been updated.[5] In this definition, antiquity is taken to mean any product of human activity dated earlier than 1700 AD. It has been argued that this approach was part of an attempt to construct a Phoenician Lebanese identity that differed from the Aramean/Syriac one, thus situating the concept of preservation within an exclusive ideological framework that supported colonization.[6] A study of the founding of Lebanon's National Museum by French archaeologists in the 1920s and its archaeological collections, as well as the larger topic of interpreting building and decorative styles in Lebanon during that period, can be used to substantiate our understanding of knowledge value at the time this legislation was passed. That value did not include contemporary or Ottoman-period buildings.

Do we really need legislation or voluntary action to achieve historic preservation?

We can sometimes beg this question, as there is a third way. Preservation can happen by default, spontaneously and with no apparent agency. Preservation by default occurs across the social spectrum, although it is most identifiable at the extremes of the social scale. Squatters or very low-income tenants (such as the residents of the Mamluk Khan al Askar or Soldiers' Khan in Tripoli) often fiercely defend the places in which they live, know them stone by stone, but are too poor to make significant interventions. In this way, they save properties, at least temporarily, that might otherwise be demolished or inappropriately modernized as tourist attractions. At the other end of the spectrum, elitist sensibilities related to the value of a family name can cause properties to be defended tenaciously. Preservation by default is thus itself a manifestation of immaterial values.

Let's now look more closely at the case study. Ain Sofar presents an interesting combination of elements of all these mechanisms for preservation. Here, many historic structures, some of which were badly damaged during Lebanon's recent civil war, remain standing today with little change or intervention. Ain Sofar grew from a linear roadside settlement on either side of a ridge between two hills. Situated on a mountain route from Beirut to Damascus, it once comprised little more than a freshwater spring, some roadside khans, and the small dwellings of people who worked in the khans.[7] In 1858, the Beirut-Damascus carriage road, funded by French investors, was routed through Ain Sofar, and the area took on new importance.[8] Easier access, the pleasant summer climate, and spectacular views of the mountains and the Hammana Valley, soon attracted investors. Foremost amongst these were the Sursock and Tabet families. Musa Sursock, who died in 1887, already had extensive real estate holdings in and around Beirut, as well as in Egypt, Palestine, and southern Turkey. He had built several times, including the Sursock Palace (about 1860) and a summer house in Suq al-Gharb (in 1880).[9] Sursock and his son, Ibrahim Bey Sursock, now brought in an Italian architect to design a Grand Hotel for Sofar, begun in 1885. (Figure 1) The hotel, a determining factor in the further development of the settlement, was part of a larger package of land speculation still remembered somewhat resentfully by local people.[10] Ibrahim Sursock went on to invest in the DHP (Damas, Hama et Prolongements) railroad, also backed by French money.[11] The Beirut-Damascus line, laid after 1893 with a halt at Ain Sofar, gave momentum to communication within Ottoman Syria. The railway encouraged wealthy Christian Beirutis (as well as Egyptians who traded in Beirut) to build large summer villas, and gradually Sofar developed into an elite summer settlement. During the Mandate period, the French High Commissioner selected Sofar for his summer residence, strengthening social connections between Christian elites and the French.[12]

The inhabitants of Ain Sofar were not just wealthy landowners from Beirut who came for the summers. Originally, the administrative unit of the new settlement included lands from six older outlying villages in surrounding valleys.[13] It thus grew to include families from those villages, whose members provided services to households as well as to the hotel. The families also settled there in defined neighborhoods linked to the roads that ran out to their villages. They maintained close village connections, however, and often moved back in the winter. These patterns are exemplified in voting registration and burial practices. Ain Sofar was thus embedded in the network of its neighboring villages, which were primarily made up of Druze populations. A separate and parallel architecture



Fig 1 Postcard showing the Grand Hotel, begun in 1885

Fig 2 A semipublic cul-de-sac off the main street

developed, reflecting the social formation of the villages. For example, one area in Sofar has spatial organization similar to that in the village of Badghan, where the older urban fabric comprising dwellings clustered around a semipublic space. (Figure 2)

Hence, the original demographic structure of Ain Sofar was made up of elite primarily Christian summer residents from Beirut, as well as Druze residents from neighboring villages (many of whom also went on to build substantial houses in Sofar). Change began in the middle of the twentieth century. Several Christian residents sold their properties after the short war of 1958 and moved to Zahle and Kesrwan. Their properties were often purchased by Beiruti Sunnis, beginning a pattern that continues today.[14] Ain Sofar was badly damaged during the Lebanese civil war in prolonged fighting, because of its key location on the Damascus Road. Though summer residents stopped going there, many retained ownership of properties. But the village declined. Since the end of the Lebanese civil war, people from the Gulf have been buying property in the region. Saudi investors now own 60,000 m^2. Sheikh Nasser Khurafi of Kuwait, who over time purchased 51,000 m^2 from the Sursocks and the Tarabays, may now own as much as 100,000 m^2.[15] While some old properties are being rebuilt and there is some high-end gentrification by Gulf investors, many properties still sit as they were left at the end of the war because of conservative municipal policies.

Ain Sofar still preserves examples of several different house typologies in various states of repair. They are generally built of cut stone with red-tiled roofs. Two kinds of locally-quarried stone were used: white limestone and sandstone. Until very recently, there were examples of early houses with rectangular plans, such as the Hawa property (the summer residence of Lebanese President Alfred Naccache, from 1941), which bore the influence of mountain style and construction techniques. (Figure 3) Not surprisingly, because of the time the settlement developed, the most predominant house type is the late-phase central hall house with three arches. (Figure 4) The three-arch house has been politically situated in the context of the occidentalization of lifestyles among the privileged classes in Beirut during the last quarter of the nineteenth century.[16] This style then spread up the mountainside. In the early twentieth century, modified neo-Palladian plans evolved, such as the Moufarrej property, with its fine octagonal hall. Perhaps the best known, and certainly the most highly visible example, is Qasr Sursock, also known as the Donna Maria Palace. Built in 1910 by Alfred Sursock, its elevated site commanded attention from all points in the village.[17] With its two front-facing turrets, it proclaimed the presence of inhabitants who had power over the activities of the entire village. Asymmetrical, neo-gothic plans also evolved, such as the Yarah property, owned today by Sheikh Nasser Khurafi. (Figure 5)

The conservative municipality of Ain Sofar continues to actively promote an exclusive self-image. The history of the municipality's very composition emphasizes the relationship between its council and Beiruti landowners in Sofar. Ottoman laws governing the organization of municipalities in Mount Lebanon date back to 1877 and were revised periodically.[18] It was in 1913 that the Ottoman *Mutasarrifieh* first made provision for a local government in Sofar. The first municipality comprised a council of nine appointed members, reflecting the seasonal demographic structure of the village.[19] There was provision for two Egyptian councilors and four from Beirut. Municipal laws contained provisions for managing the business and the infrastructure of the village

Fig 3 The Hawa property (now demolished)



Fig 4 A symmetrical central-hall house

and collecting taxes to do so.[20] At the start of the Mandate period, a transitional law bridged a change from a revised Ottoman law (modeled on French regulations of 1884) to a new Lebanese Mandatory law, Decree 1208, which was passed in 1922. This created municipal councils of from six to twelve members, according to confessional affiliation. To serve on the council required being a literate property owner and a resident in a village. Decree 1208 stipulated that settlements of more than 500 registered voters were needed to constitute a municipality; but as it is unlikely that Sofar at the time had such a large permanent population, it was given exceptional status. In a large-scale administrative reform immediately after Independence in 1944, elected municipal councils were re-created at major points in the mountain. In Sofar, however, members continued to be appointed, because there was still not enough year-round population there. With periodic revisions, that law lasted until 1977, when new laws were applied, which lasted until after the civil war. During the war, there were no elections and the government was frozen. Since the end of the war, the selection of municipal councilors in Sofar has been by election.

Conscious attention to the protection and preservation of the unique character of Sofar began at the start of Lebanon's modern period, with legislative decree No. 61 LE of August 30, 1940, followed by a law of 1954 that regulated construction in the village, which was now classified as a "centre d'estivage." The administering municipal council was now actively charged with keeping Sofar attractive for its summer visitors. Several of the founding families heavily subsidized related public works, such as the scenic Corniche Park. Villa construction was strongly encouraged, and the height of any apartment building was restricted to three storeys, including the ground floor. (Figure 6) A set-back of at least three meters from neighboring lots was also imposed in built-up areas.

In 1968, the Lebanese architect Gregoire Serof was commissioned by the Director General of Urbanism (Public Planning Unit) to do a study of the district and make recommendations for Ain Sofar's future development.[21] Adjectives like refined, luxurious, and gracious, and concepts such as aristocratic cachet, often found in the architect's report, give an idea of the way the place was to be represented. The stated aims of the study were to preserve Sofar's character, while making necessary improvements to its infrastructure. This study was occasioned in part by requirements for a wider and safer road linking Beirut to Chtoura and Damascus. The now busy main road, designed for carriages, still ran through the linear village; and road deaths were reported yearly. It was not until after the Lebanese civil war that a new highway was finally realized. When this opened in 2002, traffic was diverted from the village, further enhancing its potential as a conservation area. Shortly afterwards, money was provided by the Ministry of the Displaced to uniformly restore the facades (though not the interiors) of all the houses along Ain Sofar's main street.

The railroad that had once spurred the original development of Ain Sofar had also caused a growth surge in the nearby towns of Aley and Bhamdoun, but development was different there, as were historical circumstances. Bhamdoun grew from a pre-existing farming village.[22] Aley was a new settlement; but both developed into centers for commerce and entertainment. While these places have changed rapidly, Ain Sofar, as a result of conservative municipal politics, has seen limited new development and still prides itself on its quiet exclusivity. This sets it apart. When we were recently conducting

interviews, we were told by the municipal president, "The municipality refuses to transform Sofar into a new Bhamdoun or Aley, full of restaurants and loud people."[25] In fact, there is not a single restaurant in Ain Sofar today.

Because of its present state of preservation, Ain Sofar has been chosen for a more detailed study on the interrelationship between material culture and the broader spectrum of immaterial values of a diverse yet identifiable community.[26] Until very recently, definitions of heritage resided solely in the material layer of culture, which was commonly subdivided into two categories: the representative and the rare. In a 1982 article entitled "Mind in Matter," Jules David Prown refined the definition of material culture as: "The study through artifacts of the beliefs — values, ideas, attitudes, and assumptions — of a particular community or society at a given time."[26] The underlying premise here is that artifacts — objects made or modified by man, taken to include at the largest scale cities or designed landscapes and at the smallest, buttons or pins — reflect consciously or unconsciously, directly or indirectly, the beliefs of the individuals who made, commissioned, purchased, or used them, and by extension the beliefs of the larger society to which they belonged.[26] For Prown, and for a generation of scholars working in his discipline, artifacts, through the different systems of value embodied in them (utility, aesthetic, scarcity, spiritual), are primary texts for actively reading history.

The importance of heritage in the West is perhaps an index of the anxieties of contemporary society over the rapidity of change, a trend that has been growing since the 1960s. But when it comes to setting standards for heritage decision-making and legislation, the application of Western values onto cultures with a different, albeit now rapid, growth trajectory is problematic. Here, the notion of relative value is critical. Because of entrenched ideological mentalities that lie behind the discourse of historic preservation in the West, relative value has been slow to find its way into thinking on cultural heritage. The Burra Charter was a bridge to those ideas. The Burra Charter was the first of the International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) charters that originated outside Europe. In its updated 1999 version, it articulates the idea of a "values" approach to preservation. The Charter recognizes the need to involve different stakeholders in the decision-making process, particularly those that have strong associations with a place. The Charter also clearly defines a number of terms and concepts that had been somewhat ambiguous in the earlier European charters. According to the ideals set out in the Burra Charter, the intention of conservation (both in idea and in practice) is to maintain, and in particular cases, to recover the significance of a place for future generations. The Charter was the first to use the term "cultural heritage," and this term reflects awareness of the acceptance of complex cultural differences. The Charter also recognizes the necessity of involving people in the decision-making process, particularly those that have strong associations with a place.[27] These are useful ways of thinking when multiple values are at issue.

It is not clear that heritage preservation can fully exist outside the trap of the commoditization of history, as the very act of investigation, let alone intervention, is enough to inscribe heritage onto a different and more self-conscious page of history. However, the less a place is intervened upon, the less self-conscious its projection. Because of its historical circumstances, change has been slow to occur in Ain Sofar. Here, we have a site where the different values of different cultural groups are clearly

Fig 5 The asymmetrical, neo-gothic Yarah property



Fig 6 A three-storey apartment building from the 1950s

and unselfconsciously represented in its present state of preservation. The value-driven model that is evolving worldwide defines heritage as social action, while recognizing culture as process.[23] If the settlement starts to change, if it moves away from its present stasis, and if we were to want to implement its values through legislation, adequate information will be needed to understand what those values might be.

Historic places enrich people's lives, providing a deep sense of connection to community and landscape, to the past and to lived experiences. We now need to know more about how people's lives are enriched by connection to the lived experiences of the past in order to make valid preservation decisions for the future. And we need buildings as texts in order to do so.

Notes

[1] I would like to thank Abdallah Tabet, Doris Summer, and Mona Abdel Khalek for their research assistance for this paper.

[2] Jukka Jokilehto, *A History of Architectural Conservation.* (Amsterdam: Elsevier Butterworth Heinemann, 2004).

[3] Sylvia Shorto, "Our Architecture at the Millennium." (*Bermudian Magazine*, September 1999).

[4] See May Davie, 'Le patrimoine architecturale et urbain au Liban: enjeux et identités dans la genèse du patrimoine Libanaise' (1997). Accessed at http://almashriq.hiof.no/lebanon/900/902/MAY-Davie/patrimoine.html. The first Ottoman law regarding museums and antiquities, the 1869 Antiquities Law, Article 1, states: "All the vestiges of the former peoples of the countries forming today the Ottoman Empire." Modifications to the law were passed in 1884 and 1906.

[5] Haute Commissariat de la Republique Française en Syrie et au Liban, *Règlements sur Les Antiquités* (Beirut, 1935). I would like to thank Fadi Chayya for drawing my attention to this document.

[6] Davie, op. cit. Davie points out that the French stressed those parts of the history of the region that might also legitimate their Mandate: the Romans, the Phoenicians, the Crusaders.

[7] It has been suggested that there was a far older settlement on the site, but this is unproven. There are no old burial sites in Sofar; even today, bodies are often returned to the surrounding villages. See Gregoire Serof's unpublished report, p. 38. I am grateful to Abdallah Tabet for providing me with a copy of this report.

[8] Municipal Archives of Sofar, *sijilat el kararat* no. 2 [1933-1946], J6/10/1936, p 53.

[9] Leila Tarazi Fawaz, *Merchants and Migrants in 19th Century Beirut* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983) p. 93.

[10] Interviews with residents of Sofar, conducted in spring 2005.

[11] Fawaz, op. cit.

[12] This French residence was completely rebuilt in the 1970s.

[13] The villages are Sharoun, Magdel Baana, Qurayya, Qubbayh, Badghan, and Shebbaniyeh.

[14] Sunni families included the Salam, the Daouk, and the Bayhum families. Recently, the Tabet heirs sold their two important villas to a company owned by the late Rafik Hariri.

[15] Interview at the Sofar Municipality, January 2005.

[16] See Nada Sehnaoui, *L'occidentalisation de la vie quotidienne a Beyrouth, 1860-1914* (Beirut: Editions, Dar an-Nahar, 2002).

[17] In an interview in spring 2005, Lady Yvonne Cochrane said that it was designed by her father, Alfred Sursock, who married at the age of 50 (in 1920) and died shortly after her birth in 1922.

[18] Nawar Nassib El Aramouni, "The Municipality of Sofar and its Role in the Development of the Village, 1913-1915". (Thesis paper, Jamiat El Binifsageh, 2004), p. 45 ff.

19 These included Effendi Yacoub Karam, Yousef Pharaon, Michel Bey Ibrahim Sursock, George Effendi Tabet, and Sheikh Hussein Abou Fakhreddin. See El Aramouni, op. cit., p. 51

20 The municipality was responsible for widening and naming streets, managing markets, squares, and public buildings, installing infrastructure and lighting, and providing health and social services. The municipality could also regulate transportation, host events, build low-income housing, administer the public bathhouse, and generally control economic activities in the village. Al Aramouni, op. cit., pp. 48-49.

21 See footnote 7

22 The different development of Bhamdoun is addressed by Kamal Salibi in "Bhamdoun: Historical Portrait of a Lebanese Mountain Village" (Oxford: Center for Lebanese Studies, 1997).

23 Interview at the Municipality of Sofar, January 2005.

24 Research is currently being undertaken by Sylvia Shorto with the assistance of Doris Summer, Mona Abdel Khalek, and Lina Abu Rislan.

25 Jules David Prown, "Mind in Matter" (*Winterthur Portfolio 17*, Spring 1982), pp. 1-19

26 Prown, op. cit.

27 Burra Charter. www.icomos.org/australia/burra.html 1999 version, introduction. See also Peter Marquis-Kyle and Meredith Walker, "The Illustrated Burra Charter: Good Practice for Heritage Places" (Burwood, Vic: Australia ICOMOS, c. 2004).

28 See Erica Avrami, Randall Mason, and Marta de la Torre, "Values and Heritage Conservation" (Los Angeles: Getty Conservation Institute, 2000). Accessed at www.getty.edu/conservation/publications/pdf_publications/valuesrpt.pdf

Comments on Session II

Robert Saliba

First, I would like to draw some similarities between the three papers by Rami Daher, Nabil Itani, and Sylvia Shorto. I will then focus on some critical issues to start the debate. A common point is the problematic perception and definition of the notion of heritage; we are witnessing a national discourse that excludes the plurality of the recent past, while relying on the archaeological evidence of some perceived beginnings. In the case of Lebanon, we have the Phoenicianist discourse and in Jordan a fascination for Nabataean civilizations.

Second, for the past decade we have been witnessing the importation of two main revitalization models. The first is heritage tourism subsidized by international donor agencies leading mostly to short-term implementable projects with no considerations for long-term regeneration strategies. We have the examples of Amman and Jerash in Jordan and the five historic cities in Lebanon. The second model is corporate revitalization subsidized by large-scale investments leading to socio-economic and spatial segregation. Two examples are Beirut's Solidere and Amman's Mawared's Abdali Project. A third model proposed by Sylvia Shorto is conservation by the default or no action process, which occurs in the context of an authoritarian government and the sympathetic attitude towards the past, or in the case of Lebanon in the absence of the market pressure and conservative municipal politics like Ain Sofar.

Preservation by default brings a key question posed by Sylvia: can historic preservation exist outside the commodification of history? I would like to direct this question to Rami and Nabil. I have a second question to Nabil concerning the five historic cities project: what was the impact of the stakeholder analysis on the second phase of the project?



III The Politics of the Present

Politics of the Past in a Global Context: A View from Istanbul

Ayfer Bartu Candan

Ayfer Bartu Candan is an assistant professor of social anthropology at Boğaziçi University (Bosphorous University) in Istanbul, Turkey. She received her PhD from the University of California at Berkeley in social and cultural anthropology. Since then, she has taught at Koç University in Turkey and at Stanford University in the United States. Her research interests include urban anthropology, politics of history and heritage, contemporary uses of the past politics of archaeology, anthropology of tourism, and visual anthropology. She is currently engaged in several projects, including a study on the politics of the past in the context of a 9000-year-old archaeological site in Turkey and in research on the emerging forms of urban segregation and "gated communities" in contemporary Istanbul.

This paper aims to examine the cultural heritage of Istanbul with regard to the preservation and revitalization of Pera/Beyoğlu[1]. The politics of heritage (Errington, 1989; Handler, 1985; Herzfeld, 1982, 1991; Johnston, 1982) has drawn attention to the ways in which history, memory, and the past have become the politics of the present, and the complex and multilayered meanings of heritage have acquired different sites and periods. In the discussion over Pera, my focus is on two periods, the 1980s and 1990s, which have been marked by major controversies concerning this area. My intention is (a) to show how Pera became a site of struggle and how the symbolism of Pera became a powerful political tool in complex ways in which this heritage has been used as a symbolic capital by different groups, (b) to discuss the ways in which different readings of the past inform and shape cultural heritage, and (c) to draw attention to the centrality of heritage politic.

The heritage of the city is neither unique nor new in Istanbul. In different periods, conscious efforts were made to transform the urban form of the city for different ideological, economic, and political purposes (Çelik, 1986). The domains of identity, which may have been formulated in different terms, have always been contested. But each historical period produces its own set of contingencies and possibilities in terms of what constitutes heritage.

When I discuss the different readings of the past, my intention is not to present them as misreadings of the past nor endorse a postmodern pastiche of various free floating representations of the city. The conflicting or selective representations of the city and its history should be distinguished from such a postmodern perspective, which is apt to forget that these representations reflect and maintain structures of power and domination. The existence of multiple interpretations does not necessarily mean that all are equally valid and tenable, but it is necessary to understand in what sense all of the accounts are correct. The challenge is to understand the different historical contexts and situate them within the existing power relations.

Beyoğlu/Pera

Pera has always been a marked neighborhood in the city. It was established as a Genoese trading colony in the thirteenth century and controlled the trade routes in the area. The Byzantines referred to the area as "Pera," which means "beyond", "far away" in Greek (Rosenthal,1980). Geographically, Pera was located on the other side of the Golden Horn, and because of its autonomy, the Byzantines did not have control over the area. When the Ottomans conquered the city in the fifteenth century, this Genoese colony formed an alliance with the Ottomans, but still kept its autonomy as a trading colony. It was in the beginning of the nineteenth century that the native minorities of the Greeks, Armenians, and Jews started to move into this neighborhood. Pera became part of the empire when much of the non-Muslim population was referred to as Levantines (the descendants of Europeans that settled in Istanbul, some of them the offspring of intermarriages with other minorities).

For the Ottomans, Pera represented the "Frank"[2] Istanbul and they referred to this area as "Beyoğlu". By the nineteenth century, it had become the financial and entertainment center of the city. It was the area where the embassies were located; the Pera Palace Hotel was built here for the passengers of the Orient Express. It had become the most affluent neighborhood of the city, where most of the non-Muslim merchant families of the empire lived.

In the late nineteenth century, the Ottomans made an effort to transform Istanbul into a Western city and designated Pera as an experimental area for urban reform. The area was intended to be a model of urban planning for the rest of the city (Çelik,1986; Rosenthal,1980). The selection of Pera was not accidental, given the popularity of the area and its largely European and/or non-Muslim population. Pera became a showcase of urban reform and the first "Europeanized" quarter of the city, dominated by symbols of modern living such as office buildings, banks, theaters, hotels, department stores, and multi-storey apartment buildings.

With the transformation of the Ottoman Empire into the Turkish nation-state, Istanbul lost its status as the capital. In contrast to the new capital city of Ankara, which became the symbol of the new republic and of secularism and enlightenment, Istanbul symbolized the decadent capital of the corrupt Ottoman Empire and its entrenchment in Islam. But even during this period, Pera remained as the symbol of "civilization" as "Europe in Istanbul" for the Turkish bourgeoisie. Over the years, given the changes in its population, it can also be seen as a symbol of the transformation from empire to nation-state (Arkan,1993).

Starting in the 1950s, most of the buildings in this area were squatted by migrants from the countryside. With its nightclubs and bars, Pera also started catering to the nouveau riche merchants who migrated to the cities. Although the population of the neighborhood changed drastically over the years, Pera still contained the most well-preserved nineteenth-century urban fabric in the city.

Remaking of Pera in the 1980s

In the mid-1980s, it was the center-right government of Turgut Özal that made the challenge of transforming Istanbul into a "global", "world-class" city. Under the government of Özal, Turkey opened its gates to a massive intrusion in the global market of capitalism, lifting former tariffs on foreign goods and allowing more multinational companies in. With this intensified activity in global goods, capital, and culture, Istanbul emerged as a showcase, with shopping malls, five-star hotels, high-rise buildings, and entertainment centers.

In an effort to transform Istanbul into a global city, the government of Özal and its mayor Dalan were keen on "transforming Istanbul from a tired city whose glory resides in past history into a metropolis full of promise for the 21st century" (Keyder and Öncü,1993: 29). The image of the city as "the East in the West and the West in the East" and "the gateway to the Orient" was mobilized in marketing Istanbul to mainly foreign investors and tourists. Accompanying this marketing process was a series of highly publicized urban renewal projects of the 1980s through which Istanbul became a consumption spectacle.

The massive architectural project offered for Pera was a revitalization plan. The plan was to turn Istiklal Street (the main street in the area) into a pedestrian artery and open a boulevard (Tarlabaşı Boulevard), parallel to it which would connect the central Taksim Square (the main square in the area) with Atatürk bridge across the Golden Horn. Opening up this boulevard would require the demolition of most of the nineteenth-century buildings and relocating thousands of people.

As was the case with most of Dalan's projects, this revitalization/demolition project was a controversial one. What was referred to as "Tarlabaşı demolitions" dominated the public discourse in the 1980s. The most visible actors of this debate seemed to be Dalan and the Chamber of Architects (MMOB). Although this struggle was between "modernizers", referring to ANAP and its right-wing rhetoric and "conservationists" who were associated with MMOB and the left-wing position, I will argue that one should go beyond this dichotomous model to examine the more complex and multilayered meanings attributed to this area. This struggle over what this architectural heritage means can be read at different levels. At one level, it demonstrates how history and its relics and different readings of the past become a symbolic capital that can be used in contemporary political struggles. As with every revitalization attempt, this one also entailed a certain reading and interpretation of the past. Questions like what Beyoğlu looked like in the past, which Beyoğlu to revitalize and for whom, what Beyoğlu represents and to whom, became critical political issues. Different actors and groups had different narratives about the past and the present of this neighborhood. These stories about this physical landscape can be read as commentaries on the social, political, and cultural landscape.

At another level, these struggles bring into focus the pressing problems that Istanbulians face today, where notions of urban culture and urban identity are contested and reformulated within contemporary power relationships. What it means to be "Turkish", "European", and "Istanbulian" are contested around this built environment.

For the mayor Dalan, Beyoğlu was a place that needed to be cleaned, rehabilitated, and in parts, demolished. The proposed highway project was to take care of the traffic congestion in the inner city, and clear the area from illegal prostitution and drug traffic. Any canon of historical preservation was seen as an impediment to development and to the transformation of Istanbul into a "world-city".

For the Chamber of Architects, it was more of a political struggle against the policies of the center-right party that Dalan represented. Beyoğlu, and specifically the Tarlabasi demolitions, became both the physical and symbolic site of this struggle.

Although the main focus of MMOB's campaign was the illegal nature of the demolitions and concern about land speculation, positions within this group diverged as well. Some were more concerned about the racist overtones of the demolition rhetoric. "Besides the fact that these people don't know anything about urban planning, they are also racists. They demolished these buildings claiming that they have been the houses of Armenians and Greeks. One of them gave a speech next to a bulldozer covered with a Turkish flag. And this kind of thing does appeal to people; remember what happened on September 6th and 7th."[5]

Another powerful critique was the architectural one. Some argued that these buildings should be preserved because of their architectural value. "This architecture is a synthesis," argued one of the architects, "it is neither European nor Ottoman, it is Levantine architecture." They came up with an alternative tourism project to save the buildings from demolition. Besides the architectural value, this "synthesis" could have been used as an asset for the whole city through tourism. One of them suggested, "It is a disaster to pass a transit highway through the middle of the city. This is the only area in the city where you can find well-preserved buildings from the same period. Istanbul is a city within Europe with eastern culture; we have to use this potential." In a way, Dalan could use this potential in "marketing" the city. Given the divergences and different focuses, MMOB still presented a unified front opposing Dalan's projects.

The debate becomes more complicated when we examine the split among the left-wing circles. For some of the left-wing, these same buildings connoted yet another past. Rather than a synthesis, the architectural heritage of Beyoğlu symbolized nineteenth-century European capitalism and its alliance with the local population. It was the reminder of Europe in the Ottoman Empire. Here is what one of the prominent left-wing novelists at the time had to say about the demolition process:

> There are people who think that old Istanbul is destroyed. The thing which is destroyed is Pera and Pera has nothing to do with Turkishness. I don't see any problem with demolishing these buildings. Moreover, all of them were designed by Armenian architects. They are built in Western style. All are imitations. Their demolition will not be a great loss. They are the product of slavery years. Just as in India today British buildings are irrelevant, it is really unnecessary to preserve these buildings where the managers of the Ottoman Bank, Jewish families, and

> Turkish representatives of foreign investors used to live, and which are now being used for illegal prostitution. In other words, these places, which were all inhabited by foreigners, reminding Europe in the Ottoman Empire, are not the product of Turkish culture. (Arkan,1993: 27)

This account is striking in the contradiction that it conveys. A left-wing position allying itself with the right-wing rhetoric, disinheriting this heritage claiming that "it has nothing to do with Turkishness." This narration demonstrates both the power of the Turkish nationalist project and its ambivalent relationship with Europe. Although the Ottoman Empire was never colonized directly, it has been part of the growing capitalist networks, especially in the nineteenth century. As Keyder and Öncü (1993) argue, the empire was articulated with the European markets through the intermediary positions acquired by the indigenous (local) non-Muslim communities who were involved in trade. Their involvement allowed for the penetration of European influence in the absence of direct colonial presence. And Galata[4] and Beyoğlu, being the financial center and the residential area for families who were involved in these commercial activities, symbolized this penetration. Although the Turkish nationalist project was willing to identify with European civilization, it was also defined as a struggle against European imperialism. As a result, the local non-Muslim minorities became the symbol of this imperialism and became the targets of "ethnic cleansing."

When we turn to another set of narratives, which have been very much part of the public debate over Beyoğlu, we see different versions of what Beyoğlu symbolizes: Beyoğlu: a symbol of "civilization" and "elegance"; Beyoğlu: a "brothel"; Beyoğlu: a "foreign" heritage appropriated for "national" Beyoğlu.

For people who consider themselves the real owners of the city, the real Istanbulites, Beyoğlu represents the "ruralization of the city."[5] Although the Turkish nationalist project was, and continues to be based on the glorification of the peasant as the core of the new nation-state, for the urbanites it is a different story when those peasants come to the cities to stay. According to the chronology offered by these people, the change in the city started in the 1950s with migration from the countryside. The city was "conquered" by immigrants from Anatolia. Here is the way an older man, who comes from a well-known Istanbul family, describes this change:

> Istanbul was conquered again in the 1950s, 500 years after Sultan Mehmet's victory, by the Anatolian invasion. These people brought their own civilization to my city, instead of trying to adapt to ours. I am sure that none of these people have ever been to an exhibition in their lives, all they think about is getting enough money for a summer house. We became a nation of *lahmacun*[6] eaters, 50 years ago no one in Istanbul knew what *lahmacun* was, or if we did, we called it pizza.

This was a "lost city," "conquered by the Anatolian invasion." And Beyoğlu could no longer be identified with the Grande Rue de Pera [7], where one once saw "only well-dressed and well-behaved ladies and gentlemen". In this highly sanitized version of Beyoğlu's history, Beyoğlu became the site of nostalgia in this "lost city." This sanitized and nostalgic version of Beyoğlu's past is very much in line with the genre of "nostalgia"

literature that became very popular at the time. Since the 1980s, there has been an abundance of bestselling books on old Beyoğlu. The authors of these books would agree that something had to be done for the revitalization of this quarter, to recreate the elegance of old Beyoğlu. As a result, they would not object to demolitions, if this would help in this kind of revitalization. But most had their reservations about this revitalization. What had once made Beyoğlu unique was its people; preserving or restoring the buildings was a futile attempt, because they were not populated by the same people anymore, and thus the spirit of the place was lacking.

Another popular narration on Beyoğlu was the "brothel" version. Some were puzzled by the rhetoric of elegance regarding Beyoğlu. An actor, who lived in Beyoğlu for twenty three years, said, "Beyoğlu has always been one of the most popular red light districts of the city and still is. I don't really understand what elegance these people are talking about and I don't see any reason why this neighborhood should not be cleaned up. I don't have any objections to the demolitions."

A compromise position was offered by an activist who was highly critical of Dalan's projects. He suggested that "we need neither the nostalgic nor the brothel version of Beyoğlu. We need a national and clean Beyoğlu. One cannot argue that since people are gone, we should also get rid of the buildings. We are neither Franks nor Levantines. We have to restore these buildings and open them up for tourists. We should be the hosts and Levantines should be the guests" (Gülersoy,1987: 46). This heritage that has been identified with the "Franks" and "Levantines" could be appropriated to create a national Beyoğlu.

All these different positions reveal a complicated picture of the various meanings people attributed to this environment. What was Beyoğlu all about? What did this built environment represent? Could one think of it as "heritage"? If so, was it worth preserving? Who was the audience for any kind of preservation and/or revitalization of this area? Some argued that it should be demolished because of what old Beyoğlu was. Some suggested that it should be demolished to recreate old Beyoğlu, although most had reservations about its revival. Some argued that it should be preserved because of what it was, emphasizing its architectural value and potential for tourism. But the questions of which Beyoğlu, whose Beyoğlu, and for whom still remained the relevant issues.

Different Chronology: The Legacy of Istanbul and Pera in the Islamist Imagination

Within the Islamist discourse, the popularity and resurgence of the Ottoman past and of Istanbul take on a very different form. As a movement that challenges the Turkish nationalist project (which defines itself in opposition to the Ottoman past), the Islamic movement attempts to revitalize and resurrect that past. In this reading of Ottoman history, everything Ottoman becomes a symbol of Islamic ideology and can be utilized as a powerful political tool to challenge the Turkish secular enterprise. The Islamist aim is to resurrect the lost glorious Ottoman past. Istanbul, the glorious capital of the empire, is a key symbol for this revival.

The Islamist discourse contains a chronology of the changes in the city in a form that is quite different from the one proposed by secularists. For them, the real history

of the city starts with the conquest of Constantinople in 1453 by Sultan Mehmet. In this historical narrative, Istanbul represents the organic unity and justice of the Ottoman (read 'Islamic') rule. The city embodies a pristine purity prior to the Westernizing reforms of the nineteenth century. The authenticity of the city is claimed to be lost with Westernization, but the site of this loss and nostalgia is quite different. As an Islamist intellectual put it, "There are three Istanbuls. One is the Byzantine Constantinople, the second is the Ottoman-Islamic Istanbul, and the third one is old Pera. This last was never Islamicized and its extension now is quarters like Şişli, Mecidiyeköy, Levent, and Bebek, which are inhabited by modern business offices, skyscrapers, entertainment centers, big hotels, all buildings symbolizing the modern world. *The essence of Istanbul is the part which reflects its Ottoman-Islamic identity*." (Dursun,1995:15) [*author's emphasis*]

Given that Pera was the symbol of order and modernity for the Westernizing reformers when the first urban reform took place, it is not surprising that within the Islamist discourse this is exactly the place where the urban problems started in the first place. Another Islamist intellectual suggested, "Pera, which is marketed as the symbol of Istanbul's civilization and elegance with words like 'culture', 'civilizational heritage' and 'nostalgia', is actually the place where our contemporary urban problems emerged" (Müftüoğlu,1995: 9). It represents the cosmopolitan degeneration and the symbol of foreign cultural invasion. "Istanbul has been owned by the Turks since 1453 with one exception, Pera, which has always been a sore in the Empire's brain, a Frank sore" (Bora,1995: 49).

As one might expect, the tensions over the identity of the city took their most overtly political form during the municipal elections of March 1994.

The "Reconquest" of the City:
The Municipal Elections of March 27, 1994

The municipal elections of March 1994, in which the Islamist party *(Refah)* had an overwhelming victory, played extensively on these issues of identity and ownership. The following is not intended to be an exhaustive analysis of the elections, but rather a partial discussion of campaign themes pertinent to the issues and their specific ramifications for Beyoğlu.[8]

During the election campaign, all the parties except *Refah* embraced the global city project. The candidate of the Social Democratic Party summarized what the election was about in terms of people choosing between making Istanbul a "Middle Eastern" city or a "European" one. *Refah*, with slogans of "just order" and "a new world", was the only party that alluded to the groups that were excluded by the global city project. *Refah* called for the "conquest of the city the second time" by those they referred to as the "real owners of the city".

The election results were a scandalous development for the secularist circles. *Refah* won the elections in most of the big cities, including the greater municipality of Istanbul and most of its districts. As one sociologist put it, "Refah's most celebrated aim, 'to conquer Istanbul a second time', has now become the nightmare of the elites" (Bora,1994: 4). The destiny of the city would no longer be determined by the previous "owners of the city", but by the "outsiders" who have settled in its peripheries. Although there was a general sense of shock among the secularist circles after the elections, the

results in Beyoğlu were the most controversial of all. It was difficult for the secularists to believe that in this somewhat marginal entertainment center of the city, with its many bars, restaurants, and night clubs, *Refah* could win.

The victory of *Refah* in Beyoğlu meant different things for different groups. For secularists, it was the fulfillment of their worst nightmare. It was seen as a rupture in Beyoğlu's history. It was the end of Istanbul as they had known it, and Beyoğlu would be the most visible public space of this transformation.

But for *Refah*, the symbolism of Beyoğlu took an interesting turn both during the election campaign and after the elections. Although in the Islamist narrative, Beyoğlu represents cosmopolitan degeneration, for *Refah*, Beyoğlu became an essential symbol combining many of the campaign themes. For party officials, it was a crucial opportunity to demonstrate the Ottoman model of government, which they defined as the co-existence of different life-styles in peace and harmony. This theme was highlighted in *Refah*'s description of Beyoğlu in the campaign brochure. It read as follows: "Beyoğlu: A Different World. Beyoğlu has always been made up of different cultures, languages and faiths. Whatever their faith or language was, they all lived together in peace and harmony. Beyoğlu embraced everyone." Given its depiction in this narrative, Beyoğlu was the perfect place to resurrect the Ottoman model. For party officials, it was this model which had enabled people from different ethnic and religious backgrounds to live in peace and harmony for centuries. Beyoğlu has been the symbol of this cosmopolitan coexistence of different groups under the tolerant Ottoman (read 'Islamic') rule. Although the population of the area had changed drastically over the years and most of the non-Muslim population of the area had had to leave the country, for *Refah*, Beyoğlu was still the perfect place to resurrect the harmonious Ottoman past.

This was also a chance for *Refah* to refute the secularists' portrayal of *Refah* and Islam. If *Refah* represented anything in relation to Islam, it was the tolerance of Islam. *Refah*'s self-representation was that, just like Beyoğlu itself, it would embrace everyone. The new mayor was keen on underlining this theme both during the campaign and after the elections. The mayor's visits to all the synagogues and churches in the area were one of the highlights of the election campaign.

Contrary to many secularists' expectations, the mayor was also enthusiastic about preserving the architectural heritage of the area. The architectural heritage of nineteenth-century capitalism could be used as a tool to critique the architecture of late capitalism, which is most concretely represented by the skyscrapers in the city. Pointing to Galata Tower, the mayor asked, "This tower, symbol of Beyoğlu, when compared to the minarets in the old times, was qualified as bulky. Compare it now with the contemporary skyscrapers; doesn't it look so elegant?"

Claiming the Quarters Back: Different Strategies

The post-election period manifested different strategies of various groups to claim Beyoğlu and to inscribe new meanings in this old quarter. Through the analysis of these different strategies and practices, one can see how these discourses on the identity, the past and the present of the city, are both embedded and played out in social practice.

One of the fiercest political battles was over the Islamist party's proposal to build a mosque and Islamic cultural center in Taksim Square located in Pera. The choice of this square and the specific location of the mosque were not coincidental. It was to be located across from the Greek Orthodox Church, and would also be competing with the Atatürk Cultural Center, a powerful marker of Turkish nationalist ideology. The Islamist movement, challenging the secular nationalists' interpretation of history and their version of Istanbul's legacy, established an alternative version of national heritage apart from and in opposition to the official one. This alternative reading of Istanbul's legacy and identity was emphasized again by the mayor of the greater municipality in his defense of their mosque project. He pointed out that the idea was to highlight the Islamic identity of Istanbul.

The messages around this mosque were complicated and embodied different possibilities. For the party officials, the mosque represented the real mission and legacy of Istanbul and it became a cultural resource that was mobilized both for the local constituency and for a global audience. For the secularist circles, it was the last blow to the secular ideals of the Republic. For the financial sector and the government that was interested in resurrecting and marketing a sanitized version of the Ottoman past, building a mosque in Taksim would jeopardize Turkey's chances of membership in the European Union.

This controversy took place at a time when the party officials declared that they were going to demolish the Byzantine city walls surrounding the historical peninsula. The motivation was put rather bluntly by one of the party officials: "We don't want a Byzantine Istanbul." At a time when historic preservation has been an increasingly common phenomenon globally, and has usually been framed as a sign of tolerance where everyone is expected to "join the global drive to preserve the great architecture of all periods and civilizations" (Herzfeld,1991: 67), this proposal of *Refah* led to a series of debates both within and outside the Islamist circles. Many issues were at stake: Whose heritage was going to be preserved and for whom? How would *Refah* sustain its image of multiculturalism and tolerance (at least, an image promoted by the moderate factions of the party)? How would demolishing part of the Byzantine heritage affect the potential for tourism in a city which caters to Western tourists, most of whom visit the city for its Christian heritage?

Proposing this demolition at a time when Turkey was applying for the Customs Union with Europe made it even more problematic, especially for the central government which had been trying to promote a Western-looking, secular image. The prime minister at the time, Çiller, flew to Istanbul the following week and held a press conference in front of the city walls, in which she focused on the historical value of this heritage. Given the pressures from within and outside the party, this proposal was withdrawn.

Concluding Remarks

The different positions, alliances, and strategies that I describe in this paper bring into focus complex meanings, heritage, and historical preservation/revitalization.The struggle over Beyoğlu brings up the issues of "who we are/ who we were". What it means to be Turkish, European, modern; what becomes "local" and "global" are negotiated and contested around this built environment. The struggles are shaped not only by the (re)imaginings of the past, but also by the forces of global politics and local identities in the present. Simultaneous (re)workings of local and global converge around the discursive and material practices around the buildings. Sometimes the buildings are Turkish, sometimes European, sometimes they are Levantine, sometimes they are "our own," sometimes they are the "other."

Although in the new race between cities, cultural identity of a city becomes essential material and symbolic capital. As Hall suggests, these identities are "far from being eternally fixed in some essentialized past, they are subject to the continual play of history, culture and power" (1989: 70). Cultural heritage, preservation, and conservation become contested domains through which the past, present, and future are (re)worked and (re)formulated. Globalization is inscribed within particular localities and is reworked within particular social, cultural, and historical contexts. Within this framework, past, heritage, and politics of the past take on a very different meaning, and which past to preserve and market and for whom, become political questions. Cities, as physical embodiments of histories, become crucial sites where different claims to the past are formulated and contested. This provides opportunities to explore the reworkings of modernity (Pred and Watts, 1992) and globalization through the politics of heritage in urban contexts.

Notes

1 I use the names Pera and Beyoğlu interchangeably to refer to the same area. Although these terms connote different meanings and histories, space limitations preclude any discussion here of the relevant politics of naming and boundaries.

2 This is a term which was used by the Ottomans to refer to Westerners.

3 September 6th and 7th events refer to the late 1950s, when the shops and houses of mostly Greek minorities were looted and burned down as a response to the news that Ataturk's house in Thessaloniki was bombed. The Greek minority was forced to leave the country. Although these events are rather recent, they are in no way part of official history, and they are hardly part of popular historical narration. Many people become very irritated when asked about these events.

4 Name of the harbor region of the area.

5 A more common term used for the description of this change in the urban scene is *arabesk*. See Stokes (1992) for the discussion of *arabesk* culture in Turkey in the late 1980s.

6 One of the characteristic foods of southern and southeastern Turkey and of Arab countries, *lahmacun* became popular in cities like Istanbul as of the 1950s migration to the cities. It is often mentioned by members of the middle and upper classes as a way of expressing their resentment of migrants.

7 The name which was used mainly in the nineteenth century to refer to the main street in the area. The name was changed to Istiklal Street (Street of Independence) with the establishment of the Turkish Republic.

8 See Çakır (1994) and Kalaycıoğlu (1994) for a more comprehensive analysis of the election results.

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The Ways of the Corpse: On the Preservation of Cultural Heritage (*)

Walid Sadek

(*) A revised version of this essay, titled "From Image to Corpse", a short story about 15 years of the 1990s, is published in the journal, *Naked Punch*, Issue 08, Fall 2006.

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Although one may still debate whether or not we were ever modern, it is nevertheless ascertainable that we are no longer so. One obvious index for such an assessment is the overwhelming insistence on the preservation of cultural heritage. In this postwar period, the Lebanese are often asked to exert costly efforts and provide a constant flow of evidence that they are worthy of a past they announce as theirs and yet is often unrecognizable to them. After a protracted civil war, the Lebanese are now paying the price of their internecine strife — they must congregate around a variety of mythical pasts and in the meantime tread over painful recent histories. Such is the aporia of civil war: the recent past turns prohibitive, while an ailing present lives on the hope that it may find in the mythical past a pretext for its survival. All in all, a ready formula for the remaking of citizenry — the rich as tourists and the poor as devoted custodians.

And yet we live, or rather survive, as long as we continue to sustain the debate over how to preserve our cultural heritage. I would like to think that our persistence in debating this issue is only a manifest concern for purchasing a lease on life; and that it is a latent poignant desire to escape the edicts of cultural preservation and turn instead toward the making of a compelling contemporaneity built in part on a consensual recognition that the recent past was comprehensively catastrophic.

To think of the present as it is, one cannot but grasp at this almost inebriating endeavor to preserve the cultural heritage. And yet, one ought to find ways to ask digressive questions, which can lead us away from the technical concerns of what has become a profession of cultural preservation and over the hurdle of whether or not the preservation ought to be conducted according to a top-down or bottom-up process. A

digressive approach, even an intellectual *dérive*, is necessary for us to apprehend the fascination with which the endeavor to preserve cultural heritage continues to enamor and ensnare.

A few years ago and already an epoch away, there stood, stretched across a billboard at the far end of Martyr's Square in Beirut, a large image announcing in pictorial terms the future of that square. From its location, the image appeared as a terminal statement: a destination, constructed according to the conventions of pictorial perspective into a visual pyramid precipitating what was then an ambiguous terrain that began somewhere beneath the Fouad Chehab Bridge and tended, hesitantly and without purpose, toward the sea. That image did more than simply announce a promising future for an arrested terrain; it inhaled the actuality of the terrain through the funnel of its converging lines into a future of its own visual depth. Rather than promise a feasible development out of current conditions, that image stood as an accomplished future looking down upon a protracted and derelict present turned dumb, tangible, and reduced to a primary materiality of dust and asphalt. The radical disjunction between the visible present and the visual future promoted that image to the rank of a vision that is wholly unrelated to the promise of representation. For although constructed in perspective, that image did not provide an adequate reproduction of the visible world.[1] The operative word here is 'adequate' and is used in the sense of a reproduction of a 'possible' world. Nor did it address a supposedly monocular observer grounded at the center of that visible world and unto whose eye everything is expected to converge to the vanishing point of infinity.[2] Rather, it was an image that hovered above the ground and was unconcerned with the visible world around it. And although it pretended to visualize a future, it did so without concern for an observer abandoned and without a clue as to how to bridge the obvious but un-addressed lack of kinship between the viewing ground and the vision.

If such an image may be said to hover, it is because it appeared irreferential. An image of a city rid of secrets. A transparent city schematically arranged for the free circulation of notations. A city radically oblivious to that specifically urban nourishment called *secrets* — nourishment that prods mistakes, solicits misunderstandings, and thus offers one the possibility to speak, divulge, and so perhaps be redeemed.

Yet the reason for the forceful impression left by that image lies elsewhere. Its irreferentiality to the actuality of the city was an index of the exorbitant but unavoidable cost of a dominant and global contemporaneity, marked by what Jean Baudrillard calls "the precession of simulacra",[3] an index of Beirut's inevitable subscription to a global economy capable of liquefying cities into exchangeable currency. In deploying a visual emblematic totality, that image unequivocally announced that the city ought to enter into this economy if it is to edge away from the brink of conflict and crisis. A rather haughty statement; for while the city was being called upon to pay the costly dues of that subscription, that image stood untouched, in itself the fruit of an immaculate conception with an already accomplished future.

Exorbitant as it may be, the annunciation of that image could not be ignored. It may be said that it afforded the viewer a rather perverse pleasure. In its irreferentiality, it appeared like a divinity, an event inspiring awe and dread, both enviable and fearsome. It was the embarrassing apparition of a radical disjunction with the tangible present:

a resurrection before which any inquiry about the provenance of the resurrected is overwhelmed by the spectacle and collapses thereafter. For it mattered not whence it came; what mattered was that it managed to appear untaxed by the gateways of past, present, and future. Resurrected, it stood, visible but persistently unintelligible — an image that folded the accumulated past into a purely visual preface, a prologue without speech, an event without consequences, an accomplished vision because divorced and unbetrothed, a simulacrum[4] before which one could do little else except be fascinated.

That image our simulacrum was malefic. Not only because of unconcern with the passions of redemption and indifferent to the binary structures of authenticity and superficiality, but also more importantly because it fascinated us to our own death. Said more clearly, fascinated we beckoned our own death. We did so because when in fascination, we slip into a temporal suspension and feel as if bathing in the plenitude of an object-less perception. A painless death it is, without corporeal protest and therefore ecstatic, in the etymological sense of being out of place. When fascinated, as when facing that image, we are in the presence of a figure without a ground, an apparition with no background. The experience of the durability of the world and the concomitant experience of an elastic temporality, which usually allows us to speak of a past and of a future turn, when *ek-static*, compact and immediate. The blissful and a-corporeal pleasure that it affords is precisely one of eliding the bipolar pull of time for a simultaneous suspension. It is then of no accident that when that image was removed it left no crumbs behind on the floor of the actual terrain. Having promised nothing, it left nothing behind. When it appeared, it did so immaculately, never addressing our expectations. And when it passed away, it did so imperceptibly.

Yet if a trace it did leave behind, then it must be all the walking dead, once enamored by the fascination of this unannounced visitor, surviving now in the midst of a disappointment.

One may argue that this image or simulacrum in review is not a return. It had no provenance and is therefore merely a visual concoction. One may argue further that without a provenance, no matter how tenuous and debatable, one cannot speak of a return. Therefore, this image is of no relevance to the issue of restoring and re-collecting the cultural heritage. Such an argument I find does little except safeguard the profession of preserving/conserving/managing/restoring and re-vitalizing the so-called inherited past. It does so by maintaining intact the principle of the real. Accordingly, the profession is preoccupied in searching for the most complete inventory possible, which is then offered, even if incomplete, or rather because incomplete, as compelling evidence that an unearthing and exhuming of a provenance is possible. I willingly confess that I harbor admiration for some of the actors in that profession, be they historians, architects, or urbanists. Specifically, those who recognize that their endeavor is poignantly allegorical and that the reading of the past is always haunted by the palimpsest. It is an admiration for those who do not skirt the opacity of what is past and do not layer it with a veneer of historicist discourses about the persistence of identity and the epic struggle to reconstruct it. Yet I find that one must challenge the dominance of the principle of the real if one is to dismantle the positivist assumptions underlying the endeavor of preserving heritage. Therefore, it is necessary to diverge from the polemics of the profession and argue instead, in light of the postwar experience in

Lebanon and Beirut specifically, that a return needs not a provenance. In other words, a successful act of preservation is essentially the implementation of fascination.

Now a certain man named Lazarus fell sick and died. He was the brother of Mary and her sister Martha of Beit Aanya. Upon hearing of the death, Jesus said unto his disciples: "Our friend Lazarus sleeps; but I go, that I may awake him out of his sleep."[5] Upon arrival, Jesus found that Lazarus had lain in the grave four days already. Jesus therefore "groaning in himself"[6] came to the grave. It was a cave, and a stone lay upon it. Jesus said, take away the stone. But Martha, the sister of him that was dead, said unto Jesus, Lord, by this time he stinks: for he has been dead four days.[7] Jesus insisted. They took away the stone from the place where the dead was laid. And Jesus cried with a loud voice, Lazarus, come forth.[8] And he that was dead came forth, bound hand and foot with graveclothes; and his face was bound about with a napkin. Jesus said unto them, loose him and let him go.[9]

This story is unique in the Christian New Testament, for unlike the resurrecting of Widow Na'een's[10] son and of Ya'eer's daughter[11], it tells of a resurrection wherein Jesus calls back a dead from behind the veil of the visible, from the moonless depths of the grave. The raising of Lazarus from the dead is told in the Gospel according to St. John. Little else is told of him except for what I consider to be a telling note, a coda, in the chapter that follows informing the reader that he who was dead sat at the table for supper along with Jesus, his disciples, Mary and Martha.[12] It is precisely this added information, this coda, that makes available the link between the event of a return and the structure of fascination. Let us recapitulate:

He who was dead came forth. But none asked whether he who is now alive is the same he who once was living. Lazarus returns. That is all. Resurrected, he re-surges[13] into the familiar and familial seat he once occupied before his temporary death. With his sisters, Jesus and the disciples, he sits at the table for supper. It is only with this coda, this supper with the resurgent Lazarus now in the familial seat that the resurrection is made complete. With this coda, continuity is reinstated in the place of rupture where grief laid heavily for four days. The object of grief re-surges to dispel the traces of that grief. What is remarkable in this story of a resurrection is that it stages the appearance of the radically other in the place of the familiar and the familial. Instead of mourning and remembrance, both of which are activities that involve temporal layering and hybrid chronologies, a presence is reinstated. Lazarus returning from the invisibility of the grave sits visible, supposedly fulfilling the promise that a return is not only possible but that it can also measure the distance back home. He returns to occupy his place seemingly unhindered by the passage in time through the gate of death, namely across the threshold of radical otherness. The resurrected Lazarus is fascinating because he returns unhindered; quite unlike Orpheus who descends into Hades as a distraught lover only to reappear guilt ridden and shouldering for the rest of his wayward days the consequences of having taken the illicit journey into the underworld.

And yet what is this figure sitting in the place of Lazarus? Who is this returnee unto the seat of the familial? (What are these Lazarian heritages with which we co-habit?) Is it possible for us to approach and maintain still our belief in the veracity of figure and ground? Will the figure swiftly separate from the background and ascend into the hyper-fascination of a simulacrum or will it slowly disintegrate under the weight of its own return?

Concerning Lazarus the gospel according to St. John provides no further mention. Nor do the other three gospels. Rather, it is in the work of novelist Nikos Kazantzakis, in his *The Last Temptation of Christ*[14] that the story of Lazarus is given a poignant and disturbing extension. In the novel, Lazarus does not vanish behind that posthumous supper. Rather, he is described and given corporeality. In other words, the fascinating appearance of the radically other in the place of the familial and familiar is approached and pursued. In the novel we read that the people of Beit Aanya congregated in and around the house of Mary and Martha to see and touch this man returned to life, this revenant:

> "Lazarus was sitting tired, leaning against the darkest corner in his home. Light bothered him. His legs, arms and belly were swollen and greenish like a four day old corpse. His bloated face was chapped, oozing a white slightly yellowish liquid staining the shroud that clung tight to his skin and wrapped around him. At first he exuded a foul stench. Those approaching him had to shut close their nostrils. Gradually the stench subsided leaving only the smell of earth and incense. Every once in a while, he would move his hand and undo some of the grass entangled in his hair and beard while his sisters washed the dirt and worms still stuck to his body."[15]

Moreover, upon receiving Jesus come to visit,

> "Lazarus attempted to stand but quickly gave up fearing that his creaking pelvis might break. He extended his arm and touched the hand of Jesus with the tip of his fingers. Jesus trembled. The hand of Lazarus was cold, black and smelled of earth." Jesus said unto himself: "This resurrected man teeters still on the edge of life and death. The Lord is yet to conquer the stench that hides in him. Never has death shown its true power as it has in this man. And Jesus was seized with fear and sadness."[16]

Later in the novel, the end of Lazarus comes at the hand of Barabas the zealot who lurks in the furze waiting in ambush. He attacks the frail Lazarus and

> "grabs him by the throat but quickly recoils in fear. For he felt as if he had taken hold of something extremely soft, like cotton, no – rather like air. His nails and fingers passed through it causing not one drop of blood."[17]

Barabas then grabbed him by the hair.

> "But both the hair and his scalp fell in his hand. And the skull shone in the yellowish light of the sun. Then he grabbed his arm and shook it violently "Say you are a ghost and I will let you go". But the arm broke off and fell into his hand. He then grabbed him by the back of the neck, pressed his throat against a stone, drew his knife and cut. But the knife did nothing as if incising a bundle of wool. The blood ran cold in the veins of Barabas and he wondered could it be that I am

> slaughtering a corpse?... Finally, overcoming his fear, he grabbed him from both extremities, just like one does when wringing a damp cloth before hanging it to dry, wrung and shook him hard. Lazarus' vertebras came undone and he broke in two at the middle. Barabas hid the parts under a furze shrub and ran away."[18]

For Kazantzakis, the corpse endures. Within the logic of his novel, the corpse functions as a corollary to the human suffering and corporeal doubt that is Jesus. But if we were to read the novel against the grain, it would seem that what Kazantzakis proposes is that the return of Lazarus is not quite a resurrection. Or rather that a resurrection cannot be complete unless the resurrected graduates hurriedly unto the realm of the divine. It is as if the road that leads the resurrected away from the darkness of the grave better head directly toward the ambient light of the eternal. For when the resurrected is brought back into the light of the sun, he returns and with him an accelerated corpse. Lazarus is such an accelerated corpse. He returns not from the past, but from the future with time elapsed clinging to his withering flesh. In this sense, Lazarus is time condensed.He returns with excess time, the weight of which gnaws at his joints and eats his flesh.

If this apprehension of Lazarus seems distant from the fascination of a simulacrum,and from the fascinating appearance of radical otherness in the place of the familiar and familial, it is because we have traveled far and have entered the domain of the corpse: that which is neither behind us nor is of the past. But rather that which is approaching, the coming future. Let it be said that this statement resonates deeply today. For it must be noted that the Lebanese, and for the first time in almost 16 years, recognize that the corpse has returned to their city center. It is therefore none too soon that we desist from resurrecting our putative heritage and apply ourselves in negotiating the comings of the future, in learning the ways of an allegorical future wherein the corpse is often near and always ours.

Notes

1 Erwin Panofsky, *Perspective as Symbolic Form* (Zone Books, 1926) p. 29.

2 John Berger, *Ways of Seeing* (London: British Broadcasting Corp., 1973, c1972) p. 16.

3 Jean Baudrillard, "The Precession of Simulacra" in *Simulacra and Simulacrum* (University of Michigan Press, 1994) pp.1-42.

4 The ancient theological use of the term simulacrum can clarify my deployment of it in this text. According to St. Bonaventure (1221-1274):

> "All created things of the sensible world lead the mind of the contemplator and wise man to eternal God... They are the shades, the resonances, the pictures of that efficient, exemplifying, and ordering art; they are the tracks, simulacra, and spectacles; they are divinely given signs set before us for the purpose of seeing God. They are examples, or rather simplifications set before our still unrefined and sense-oriented minds, so that by the sensible things which they see they might be transferred to the intelligible which they cannot see, as if by signs to the signified (tamquam per signa ad signata)." Quoted in David Freedberg, *The Power of Images; studies in the history and theory of response* (University of Chicago Press, 1989) p. 165.

Freedberg observes that in the passage by St. Bonaventure the anagogical view is beginning to collapse, since when in front of the image the ascent is instantaneous. We are with God the moment we see his exemplifications, for these are not mere traces of him, *vestigia*; they are *simulacra* – divinely given signs, it is true, but nevertheless real signs. I might add that a simulacrum like the one discussed in this paper trades its power to lead anagogically the meditator towards the divine with the power to fascinate. In St. Bonaventure's view, the simulacrum has a reference in the divine, while a simulacrum as discussed in this text and following the work of Jean Baudrillard is its own reference. Yet in both, the reference is unattainable because in the first case divine and in our case specular.

[5] The Gospel according to John 11:11.

[6] The Gospel according to John 11:38.

[7] The Gospel according to John 11:39.

[8] The Gospel according to John 11:43.

[9] The Gospel according to John 11:44.

[10] The Gospel according to Luke 7:11-17.

[11] The Gospel according to Matthew 9:18-26.

[12] The Gospel according to John 12:1-2.

[13] Resurrect: [Middle English, from Old French, from Late Latin resurrectio, resurrection-, from Latin resurrectus, past participle of resurgere, to rise again. See Resurge.]

[14] Kazantzakis, Nikos, (1951) *The Last Temptation of Christ,* translated by Osama Manzalgi as الإغواء الأخير للمسيح (Al Mada, Syria, 1995).

[15] Ibid. p. 516.

[16] Ibid. p. 539.

[17] Ibid. p. 569.

[18] Ibid. p. 570.

The Reconstruction of Jerusalem's Jewish Quarter: An Example of Politically-driven Heritage Planning

Simone Ricca

Simone Ricca is a researcher in the field of urban heritage and a practicing consultant and restoration architect. Ricca holds a PhD in Middle Eastern Politics from Exeter University (UK) and a master's degree in conservation from the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven in Belgium. He is the author of ***Inventing Jerusalem, the Israeli Reconstruction of the Jewish Quarter,*** *IB Tauris, London, 2007 (forthcoming).*

Since the early 1990s, Ricca has worked as a practicing architect, specializing in restoration works in Europe and in the Middle-East. He regularly collaborates with UNESCO and other international organizations in the conservation of cultural heritage.

I am pleased to have this opportunity to share with you my reflections regarding the underlying framework that directed the reconstruction of a large sector of the Old City of Jerusalem. As the subject is particularly sensitive from the political point of view, I would like to stress that the critical analytical approach I followed might be usefully applied also to other politically-driven plans in Europe and in the Arab countries. My concern to deal with Zionist thinking and planning does not imply ideological sympathy, but is instead an attempt to understand some of the underlying elements that are too often overlooked when discussing the fate of this highly contested urban space.

In my professional practice as a conservation architect collaborating with a Palestinian NGO, the Welfare Association, I have been personally involved in the restoration and revitalization of the Old City of Jerusalem. During the two years I spent in the almost impossible attempt to restore and conserve the architectural heritage of this unique city, while protecting and defending the rights of its Palestinian residents to live and dwell within the Old City walls, I was continuously confronted with the political dimension and significance of its architectural conservation.

Although I had been trained to analyze architectural and historic elements and to solve technical challenges such as humidity problems, physical stability, building materials, and so on, I lacked the knowledge of a political scientist. Indeed, before working in Jerusalem, I did not fully realize how far from being sufficient this technical background was, and how necessary an overall theoretical and political framework was in guiding and justifying technical and aesthetic choices. Recognizing those gaps in my

personal cultural development, I decided to undertake doctoral studies in Political Sciences to expand my perspective from its purely technical level to embrace more abstract and scientific aspects of thought.

The subject of today's presentation is the reconstruction of the Jewish Quarter of Jerusalem after the Israeli conquest in 1967. Yet, the real argument of this presentation, more than the project that developed in Jerusalem between 1967 and the mid-1980s, is the actual meaning of *heritage* and *urban restoration* and the implications of their political misuse. Through the example of Jerusalem, I will try to point out the hidden dimension behind what is often considered a purely technical activity for specialized professionals.

I will briefly introduce the Old City of Jerusalem and what is now known as its Jewish Quarter, with the support of maps and images. I will then detail the reconstruction plan implemented by the Israeli authorities after the 1967 Six-Day War, and propose for your consideration some general reflections on the significance of urban conservation and restoration. Finally, I will be pleased to answer to your questions and debate my ideas with my colleagues on today's panel.

Presentation of the Site

Jerusalem, which was meant to remain a *'corpus separatum'* according to the 1947 United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine, was divided into two halves after the 1948 war that followed the creation of the state of Israel. Between 1948 and 1967, West Jerusalem remained under Israeli control, while the eastern sector (including the Old City) came under Jordanian rule.

Following the 1967 war, Israel conquered and annexed the city and unilaterally declared it its capital. Although the international community did not recognize this unilateral act, Jerusalem since then has been, *de facto,* the Israeli capital.

In the years that followed, the Israelis developed a grandiose plan of development for the city, designed to adapt it to its new administrative and symbolic functions. They greatly enlarged its urban surface (from 10 km^2 to 100 km^2), creating a ring of suburban settlements around the city that were inhabited exclusively by Israeli Jews. (It is useful to remember that the entire area of the Old City is just less than one km^2 in size.) In a few years, the city grew from some 100,000 inhabitants to a million and spread over the surrounding hills.

The reconstruction of the Jewish Quarter was but a part, though the most symbolic and emotional part, of the overall plan implemented by the Israeli government and the Municipality of Jerusalem following the 1967 war. The political role the 'unified' capital was called to perform imposed its extensive growth over the rapid settlement of thousands of new Jewish residents in far away settlements; but these suburban settlements found their raison d'être only in relation to the symbolic sites of the Old City, the reconstructed Jewish Quarter, and the Wailing Wall, whose full appropriation allowed the extension of the religious and symbolic significance of the city to the new, remote city boundaries.

Immediately after the 1967conquest, even before the war was over, an entire neighborhood dating from the Middle Ages — the Moroccan Quarter — was razed to open a large square in front of the Wailing Wall.

Following the end of the hostilities, a team was charged with preparing an outline of the reconstruction plan of a large sector of the city around the original nucleus of the Jewish Quarter that had been damaged during the 1948 war and during the period of Jordanian rule, when its Jewish residents (about 2,500 before the war) were forced to leave and move to the city's Jewish sector.

According to the initial indications of the planning team in April 1968, 29 acres of urban land were expropriated; and in the following years, all the Palestinian residents living within this sector (both the pre-1948 residents and the postwar squatters and refugees that took shelter in the ruined areas of the ancient Jewish Quarter) were expelled. This area, much larger than the maximum extension of Jewish inhabited areas throughout the nineteenth century, included neighborhoods owned and inhabited by Palestinian Arabs and Armenians, Muslims, and Christians.

Indeed, the size of Jerusalem's original Jewish Quarter is difficult to define precisely, as it had continuously changed — reaching its maximum expansion in the second half of the nineteenth century and then shrinking again with the growth of the new city outside the walls in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The expropriated area, however, did not reflect any particular historic phase, but seemed simply designed to consolidate maximum territorial gain after the war. It included the original Jewish neighborhood, but was expanded to include also other neighborhoods that had traditionally been Muslim or Christian, with a more or less high presence of Jewish residents in certain periods; namely, the Moroccan Quarter, the al-Sharif Quarter, the Bab al-Silsileh Quarter, and Darj al-Tabouna, as well as several large compounds located in the Armenian quarter.

Of the over 700 buildings expropriated, only 105 had been Jewish-owned on the eve of the 1948 war; of the others, 111 were public buildings, 354 were private Islamic *waqf,* and the remaining 130 belonged to private owners. The 'reconstruction' process caused several thousand Palestinian residents and owners to be evicted from their homes, usually after heavy pressure and harassment.

In the following year, the main directives of the reconstruction work were defined. The new quarter was to become a 'Jewish only' area and Arabs were legally prevented from buying a house there, while a state-owned company, the Company for the Development and Reconstruction of the Jewish Quarter (CDRJQ), was created to implement the reconstruction plan.

The Reconstruction Plan

The team of the CDRJQ surveyed all the buildings within the expropriated perimeter and assessed whether the houses were to be restored or demolished. However, no specialized conservation architect was involved in this activity, and the criteria used to determine the fate of the buildings were not clearly stated. Indeed, the definition of what constituted a ruin was heavily influenced by the political and cultural framework that directed the reconstruction. Notably, the traditional fabric of the city was not considered important, and only some major structures were deemed worthy of restoration. This approach paved the way for a selective demolition of the neighborhood, which erased its original features far beyond the offences of war and time, leaving vast empty plots in the heart of the Old City. Of the densely built original



Fig 1 Old city with Jewish Quarter

Fig 2 Reconstruction in progress

Fig 3 Moroccan Quarter 1966

fabric, the planning team decided to keep only the street layout to conserve the 'spirit' of the area, while new constructions — all stone-faced in order to achieve an urban uniformity — were allowed. The original architecture of the area did not differ from that of the rest of the Old City: mainly two-level, simple stone houses with domes, with no noticeable differences between 'Arab' and 'Jewish' houses.

The projects, partially assigned to private architects under the coordination of the CDRJQ architectural team, were directly designed and implemented by the CDRJQ. The guidelines of the plan included:

- Creating a living neighborhood with a large presence of residential buildings;
- Digging of the soil to look for traces of the city's history;
- Creating archaeological and historical museums to present the history of the city and of the neighborhood;
- Creating religious institutions;
- Attempting to have a new mixed religious/secular Jewish population according to predefined criteria for the allocation of the restored flats.

The plan focused on three areas that were completely freed of their original buildings and planned anew: the Wailing Wall Plaza, the area around the ruins of the Hurva Synagogue, and a narrow corridor along the 'Street of Jews' that was rebaptized the 'Cardo.' From its very origin, the plan was not concerned with restoring the original buildings or with maintaining the previous population (neither the pre- and post-1948 Arab residents nor the pre-1948 Jewish ones). The plan's guidelines, on the contrary, foresaw the complete ethnic cleansing and gentrification of the area; it stressed the separation of the quarter from the rest of the Old City and supported the creation of modern houses within the area. The original owners were not looked for and had no priority in the purchase of the 'restored' houses.

Archaeology was meant to play an important and visible role. While Ottoman and Mamluk buildings, both ruined and still sound, were razed, remains from antiquity (both ancient, Roman, and Byzantine) were carefully excavated and partially presented under the new constructions, as these remains were essential in the overall operation, whose actual scope was the 'demonstration' of the Israeli historic and moral right to the city.

The reconstruction of the Jewish Quarter has often been praised by international critics as a highly successful example of urban rehabilitation. Anthony Tung, former Landmarks Preservation Commissioner in New York, recently defined it as: "one of the most progressive urban transformations of a historic cityscape... a model for the future in terms of architectural conservation and urban planning."[1] And the reconstruction plan carried out by the Israelis between 1967 and the mid-1980s has been described as an urban conservation plan aimed at restoring Jerusalem's urban fabric which, it was argued, had been heavily damaged by war and Jordanian rule.

However, even though the Jewish Quarter architecture offers some creative and interesting solutions — notably in its attempt to revitalize the traditional architectural concepts of central courtyard and roof terrace — it fails in its approach to restoration of the existing ancient structures. The large majority of the original buildings that were demolished to make room for archaeological excavations and new houses were undoubtedly poorly conceived and poorly built, the result of endless additions and

modifications more than precise design; yet, they managed to convey by their very chaotic appearance an image of civilizational continuity, which is lacking in the new structures that pretend genuineness and seek to resurrect an imagined past.

The urban transformations initiated by the June 1967 war were not only a purely technical enterprise, but on the contrary, participated in the overall campaign for the legitimation of Israeli rule over the city.

The new Jewish Quarter has played an extraordinarily important role in shaping the national and international images of the Israeli nation. The architectural and conservation choices that were applied in the reconstruction plan obeyed an underlying theoretical framework whose goal was the appropriation of the city and its urban fabric by the state of Israel.

The predominance of political elements over technical ones might be demonstrated by several indicators: the buildings themselves, with their modern architectural features meant to represent the new state and in the meantime the timeless Jewish presence in the land; the symbolic and political use of archaeology; the continuous financial and political support the plan has received from the highest sphere of the Israeli state throughout the fifteen years in which it developed; and the refusal of all international interference in the works.

Architecture played a role in the creation of a mythical image of the past. The rebuilt houses that constitute the renewed and enlarged Jewish Quarter are a conscious attempt to create a traditional Jewish old city, reborn from the ashes of the first century, both modern and eternal. The dream of the architects to create a 'Jewish' style and a Jewish architecture resulted in a relatively insignificant neo-orientalist style and in the quasi-mechanical refuse of the arch for the lintel (perceived as more Jewish and less Arab). Ancient-like stone details and Mediterranean-flavored cubic blocks faced in Jerusalem stone are meant to represent the continuity, while modern technology and rational planning are meant to manifest the achievements of the reborn Jewish state. The Jewish Quarter attempts to be, at the same time, a traditional and a modern one, witnessing both the rebirth of the state after 2,000 years and the eternal Jewish presence in the city. Indeed, alongside the new structures, archaeological sites dot the reconstructed neighborhood, affirming the intimate connection with antiquity, while the restored Sefardi synagogues (or any other ancient traces of the Jewish community's life in the city over the last 2,000 years) convey the message of continuity and endurance.

The invention of the Jewish Quarter constituted an essential element in the nation-building process, as this area was to serve as a showcase of the Israeli state and of its approach to history and heritage. It was not merely a modern quarter, nor just another Jewish settlement in the city; it was the actual incarnation of the state ideology. Demolishing the existing houses, excavating the soil looking for traces of an ancient past, and rebuilding new, modern houses upon the preserved ruins, was a physical manifestation of the Israeli desire to express a direct connection between the past, the present, and the future that constitutes the essence of the Zionist discourse.

The Jewish Quarter has played and continues to play an important role in promoting Jewish claims to the land at the international level by conveying the message of Israel's 'eternal right' to the city. The Israeli commitment to Jerusalem and the emotions stirred by the archaeological excavations in the Old City sent to the world an unequivocal



Fig 4 Jewish Quarter street

message affirming Israel's right of possession to and its 'enlightened' rule over Jerusalem.

The new Jewish Quarter is a densely inhabited Jewish neighborhood in the heart of the crowded Old City of Jerusalem. A Jewish 'island' in an Arab environment, it is living proof of the transformations caused by the Six-Day War. However, the specificity of this urban transformation is such that the almost complete redevelopment of the area has been presented not as the result of the new political situation brought about by military conquest, but rather as proof of the immutable and historic Jewish presence and of Israel's commitment to safeguard the historic heritage of the city.

Though the expulsion of residents, widespread demolitions and even the creation of new neighborhoods within historic cores are not an Israeli proclivity — on the contrary, they constitute a relatively common, if regrettable, pattern worldwide — nowhere else are these actions portrayed as being part of a "restoration" plan. In the context of Jerusalem's Jewish Quarter project, this term should be understood as the "restoration of Jewish sovereignty," and not be confused with the altogether different concept of urban restoration in its architectural significance, i.e., a plan meant to protect and reuse the existing urban fabric.

Heritage Planning

The key for the analysis of this plan, I suggest, lies in the very concept of heritage. In the last decade, scholars like Lowenthal, Fowler, Tunbridge and Ashworth, and others, have put forward a revolutionary approach that shakes most of the traditionally accepted truths upon which planners, architects, and conservation bodies base their practical activities. Ashworth and Tunbridge have introduced the provocative idea that heritage might actually be created as an economic good, of utility to the market. This concept, which reverses the traditional approach — considering that there is a given, limited amount of original past 'products' available to be conserved and exhibited — is the key element of a new discipline that they have dubbed "heritage planning."

Not only is the 'past' not an immutable slab of time waiting to be revealed; it can actually be manipulated.[2] In fact,

> "All heritage is someone's heritage and that someone determines that it exists. It is thus a product of the present, purposefully developed in response to current needs or demands for it, and shaped by those requirements."[3]

Indeed, the architectural landscape of the city of Jerusalem, where only rare Jewish constructions predated the nineteenth century, contradicted the Israeli nationalist vision portraying Jerusalem as the age-old center of a vibrant Jewish community. To adapt the city to its image within the dominant discourse of Zionism, the urban physical fabric had to be transformed.

The hypothesis of this paper is that the reconstruction plan of the Jewish Quarter embodies the will of appropriation of this 'alien' Arab city, which was to be reshaped both physically and symbolically to become the 'eternal Jewish capital.' Once more, I will refer to Tunbridge and Ashworth:

> "Not only does the past shape the sense of locality upon which rests the uniqueness of local place identities, but also the reverse process can now be conceived; namely that places can be structured or planned deliberately to create such associations with a past, for various purposes, and that possibility is the core of the link between heritage and physical planning and place management in what has been defined as the practice of 'heritage planning'."[4]

Indeed, the difference between history and heritage is fundamental, and the nationalistic dimension of the latter is unavoidable. Heritage is a partisan perversion, the past manipulated for some present aim (as acutely observed by David Lowenthal).[5]

The conscious use of heritage as a nation-making, identity-stressing tool that determined the guidelines of the Jewish Quarter reconstruction is particularly obvious in the didactic apparatus of the many exhibition areas visible within the neighborhood.

This process is still in the making, as most of the neighborhood's museums are now getting revamped. To the Citadel/Tower of the David Museum — the first example of a museum without original artifacts in the city — whose ideological portrait of the city's history has been analyzed by Meron Benvenisti,[6] is now added the newly inaugurated Davidson Virtual Center, where a high-tech 3D computer graphic show presents Jerusalem during the first century, following the path of a Jewish pilgrim visiting the city.

This highly impressive and archaeologically accurate reconstruction conveys an extraordinarily strong political statement, reaffirming the importance of the site for the Jews, while electronically erasing all successive historic phases from the scene. To underline the connection between first-century Jerusalem and the reconstructed Jewish Quarter, the graphic images of the ancient houses around the city present a surprising similarity to the contemporary houses of the neighborhood.

It may be interesting to consider the words of David Uzzell on the significance of such museums:

> "The ultimate logic of this type of museum is the museum that has no collection. The 'Heritage Centre' museums are then not only objects of consumption, but also units of production. They produce what has been defined as: Spectacle, Hyperreality, Historicism. Heritage is gradually effacing History, by substituting an image of the past for its reality."[7]

The Jewish Quarter reconstruction, therefore, is more than an example of urban restoration; it might be better defined as a highly successful example of heritage planning, capable of superimposing over a multi-layered, multi-ethnic, and multi-religious millennary history, a new mono-cultural reading.

Walking through the renewed Jewish Quarter, the visitor should always bear in mind

> "...not only the 'Whose heritage is this?' question, but also the insistent 'Who is disinherited here and what are the consequences of such dispossession'?"[8]

Notes

1 Anthony M. Tung, *Preserving the World's Great Cities* (New York: Clarkson Potter Publishers, 2001) pp. 420 and 428.

2 Cf. Peter Fowler, *The Past in Contemporary Society: Then, Now,* (London: Routledge, 1992).

3 J.E. Tunbridge and G.J. Ashworth, *Dissonant Heritage,* (Chichester, England: Wiley and Sons, 1996), p. 6.

4 Tunbridge and Ashworth, op. cit., p. 24.

5 Cf. David Lowenthal, *The Heritage Crusade and the Spoils of History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 102.

6 Meron Benvenisti, *The City of Stone,* (Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 1996).

7 David Uzzell, "The Natural and Built Environment," in Uzzell, D.L., ed., *Heritage Interpretation,* Vol. I, (London and New York: Belhaven Press, 1989).

8 Tunbridge and Ashworth, op. cit., p. xi.

Comments on Session III

Sonja Mejcher-Atassi

The three papers by Simone Ricca, Walid Sadek, and Ayfer Bartu Candan take us from Jerusalem to Beirut and Istanbul. At first sight, the differences between the cities and their respective heritages seem striking. In Jerusalem, says Ricca, Zionist thinking and the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict have played a decisive role in the reconstruction of the old city. In Beirut, holds Sadek, the civil war has advanced the quest for a mythical past, with Martyr's Square as its city center while the recent past is cut out. In Istanbul, as Candan shows, Turkish, European, and Levantine identities contest each other in the neighborhood of Pera/Beyoğlu, as we negotiate between the local and the global and try to find out "who we are/who we were." At a closer look, however, there are many similarities. First and foremost is the political dimension. As all three papers bring to the fore, heritage does not exist in itself. Closely linked to our present, it is continuously redefined by political concerns.

To open the discussion, I would like to ask whether the political use — or better, misuse — of heritage, as exemplified in Jerusalem, Beirut, and Istanbul, can be countered and if yes, how? What kind of practices, institutions, mechanisms, etc. do we need to arrive at a heritage encompassing our lived experience that is the recent past?



IV Heritage in Practice

Inherited Modernism

George Arbid

George Arbid, assistant professor at the American University of Beirut Department of Architecture and Design, was born in 1961. He graduated from the Académie Libanaise des Beaux-Arts, where he taught history and theory of architecture along with architectural design. He was a Fulbright visiting scholar at the MIT History, Theory and Criticism program, and holds a doctor of design degree from Harvard University; thesis title, ***Practicing Modernism in Beirut, Achitecture in Lebanon, 1946-1970.*** *Arbid practices architecture in Beirut. His current research interests cover modern and contemporary architecture in Lebanon and the region.*

As a practicing architect involved in teaching and research, I would like to think that what is inherited is still living in a way. Inherited modernism is, in that sense, not only a body of architecture, but an inherited tradition or praxis of making architecture. In answer to Walid Sadek's paper of last week for the City Debates, a call for the preservation of modern architecture would not rely on the observation that it is more alive than its elders or in a lesser state of decomposition; rather, it presents the opportunity to potentially use the recent past to stitch the fabric of our common history, and make some sense out of its traces. What Walid called the "here and now" should be reinstated, yet I hope it can happen without denying the "here and then." More than for architectural style itself, modernism is needed as a cathartic stand in many fields of our culture and life. After the Lebanese war, a period that was greatly fueled by certainties or positions that leave no room for doubt or misapprehensions on history and identity, let us hope, as Marshall Berman tells us, that "the sparsest and most abstract modes of modernism can set us free from lies and give us space to make a fresh start, so we can at least try to construct personal and public lives we won't have to be ashamed of."[1]

A question we should start with is: what are the "here and now" in architecture? I believe it is useful to include local contemporary production in the teaching of architecture, and more generally, to include modern architecture in the reflection on urban heritage in a country inclined to look to ancient times when confronted with new beginnings. If we consider that what we today call tradition is actually modernity compiled across time, we could refute the accepted traditional versus modern antinomy.

Modern architecture in Lebanon, superficially and hastily presented as alien to tradition, is actually the normal development of a practice of rationalism and openness to various beneficial influences.

> "Lebanese architecture built without architects and without artifice, with its pureness and naivety, is the best proof that mind and reason are the principal sources of beauty. It is erroneous to ascribe this pureness and naivety — in total harmony with the function of the building — to the whims of sentiment or the caprices of imagination. Needs, climate, materials, tools, and soil all contributed to determine this brilliant form, free of frivolity and ornamentation. Nothing is closer to beauty than this effort that does not force adornment and that ensures both our spiritual and material needs."
> (Antoine Tabet, 1947, in *Fann Al'amar Allubnani*[2] [Lebanese architecture])

I will start with a survey of modern architecture in Lebanon, following a more or less chronological logic and including some disfigured and demolished buildings. The presentation will end with a discussion of the potential ways to document, analyze, and learn from recent architectural production, possibly leading to the implementation of protection and preservation policies.

Obviously, this is not a country keen on documenting, preserving, and protecting. The law covering the protection of historic monuments and antiquities is the Law of 7 November 1933 (French Mandate). There is currently a new law in preparation.There is need for an institute of architecture in Beirut, dedicated to the promotion of architecture through the encouragement of competitions, awards, exhibitions, publications, debates, lectures, and the gathering of archival collections. Along with the existing institutions that promote the protection of traditional architecture — such as APSAD, the "Association pour la Protection des Sites et Anciennes Demeures" and The National Heritage Foundation — it is hoped that such a center would fend off the accepted notion that ancient heritage is the "self," and modernity is alien and "other."

Current Architecture Culture

The other concern is about the present condition of architectural practice, in which a regained nationalism can bring with it a superficial search for Lebanese identity in architecture, quickly concocted in a pastiche of traditional forms. There is, now, a return of the repressed romanticism, nostalgia, and Lebanonization of architecture.

In the pastiche of tradition, the Lebanese situation is not unique, and there is a trend to consider the past as a source from which to select, instead of its being a continuum and context of creative work. As Juhani Pallasmaa argues, "Instead of being accepted as an autonomous process, culture has been turned into an object of deliberate fabrication."[3] In Lebanon, the invigorating impulse that the successive modernisms have given to tradition is replaced today with a frozen use of architectural elements taken out of their context by the postmodern architect. This covers both a pastiche of tradition and a pastiche of modernism. In a time when mimetic exercises can only testify to the loss of tradition, we may well be in a situation where an appropriate resisting position

would ironically be one that refrains from the recourse to local architectural forms.

While postmodernism had the benefit of opening up theoretical grounds that in some ways helped adjust modernism, when applied in countries that had not assimilated modernity in its full course, it did more damage than truncated modernism, because it often "threw the baby out with the bathwater." Thus, it lost the basic gains attributable to modern architecture. In the post-colonial world, modernism has a more challenging task. Rather than passively receiving architectural trends as given, or even less by resisting them blindly, the challenge resides in being constantly vigilant and adjusting to the quickly evolving conditions of the economy and practice, and last but not least, to the constantly evolving ethos of each particular situation. Hobsbawn rightly observes that "tradition and pragmatic conventions are inversely related." In an ideal model, pragmatism should lead to a situated architecture which, while it is connected to the evolving market, still allows for a continuity that stems from continuous factors.

I hope that so far we have come to a full circle with the "here and now."

We would like to think of the built environment as the context of urban living, and therefore accept the fatality of change and adaptive reuse. At the same time, we ought to preserve the essential qualities of buildings that acquired a certain nature of being, whether embedded in the original design or in successive adaptations and transformations. The importance of certain buildings does not always reside in the esthetic quality they may have. It could reside in how they were lived in by the people, in their past activities, in what was coined as intangible heritage, and so on. (The Grand Theatre: "During reconstruction, not only the dwellers but the buildings themselves were evicted from the buildings," observed Oliver Kögler in the first City Debates session. In other words, the facades of buildings were reduced to stage sets).

It is hard and may be useless to scientifically define what heritage is. It is probably more useful to define what is meaningful and instrumental for us and how we envisage our present and future. In this regard, we could think of architecture as a depository of memory and history. Construed as such, modern architectural heritage would become the most recent manifestation of a vibrant tradition.

Notes

1 For an insightful account of modernism as a critical tool, see Marshall Berman, "Why Modernism Still Matters," in *Modernity and Identity,* eds. Scott Lash and Jonathan Friedman (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), pp. 33-58.

2 Tabet, Antoine, "Fann Al'amar Allubnani." [Lebanese architecture]. Lecture addressed at the Cénacle libanais on 25 April 1947 and published in *Les conférences du Cénacle,* 10 November 1947, pp. 412-422.

3 Juhani Pallasmaa, "Tradition and Modernity," in AR 100, *The Recovery of the Modern,* ed. Michael Spens (Oxford: Butterworth, 1996), p. 137

Economic and Cultural Constraints of Conservation: Case Studies from Aleppo, Syria, and Shibam, Yemen

Omar Abdulaziz Hallaj

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Many of the themes developed in this year's City Debates series are related to the difficulties being faced in trying to save the urban heritage in the region. One continuous theme that emerges, in many instances, is the difficulty to overcome the obsolescence in economic terms of private heritage assets. Often, individual stakeholders are portrayed as behaving out of greed, ignorance, or both. The intention in this paper is to explain the economic and socio-cultural constraints that influence the decisions of individual stakeholders. By understanding some of these constraints, one can begin to perceive the implication of public intervention in heritage conservation on this decision process.

Two case studies are brought to light in examining the differing approaches to the question of the public role in the private urban heritage domain. I personally have been engaged in both cases, and the discussions presented here have reflected some of the ethical questions I faced in my professional work. Some questions need to be asked. Why do we subsidize private stakeholders? Who are these stakeholders? What is the impact of our subsidy on the actual preservation of heritage? The two case studies of Aleppo in Syria and Shibam in Yemen are used to address and explore these questions. The answers to the questions are often specific to the sites and their conditions. However, I hope the methodological approach may be of use in understanding the complexity of the issues at large.

An Economic Model for the Valuation of Private Heritage Assets

To understand the economic rationale of the decision-making process of a private stakeholder, I propose an economic model that would put in context the social, as well as the economic, constraints of the process on one chart. However, first I would like to discuss a rather simplistic ideal model for the preservation of a heritage asset. On a time-value chart, we can assume that the use-value of the asset remains constant (the owner is using the place to live in or work in). However, the owner will have to preserve his property every time the property starts to deteriorate, in the hope that the restoration will maintain the use-value of the property.

A building can not assume a greater market value than its social value. As is evident in the chart, at some point the curve would dip below its use value, and the owner would keep using the asset out of social obligation even when he/she can no longer expect profit in case the asset was sold. At this phase, the use is occurring out of social obligation, not out of economic profit (not wanting to leave the old neighborhood, property having multiple ownerships due to inheritance laws, and so forth). At some point, the devaluation would bring the actual value of the asset to near zero. The value of the land would overcome the value of the assets on it. It becomes possible likely then to have the asset demolished and redeveloped to initiate a new cycle of valuation and devaluation.

Urban Cycles of Valuation and Devaluation

The cycle described above is further emphasized in an urban context, where whole neighborhoods or cities go through this cycle. The image of urban tradition as something fixed and stable is an idealized and largely historically inaccurate romantic notion. Unfortunately, whenever we talk of preservation of urban heritage, we try to restore the historical forces of these areas to past glories that never simultaneously existed before. By looking at the Aleppo case, one is able to understand this process in greater detail.

Although Aleppo is a very old city, we have little actual physical evidence of its urban conditions prior to the Ayoubid period. Though the trajectories of some streets are known to us from the earlier periods, the actual physical evidence of those periods is almost entirely lost. From the Ayoubid period, we retain a few monuments that were mostly concentrated in the western intramural part of the city. The city was severely damaged after the Mongol invasion of 1260, to the point that no monument was rebuilt in the city for forty years to come. If we then trace the development of major public monuments that were built in Aleppo over forty-year intervals, we can see a clear shifting of attention from one zone of the city to the next.

In other words, one can see how certain neighborhoods were devalued and then went through a period of intense building, which usually indicates major urban investments. One can take any particular neighborhood in case of point. For instance, in the Roman period, the main *maydan* of the city to be devalued at some point then becomes the prostitution and wine-drinking quarters in the late Byzantine period,



Fig 1 **Optimum valuation cycle for continued preservation**

Should the conditions remain relatively stable, the ideal situation would be for the rehabilitation to take place periodically to insure a sustained preservation of the asset in the future. However, this ideal model ignores urban conditions in general. It would be totally naïve to assume that this model has ever applied. As we shall see in the case of Aleppo in greater detail below, the idealist image of stable "traditional" conditions were seldom applicable. In reality, the model is actually considerably more complex. In reality, the individual stakeholder acts within market conditions that change and vary over time. Owners of urban property often maintain their homes with an eye to expected profit from home sales or alternatively by social obligations and constraints.



Fig 2 **Valuation / devaluation life-cycle of a heritage building**

An individual owner would spend resources (shaded area under curve) only with the expectations of making more profit later (shaded area over curve). However, as the finality of building materials imposes a certain physical decay, the building would never be rehabilitated to original status; over time the overall curve would tend to decline. The upper limits of this curve are determined by the social value (a combination of the general status of the neighborhood, building style, and other social factors).



Fig 3 Distribution of the monuments at the end of the Ayoubid period; the main mosque was the center of the town.

Fig 4 Forty years of the Mongol invasion, the citadel becomes the center of the city and the monuments start shifting westwards.



Fig 5 The old *maydan* area is slowly surrounded by monuments that ushered a new wave of urbanization. A periphery neighborhood is gentrified.

and sort of almost emptied out for military practices in the Ayoubid period. Then, because it is on the fringe of the city, it returns again to be the drinking and prostitution neighborhood. To control the situation in the Mamluk period, the governors of the city started building public buildings around it. Several mosques were build on the perimeter of the neighborhood, having as their main orientation the encircling of the area, to the point of deviating considerably from the main southern direction of Mecca. Various texts from the period indicate that the notables were asked to stay around those mosques to control social behavior. Eventually, the neighborhood became dotted with big mansions and many of the notable families moved there. The area became famous as a place for the wealthy of the city.

This movement of investment from one neighborhood of the city to the next left a distinguishing mark on the urban fabric of the city. Every neighborhood is dotted with some large plots surrounded by smaller ones. No specific area of the city has a particular concentration of large plots or small plots (except the fringe neighborhoods that came about at the end of the Ottoman period). There is a certain structure to the city, where in a sense every part of the city becomes at some point valued and at some points not very valued.

What makes this issue important to us today? Because in many ways the last time this happened, Aleppo was growing beyond the walls and people very normally continued in the same pattern; they moved from the notable area in the west of the city to the next area, and the cycle that caused the obsoleteness of the old city was a "traditional" one, if one could ascribe to it as such. The old city became devalued and had little real estate value beyond the activities of the main market. Those who continued to live in the old city did so for lack of other alternatives. If we look back at the diagram of the valuation cycle, we can say they continued to live there as a result of social obligation.

Rehabilitation through Public Investment

The Case of Aleppo

The project for the rehabilitation of the old city of Aleppo is well published by now, and I do not intend to repeat what had been said about it. What is mostly of interest here is to show how the rehabilitation of the old city of Aleppo has tackled the issue of urban economics.

From the outset, the project (mostly a German-Syrian cooperation effort with financial subsidies from other donors) was set to preserve a certain vision of the old city of Aleppo not as a national symbol but as a living space. In other words, the emphasis was on creating mechanisms to demonstrate the feasibility of preserving the old city and then to insure that the institutional structures would be in place to continue the work. The early economic studies carried on by the project were mostly at the level of defining the economic need for the public and private investments to insure its long-term sustainability. At that early stage, little attention was given as to how the financing would be generated. A general perception prevailed that the provision of the public infrastructure and the public commitment to the preservation of public space would set, once and for all, the status of the old city as a historical zone; this would assure investors that their investments were safe and would encourage the private sector, in turn, to invest in preserving its private assets. Also, by providing technical solutions for

the rehabilitation work, the cost of restoration would be reduced and the preservation would become affordable.

A basic model was devised to estimate the level of public expenditures needed. About 25 percent of the total bill for rehabilitation was thought to be the public contribution to the process. This would mainly be the cost of rehabilitating the infrastructure and public monuments. As for the cost of rehabilitating private properties, businesses, and monuments, it would be born by the private sector. During this early stage, it was thought that assistance to the private sector would be akin to transferring public goods to private hands. Only the poorest and most endangered houses were assisted by the project through a housing fund. Indeed, slowly the level of investment in the old city on the part of public institutions almost quadrupled, but it is still short from reaching the 25 percent estimated cost of the rehabilitation bill.

The Evolution of New Consumption Patterns

Supply-Side Subsidies

Being short on funds, resources, skills, and institutional capacities, the project concentrated on three action areas at first and then later expanded them to two more. This led to an increase in public funding in concentrated areas, and eventually to an uneven valuation of urban space in these areas. The net result was that property values in these areas went up (though they were still very much influenced by the general fluctuations in the real estate market in the city at large). Over a short period of time, this caused many owners in the pilot areas to refrain from further investing in maintaining their properties and investing instead in consolidating their properties (buying out the shares of co-owners). The overhauling of the entire's infrastructure was not matched by a capacity of the local residents to pay their share of the bill. However, other investors moved into the areas to take advantage of improved public access, and better infrastructure provided for the project's intervention and subsequent public spending. It is perhaps too early to ascribe a gentrification label to the process, as the majority of the residents are still the original inhabitants in these areas. However, core pockets in these neighborhoods are being emptied either by tourist-oriented facilities or by speculators (as opposed to changes in property ownership in non-priority areas that remained mostly as local transactions). In turn, these areas saw the highest number of applications for restoration (often accompanied by title of transfer of property). In short, the main economic impact of the project was positive for the preservation of the architectural heritage, but not for the preservation of the social fabric per se.

An awareness of sort has been created with the residents of the old city, mainly that having a listed property is no longer congruent with a denial of development right, but is an opportunity to obtain higher market values. A new language has emerged among the realtors as to the description of property to be offered to clients, with a terminology borrowed from the technical terms used by the staff of the old city project. Potential uses are listed in terms of tourist facilities, services, and spaces of private or public entertainment rather than in terms of workshops, warehouses, and shops.

The project has developed a support system (revolving loans) for house rehabilitation. The housing fund enabled several hundred houses to be restored

throughout the old city. A post-occupancy survey indicated that the overwhelming majority of recipients stayed in their houses and did not sell or change land uses. The only problem with that system is that the distribution of these houses was in the city at large and failed to create a counter impact to the localized pilot investment by the municipality for the development of public space and infrastructure work.

The experience of the housing fund strongly indicates that supply-side state intervention leads to accelerated private land speculation (with a visible side effect of increased investment in restoration of heritage assets), yet it contributes to the breaking down of social networks. On the one hand, demand-driven subsidies show slower results of preserving important heritage assets, but have a positive impact on consolidating communities. This conclusion comes as no surprise to observers of the Syrian macro-economic bias to support the supply side at the expense of the demand side. The supply side is easier to administer; it can be justified in terms of public spending and it has a visible effect on the role of the state. The demand-side support is piecemeal, hard to administer, and is difficult to justify in terms of public spending. In reference to the graph in Figure 1, supply-side spending is an attempt at raising the level of the social curve to encourage the private sector to raise its spending. The demand-side support is an attempt to top the spending by the private sector to rise to a sustainable valuation/devaluation cycle.

In theory, a mixture of supply-side and demand-side subsidies is needed in the process of urban rehabilitation. However, despite the best efforts of the project in Aleppo, the supply-side interventions are at the range of 100 times the order of the demand-side subsidies.

The Alternative Modes of Tradition and Modernity

The Case of Shibam

Shibam, in contrast to Aleppo, is a small site confined topographically and geographically to a small plot of about 8.1 hectares. It contains about 500 buildings and its economic base is more rural than urban. However, it has not witnessed the large cycles of devaluation/valuation known by Aleppo. The cycle takes place mostly on the level of individual buildings rather than on the level of neighborhoods, and the city as a whole has undergone long-term cycles of valuation and devaluation. The last cycle was seriously affected by State policies under the socialist system (1967-1990). The site was perceived by the State as a symbol of feudal power and was intentionally subjected to devaluation through expropriations and persecution of large property owners.

However, as the State was searching for candidate sites to be listed in the World Heritage list, the choice of Shibam seemed a most likely candidate, and it received the blessing of the international experts who participated in the process. The symbolic value of Shibam changed overnight on the level of national discourse, though not necessarily on the level of public investment.

At the time of its inclusion on the Heritage list, Shibam and its surrounding were still in what could be described by experts as a traditional setting. The main economic activities were agriculture and small-scale commerce and crafts. Yet what seemed like

a traditional setting to many was actually a cultural environment already in the midst of a major transformation since the 1920s and 1930s. The cast system defining social rights and obligations was being challenged, along with it the value system used by the community to negotiate social conflict. Mainly challenged was the position of the upper echelon of the Sadah cast hierarchy (those claiming descent from the Prophet Mohammed, who had acted as mediators in tribal conflicts and accumulated their wealth and status as custodians of religious cults practiced in the region, a mixture of classical Shafii tradition with mystic Sufi practices). The challengers were members of the merchant cast who had made their fortunes in southeast Asia and who were seeking to establish their new social position. Both cultural trends were in stark contrast to the socialist ideology then propagated by the State.

The pace of modernization that followed was more visible on a social scale than on the ground. Modern infrastructure and amenities were not affordable by the meagre resources of the State, and to a great extent did not pick up till a few years ago. Yet the value systems operating were already in great turmoil, and in more recent years after the union between north and south Yemen and the abolishment of the old socialist system in the south, new realities began to appear on the ground. The State played a more proactive role in advancing modern infrastructure and amenities in the area, but cultural values took a back seat. The State's attempt to create a language of unity in the country also had to buy local loyalty, though not in interfering with local cultural conflicts and debates. The process was dubbed by the State as a process of decentralization.

The net result was the rapid transformation of the landscape around Shibam, but with a regression of cultural values on the part of the community towards imaginary pasts. These pasts (whichever version promoted by whichever group) were meant to provide a stable and meaningful ground for their adherents to establish firm identities to face a rapidly changing world. Each of the two main ideologies that Shibam is listed as "heritage site" was an opportunity to use heritage as a tool to promote their cause, albeit in different ways.

However, the attempt by the State to remove its hand from cultural conflicts and to concentrate on "development issues" does not mean that the State is not involved in the negotiation over the valuation of heritage assets. The heritage of Hadhramawt, like other parts of Yemen, is promoted as a national symbol and is a unifying emblem for a nation that is seeking to promote itself as a cultural tourism destination. The State, however, has little actual resources to develop a meaningful strategy for preservation. Moreover, its efforts for preservation often run contrary to other interests of providing needed infrastructure (sometimes to buy political loyalty rather than for development purposes). The end result is mixed messages by the State as to the value of preservation.

Social Valuation of the Signifier

Heritage in Shibam then becomes a deeply, though not overtly, contested signifier among the various stakeholders. On a surface level, there is solid common agreement that it must be preserved and protected (and lived in). However, lest we mistake heritage with urban heritage, the signifier of heritage in Shibam implies a much broader signification field than urban heritage. It is both the tangible and the intangible realms of heritage preservation that feature in the discourse on preservation

in Shibam. Indeed, some of the most effective breakthroughs in opening the field for discussion were efforts to preserve and to promote the intangible heritage of the city.

Yet, on a deeper level, a signifier remains a contested vessel for projecting various attitudes and value systems. In the case of Shibam, the range of uses reflects many of the contradictions embedded in the conflict between the local and the modern national state, the competition over social status and resources and economic value.

The inability of the State in the initial phases to inject funding into the site has left its intervention mostly on a symbolic level. In the new administrative system of Yemen after unification, Shibam was to follow its archrival town of Seiyun. These two factors combined meant that the residents of Shibam (regardless of their degree of loyalty to the national government or their background) were indifferent to the symbolic valuation of the state of their town. In some cases, this indifference was followed by active resistance on the part of some resident groups. Historical manuscripts are moved in secret from one household to another to avoid having to deliver them to the responsible authorities for preservation; a group of citizens organizes a petition to prevent the Seiyun Museum from taking charge of the dilapidated wooden minbar of the Shibam mosque; and private citizens gather and publicize actual government spending and compare it to spending by government in other areas and for other purposes.

A Critical Mass of Users

Demand Side Subsidies

If we go back to the graph in Figure1, we can see that the social curve has been maintained at a relatively high level. Despite the physical deterioration of the housing stock in the city, the part of the curve where preservation takes place because of social obligation is still high. In this case, the government intervention to prevent modern construction did not have the same impact as in Aleppo. The curve was not allowed to decline to total obsolescence, because of a minimum social obligation on the part of the residents to keep maintaining their homes.

In Shibam, a critical mass of users capable of and willing to intervene to preserve what they perceive as their heritage has enabled a different type of official intervention in the site. The international donor (German Technical Cooperation, the same as in Aleppo) was able to forge agreements with national institutions to provide demand-side subsidies to house owners willing to preserve their homes. The level of subsidy was calculated on the basis of covering the extra cost involved in restoring a house to historically acceptable standards, as compared to basic maintenance had the house not been historically designated.

In other words, the national institutions accepted a premium position that imposing a historic designation on a site is indirectly imposing a tax on its residents. The subsidies provided are, therefore, to help offset this indirect tax. At a first phase, the concerned national institutions accepted to advance direct national funds for the purpose, but over the long run a special tourism fee is to be imposed to help sustain the operation into the future.



Fig 6 **Valuation / devaluation life cycle of a heritage building**

Government spending aims at covering the gap between the actual exchange value of the heritage asset (the reasonable rate of return under market conditions) and the actual cost of preserving the asset up to historically accepted standards. In the case of supply-side intervention (Aleppo), the State aimed at raising the curve by directly working on improving the image of the area; funds were mostly dispersed to location specific projects, and funds were spent through public contracts according to priorities defined by the State. The result was that the priority areas improved their image, but not the capacity of their residents to fill the gap. This was done by outside speculators in an early form of economic, if not social, gentrification. On the other hand, the demand-side subsidy provided by the State (Shibam) was dispersed directly to end users in small increments to match their capacity to pay. Demand-side subsidies require a critical mass of local interest, are not site specific, and require an already high social valuation curve.

In Conclusion

The Evolution of the Common Denominator

In both the cases of Aleppo and Shibam, a certain language emerged as a result of intense public intervention in the site. The residents, at first skeptical of the newly developed government interest in their city, quickly learn they can plead their cases and negotiate certain advantages if they master the official discourse used by the technical staff of the official institutions. In Shibam, special attention was made to insure that the language used by the technical staff was as close as possible to the common use of the residents. Yet in both cases, the system of providing funds involve using standard measurements, quantity surveys, and pricing that are alien to the local traditions.

At first, this language seems to be at odd not with the traditional system per se, but with the modern market-oriented system used in non-historically designated areas. However, residents soon understand that benefiting from public spending requires mastering a new language. Contractors will be most resistant to the new approach, because this would mean providing non-standard services. However, soon a few contractors will emerge who will have understood and mastered the new system. Residents will teach each other how to accommodate to the new system and its requirements.

A common language will be negotiated. The official system will not be accepted at face value. The technicians will have to change their discourse and accommodate partially to the market requirements. At the end, a common language will be forged, a mix of official terms, local dialect, market availability, and so forth. The closer this language is to the common understanding of local users, the more likely they are to use it. In all cases, it is the direct negotiation over economic value that will work as a catalyst for the emergence of a new social consensus.

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Comments on Session IV

Abdulhay Sayed

As I listened, a number of observations came to mind, and I'd like to touch upon two sets of observations, if I may.

The first set relates to the way in which the inhabitants and the daily users, or the people embedded in the place, are engaged with their urban heritage. One observes a certain gap, on the one hand, between the way in which the inhabitants represent their own (historic) places which make an integral part of their daily lives, and on the other hand, the romanticized image that local and foreign conservationists project on such places.

Even when conservationists take into account the inhabitants' expectations, one is entitled to ask whether those expectations are constructed more by the conservationists than they are by expressing the real needs and aspirations of the population.

Ultimately, it would seem that a balance has to be found between the real aspirations of the people in the place and the projections of the conservationists about the place.

This brings me to my second set of observations. It concerns the objective interrelations between the inhabited urban heritage in our cities and the traditions of the people living and using the place.

One wonders to what extent the built environment of the urban heritage in our cities contributes in perpetuating traditional systems of dispositions, to use Bourdieu's term, which tend to structure socio-economic relations in forms such as patriarchy or gender segregation.

Clearly, the task of the conservationist is not easy. To what extent is he or she able to engage with the inhabitants in a process that can allow them to rethink their relations within their own space in emancipatory ways? One asks whether the conservationist can remain faithful to the need to consider the real aspirations of the inhabitants without slipping into missionary idealism or anthropological passivism.